

'Economically Hot, Politically Cold' The chilling effect of nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations

Phil Deans
Director, Contemporary China Institute
SOAS, University of London
and
Professor of International Affairs
Temple University, Japan Campus

【SLIDE 1】

Something personal

- Thank-you
- A personal view or the relationship
- My role as a 'concerned outsider'
- My dislike/distrust of nationalism (and, often, of nationalists)

【SLIDE 2】

Liberal views

- The belief that interaction, and especially economic exchange, leads to improved political or social relations is deeply embedded in western liberal traditions and can be identified in both Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant
- From these roots it is manifested in liberal theories of international relations, especially in functionalism/neo-functionalism and in some variants of the 'democratic peace' hypothesis

【SLIDE 3】

A liberal view:

"There are always political issues, but fundamentally people look to their economic interests, which normally drive relationships. That is why people want to keep the current economic framework in place. Trade, capital flows, currencies will produce growth and growth will lead to more trade. More trade will lead to more growth... and so on."

US Treasury Secretary John Snow referring directly to Sino-Japanese relations (2004)

【SLIDE 4】

However...


- Nationalist narratives in the PRC and in Japan present a direct challenge to rational liberal assumptions
- These narratives also challenge the rationality which underpins realist assumptions concerning the pursuit of self-interest in international society
- Understanding ideas and ideologies is as important as understanding material issues when trying to explain Sino-Japanese relations

【SLIDE 5】


Overview

- Economically hot: the evidence
- Politically cold: the evidence
- Cold: the causes
 - Japanese revisionist nationalism
 - Chinese reactionary nationalism
 - From social class to nation
- Cases
 - The Yasukuni Shrine Controversy
 - The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute
 - The Taiwan Question


【SLIDE 6】




【SLIDE 7】




【SLIDE 8】




【SLIDE 9】



【SLIDE 11】



【SLIDE 10】



【SLIDE 12】

COLD –the evidence

- The main factor cited here is normally the cancellation of highest level contact between Japan and the PRC under PM Koizumi
- Government statements and pronouncements and opinion formers commentary
- Changing public opinion as measured in polls
- Media coverage and internet use
- The 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China




【SLIDE 13】

Cold: the causes

- Trade imbalances and the 'Chinese economic threat'?
- Military spending – perception, misperception and the security dilemma
- Changing nationalist dynamics
 - Revisionist nationalism in Japan confronts reactionary nationalism in China
 - Elite antagonism
 - Popular antipathy

【SLIDE 15】



【SLIDE 14】

MILITARY SPENDING (all figures CIA)

Rank	Country	Military expenditures (US\$)	Date of Information
1	United States	\$518,100,000,000	2005 est
2	China	\$81,470,000,000	2005 est
3	France	\$45,000,000,000	2005
4	Japan	\$44,310,000,000	2005 est
5	United Kingdom	\$42,836,000,000	2005 est
6	Germany	\$35,063,000,000	2003
7	Italy	\$28,182,800,000	2003
8	Korea, South	\$21,050,000,000	2005 est
9	India	\$19,040,000,000	2005 est
10	Saudi Arabia	\$18,000,000,000	2005 est

【SLIDE 16】

Military expenditure as a % of GDP


Country	Official	SIPRI	Dept. of Defense	CIA
PRC	1.4%	1.8%	4.2%	4.3%
USA	3.7%	3.9%	3.7%	4.1%
UK	2.7%	2.2%	-	2.4%
Japan	1%	1%	-	1%
Russia	2.8%	4.3%	12%	-
Taiwan	2.6%	-	-	2.4%

[SLIDE 17]


Military expenditure (US\$ bn for 2005)

Country	Official	SIPRI	DoD	CIA
PRC	\$29.9bn	\$41bn	\$90bn	\$81.5bn
USA	\$419.3	\$455.3	\$419.3	\$518.1
UK	\$58.6	\$47.4	-	\$42.8
Japan	\$45.8	\$42.4	-	\$44.31
Russia	\$14.5	\$19.4	-	-
Taiwan	\$7.6	-	-	\$7.93

[SLIDE 19]



[SLIDE 18]



[SLIDE 20]

Japan – conservative nationalism

- **The dominant form of nationalism in post-war Japan has been 'conservative'**
 - (broadly) accepts the verdicts against Japan passed after 1945
 - (broadly) supports the Constitution/does not regard constitutional revision as a priority
 - Supports the US-Japan alliance and security treaty
 - Believes in Japan adopting a low profile in international affairs, in particular avoiding military issues
 - Associated with PM Yoshida Shigeru and has dominated the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955

[SLIDE 21]

Japanese revisionism

- Calls for Japan to play a larger international role; some oppose the US-Japan security relationship
- Strongly anti-communist and usually anti-China
- Has developed a 'special relationship' with Taiwan, especially pro-independence groups;
- Ever-present in post-war Japan (e.g. PM Kishi) but usually less influential than conservative nationalism.
- A significant and vocal section of Japanese commentators can be associated with this view
- Has grown more significant since the mid-1990s as a result of:
 - Political and economic uncertainty in Japan
 - Fear of the PRC's growing political/economic power

[SLIDE 23]

Japan: the rise of revisionist nationalism

- seeks to change, to re-write and to reconsider accepted 'facts' and interpretations of Japan's imperial past and present
- Seeks to revise the 1947 Constitution
- focuses on the many 'benefits' Japanese imperialism brought to Asia
- Rejects the verdicts Tokyo War Crimes Trials and rejects the view that Japan is 'guilty of aggression' before 1945
- Some deny the importance or significance of historical episodes (or even the historical veracity) such as the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women etc.

[SLIDE 22]



With the help of Japan, China and Manchukuo, the world can be at peace

[SLIDE 24]

Explaining Japan in China Japan: class dynamics

- Before 1976 class-based analysis dominated official discourse on the war and on Japan
- Anti-Japanese sentiment at the official level was usually expressed in class terms, i.e. warnings concerning the revival of militarism
- Class analysis was at the heart of the compromise reached between Mao and Zhou Enlai and the Japanese under PM Tanaka in 1972 – a militarist clique were responsible for the war, not the Japanese people

【SLIDE 29】



帝国主义和一切反动派都是纸老虎

Imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers, 1965

【SLIDE 31】

From class to nation

- After 1978 and the transformations initiated by Deng Xiaoping, class analysis fades away
- Nationalism (re-)appears at both elite and mass levels
- The Chinese discourse on Japan and Japan's war responsibility is increasingly couched in terms of the 'nation', which in turn de-legitimises the 1972 compromise – the discursive space created by class analysis collapses and is replaced by a discourse of nation and nationalism.


【SLIDE 30】




打倒复活的日本帝国主义

Down with the revival of Japanese militarism, 1971


【SLIDE 32】



【SLIDE 34】



【SLIDE 33】




【SLIDE 36】



【SLIDE 35】

Should the Prime Minister visit Yasukuni?



[SLIDE 37]

PRC: government responses

- Protests begin in 1985 over PM Nakasone's visits – (n.b. 18 PM visits between 1978 and 1984)
- Why the change?
 - Concern over Nakasone's nationalist agenda, especially increased military spending and closer relationship with the US
 - Concern over Japanese 'revisionism' (c.f. 1982 text-book controversy)
 - Conflict over Japan policy within the CCP
 - Changing nationalist dynamics within China – a shift from class-based to nationalist ideology.
- Yasukuni is a litmus test

[SLIDE 38]

- PRC: popular responses and popular nationalism
- The CCP has always relied on anti-Japanese sentiment to generate and bolster legitimacy, however...
- ... since 1989 nationalist dynamics have increasingly escaped Party control and now pose a potential threat to the CCP.
- The CCP fears anti-Japanese protests, and its ability to make and implement policy is constrained by it, e.g. the demise of the 'New Diplomacy (新外交) initiative
- State controlled media in China often stresses Japanese opposition to the visits (as seen in opinion polls etc.) and, increasingly, US opposition to Yasukuni.



[SLIDE 39]

The slide contains three main visual elements:

- A map of East Asia showing the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the Sea of Japan.
- A map of the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) in the East China Sea, with the text '保釣 DEFEND DIAOYUTAI' and 'RYUKYU' overlaid.
- A photograph of a protest with people holding flags and banners.

[SLIDE 40]

Case 2 – Diaoyu/Senkaku [钓鱼台] Islands

- Both China and Japan have excellent claims to the islands – but both sides fail to respect the other's position
- The dispute is not about natural resources (oil or gas or fish) – the 'resource-driven' explanation is an attempt to make the dispute 'rational' when it is not.
- At the highest governmental levels (since 1978) both sides have tried to keep the ownership and control dispute off the agenda, however...
- Nationalist groups on both sides have repeatedly taken provocative steps to ignite the dispute in order to pursue their own nationalist agenda at home

[SLIDE 41]

Case 3 Taiwan and Chinese nationalism

- Taiwan highlights both the Japanese and the American aspects of the 'national humiliation' historiography
- For the CCP, national reunification is central to its legitimacy - the issue of ultimate reunification is non-negotiable
- The CCP's changing approaches to reunification reflect variations in radical and conservative agendas in the party elite
- The new reactionary nationalism agenda could generate pressure for a return to 'radicalism' in the PRC's approach to Taiwan.



[SLIDE 42]

Liberate Taiwan!



[SLIDE 43]

Peaceful Reunification

The Reunings of the Sisters on Both Sides of the Taiwan Straits, 1990



[SLIDE 44]

Taiwan and Japanese revisionist nationalism

- For Japanese revisionist nationalists the case of Taiwan 'proves' the following:
- Japanese imperialism was welcomed
- Japanese imperialism brought many benefits
- Japan did not wage a war of aggression against Asia
- Japan should re-assert leadership in and over Asia
- Taiwan is not a part of China

【SLIDE 45】

Lee Teng-hui:
Taiwan no Shucho



Lee as Edajima Heihachi
(江田島平八) from the manga 'Sakigake!! Chohokoku' (山陽堂)

【SLIDE 47】

Presidential Palace, Taipei (1919)
inset: Mitsukoshi Shin-Kong Department Store (1993)



【SLIDE 46】

Lee on Japan

- 'Until my early 20s I thought I was Japanese' (1996)
- 'The KMT felt like an alien force' (1996)
- 'My heartfelt wish is to return to Japan' (2000)
- 'The Senkaku [Diaoyu] Islands are Japanese territory' (2003)
- 'I hope to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pray for my brother' (2004)
- All these comments are in interviews with Japanese correspondents. Lee also spoke at length with Kobayashi Yoshinori...

【SLIDE 48】

Pro-Japanese works by Taiwanese nationalists



【SLIDE 49】

Pro-Japanese works by Taiwanese nationalists 2



【SLIDE 50】

Kobayashi: covers



【SLIDE 51】

Taiwanron: front and back



【SLIDE 52】



[SLIDE 53]

Conclusions 1

re-linking politics and economics

- Sino-Japanese relations since 1949 have frequently been premised on the assumption that politics and economics can be separated 政經分離
- Most famously this was formulated as a principle by Zhou Enlai, and it provided the legitimising rationale for Sino-Japanese relations

[SLIDE 55]



[SLIDE 54]

Conclusions 2

- Sadly, politics and economics are declined – the booming economic exchange has not (yet) led to an improved political relationship
- The collapse of Marxism as an analytical framework has undermined the 1972 system's solution to the issue of Japanese responsibility
- The irrational modern narrative of nationalism is in danger of derailing the modern rational narratives of liberalism and realism

[SLIDE 56]

Conclusions 3

- To escape this impasse and the dangers it threatens.
- The Japanese government and the Japanese people must have a serious debate about war responsibility.
- The CCP must accept that this debate will undermine the 1972 consensus and must address its own historical legacies.
- The leadership on both sides must exercise statesmanship and avoid appealing to the ugly and vicious elements in their societies for short-term political gain.

【SLIDE 57】