Friendship, Treason, and the Concept of the Ethnopolitical in China

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Summary

This paper examines the master signifiers “Mongolian traitors” (Mengjian) and “Mongolian cadres” (Menggu Ganbu), as a pair of alterity. Mengjian is a ubiquitous term in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historiography of modern Inner Mongolia referring specifically to the Mongol nationalists who collaborated with Japanese, a designation different from the Chinese Nationalist appellation for the same people: Hanjian (Han-Chinese traitors). While the CCP frowned upon Mengjian, they created their own Mongol collaborators, Menggu Ganbu (Mongolian cadres). This paper treats Mengjian and Menggu Ganbu as two categories of people, which came into being at about the same time as they were invented, thereby opening up new possibilities for action.

Although the two were exclusive of each other, I argue that Mongolian traitors and Mongolian cadres were both “collaborative nationalists” due to the fact that they had to rely on an external power (be it Japan, China, or Russia), misrecognizing their interdependency as friendship. There is a profound irony and even tragedy in collaborative nationalism. It is ironic because it violates the basic principle of nationalism as imbedded in group sovereignty; keeping the national self from any others: be they friends or enemies. By aligning with a friendly power, collaborative nationalists closed the front door to enemies but opened the back door to friends. The tragedy of this type of collaborative nationalism is that weaker or smaller groups often cannot independently meet their goals, not only because of the sheer power asymmetry with dominant others, but more importantly because they usually subscribe to some of the best ideas humanity has produced, i.e. civilization, equality, fraternity, human rights, nondiscrimination—ideas that transcend national boundaries. Moral contentions arose when the Mongols did not agree on who should be their “friends”, especially when the “friends” were enemies with each other.

Key words: Mongolian traitors, Mongolian cadres, collaborative nationalism, friendship, national boundaries

Introduction

In this paper, I suggest that since nationality cadres are so much implicated in questions of treason or violation of national/nationality interest that we need to explore the “ethnopolitical” in China. I will develop a new concept called collaborative nationalism, an analytical tool which I hope can better capture the intricate issues at hand without privileging the standpoint of one party or the other. This will be done by examining the dialectical relationship between Mengjian (Mongolian traitors) and Menggu Ganbu (Mongolian cadres) in the long 20th century, not to prove or disprove the equation of the two, but to discuss, through tracing their entangled genealogical trajectory, collaborative nationalism and its legacy as well as its implication for ethnic relations in today’s China. Mengjian is of course not a self-reference, but a denunciative one used by the critics, whereas Menggu Ganbu is a neutral term. I juxtapose these two terms, mindful of the position of the enunciators/denunciators. I treat both Mengjian and Menggu Ganbu as “super-signs”. A super-sign,
according to Lydia Liu, “is not a word, but a hetero-cultural signifying chain.”¹

**The Cunning of Ethnic Recognition**

In the wake of the Japanese invasion of China, Inner Mongolian nationalism came to pose a credible threat to the inchoate Republic of China’s territorial sovereignty, not because of Mongols’ own physical strength vis-à-vis China, but because of the Japanese support, based on claims of mutual cultural and even biological affinity. Mongols were particularly responsive to the Japanese overture, seeing Japan as a possible deterrent to the aggressive Chinese colonization of the Mongolian land.² To the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (GMD), the Mongol cooperation with the Japanese never constituted Mongol nationalism in its own right, but treason. The GMD Chinese denounced Prince Demchugdonrub (Prince De), the most prominent Inner Mongolian nationalist, and his fellow Mongolian supporters, as Hanjian.³

_Hanjian_ is a moral concept condemning the Han Chinese who collaborated with enemies of China, carrying the overtones not just of treachery but negation of Chineseness on the collaborators. Both the GMD and the CCP Chinese treated them as wicked people, not unlike witches, carrying out operations to assassinate them. Obviously, the designation of the Mongol nationalists as _Hanjian_ reveals not necessarily the real nature of the Mongol behavior, but the Chinese national morality and, more importantly, the peculiar Chinese nationalist imagination of China’s nationscape.

In response to the Japanese attempt at reordering the regional world order, shifting the galactic center from China to Japan, with the possible demise of China as a state, the GMD, having newly assumed national power in 1927/8, radically re-envisioned China from a Five Race Republic (wu zu gonghe) to a single homogenous Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu), a vision eventually enshrined in Jiang Jieshi’s _China’s Destiny_ published in 1943. In this revanchist imagination, non-Chinese peoples were no longer recognized as having separate ethnic identities, but were genealogically linked with the Han Chinese to form a single Chinese nation. The term _Hanjian_ was, in the GMD usage, therefore, not reserved to the Han Chinese alone, but covered Mongols and Hui Muslims, Taiwanese, as well as Manchu, without making any ethnic distinction. In an article published in 1940, arguably the GMD’s best assessment of the Mongol princes, the author lambasted them for not being good descendants of Chinggis Khan:

> These utterly unworthy persons have committed crimes against the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu), they are the disobedient descendants of Chinggis Khan, and they have become real _Hanjian_; their crimes are beyond pardon, even death would not expiate all their crimes. In accordance with the national law or morality, they deserve capital punishment, as they have already been abandoned by all the people of the country.⁴

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² From the Japanese perspective, they were Tainichi kyōryokusha, that is, people who collaborated with Japan.

³ The fact Mongol collaborators were denounced as _Hanjian_, but not as _Zhonghua minzu jian_, suggests the enormous appeal of Han as the core of _Zhonghua minzu_. In other words, Mongols became a member of the _Zhonghua minzu_ only through negativity, i.e. betraying the Han, who they were not even in the most radical formulation of the day.

⁴ De Hengshan 1981 [1940]. “Kangri de Menggu.” In _Zhonghua Minzu Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian_.
Unlike the GMD, the CCP, however, did not call them Hanjian, but Mengjian – Mongolian traitors. The CCP Central Committee’s first core slogan in Inner Mongolia was “Down with Mengjian Prince De!” raised in June 1937.5

There is something very uncanny about this designation. Why did the CCP Chinese denounce Mongol nationalists for treason against the Mongol nation? After all, the CCP advocated the primacy of non-Chinese identities and their self-determination in its early years. The devil is perhaps in the historical details. Contra many scholars who believe that the CCP changed its support for minority self-determination in 1949 after it came to power, in actual fact, the CCP’s nationality policy underwent several stages, each modification shaped by their experiences in dealing with the non-Chinese peoples, finally culminating in the adoption of official Chinese nationalism during the war against Japan. Perhaps the most radical change of heart came as it retreated from supporting minority self-determination, and imputed negativity to minority nationalism by calling it parochial nationalism (xiaoyi minzu zhuyi),6 effectively rendering non-Chinese nationalism internal to China. Fundamental to this revisionism was a spatial change of the CCP’s mission – from world revolution to defending a geographically bounded China. The existential experiences of the excruciatingly brutal war for the survival of China led the CCP to re-imagine China’s “international” political order, adding an internal ethnic frontier problem to the threat from external enemy. The CCP’s new treatment of Mongol nationalism as “internal” to China converged largely with the GMD’s stance, but differed radically in their diagnosis of the cause of Mongol nationalism and the solution to it.

I argue that the denunciation of Mongolian collaborators as Mengjian was part and parcel of the CCP’s struggle against the GMD’s non-recognition of the Mongols; it was a struggle not for an unconditional emancipation of the Mongols, but a strategy to win the Mongols over to China from the Japanese control. Thus, for instance, in its most comprehensive policy-oriented research written in the early 1940s, the CCP made scathing criticisms of the GMD’s non-recognition policy for alienating the Mongols from China, saying that it “forcefully pushed Inner Mongolia’s Mongolian nationality into the fold of the Japanese invaders.” 7 The CCP, however, refrained from calling for their self-determination, because it believed that autonomy or independence movement would only help both the GMD and the Japanese.

Mengjian was thus the best embodiment of the CCP’s struggle for ethnic recognition, not prescribing Mongols’ independence from China, but in fact proscribing it by a double strategy. In this scheme, Mongols, grateful for being recognized as a nationality (minzu), would be centripetal to China, and as a domestic(cated) nationality, they would be subject to witchcraft accusation of committing jian – treason – the most heinous crime, should they collaborate with China’s enemy – Japan. The CCP’s recognition was, therefore, appropriative recognition.

The CCP’s Mengjian discourse or its appropriative recognition was predicated on

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acknowledging, curiously, the Mongolian agency. According to Frederic Wakeman Jr., Hanjian were characterized by their antagonists as feminine, weak, passive, as opposed to masculine, strong, and active resistance heroes. Following this logic, calling Prince De Hanjian or puppet was meant to deny any subjectivity and agency to Prince De and Mongols and, moreover, to deny legitimacy to Mongolian nationalism. However, in wartime China, according to Wakeman Jr., Chinese collaborators were committed to a larger cause, one initiated by Sun Yatsen, and then taken up by the Japanese, i.e. pan-Asianism. And that commitment and its articulation constituted the Hanjian’s agency, which was particularly threatening to the GMD which was committed to a more narrowly defined national identity. The Chinese abhorrence at Hanjian was really a fear of Chinese pan-Asianists for inadvertently assisting Japanese imperialism to conquer China.

Unlike Hanjian, Mongol collaborators were not committed to a pan-Asianist cause, but to Mongolian nationalism, which was a threat to China in a different way: instead of encompassing China, Mongolian nationalism threatened to secede from it. Mongolian nationalists were equipped with a strong agency, which did not always make them good collaborators. In 1936 Prince De specifically replied to a Chinese journalist called Zhao Chizi, arguing against the Chinese accusation of him of being a puppet:

Everyone says that I am pro-Japan, and also says that I will definitely become a puppet of the Japanese. Chizi, please think honestly: do the Japanese, being so clever, really want me to be puppet? The first qualification for a puppet is to be muddle-headed, but I am not necessarily muddle-headed; and the second is to be submissive, but I am not always obedient. People all say that I have ambitions, and I also take upon myself to accomplish something, so even the Japanese also say I am too ambitious. So how can an ambitious person like me be qualified for the job of a puppet?

Chizi refused to believe Prince De’s words about his nationalist agency, and insisted that “although not subjectively pro-Japanese, objectively he is already pro-Japanese....One more soldier for Prince De is one more soldier for Japan, one more weapon is one more addition to Japan: his so-called Mongolian nationalism is the best theory for Japan to prop up a Mongolian state.”

Setting aside Chizi’s skepticism, we may more accurately characterize Prince De’s nationalism “collaborative nationalism”. Timothy Brook recently formulated a notion called “collaborationist nationalism” to describe the war-time Japan-sponsored Chinese collaborationist regimes. He argued that the collaborators’ self-justification for their action should not be dismissed outright. They felt they were morally superior to the self-claimed resistance fighters, because the latter’s ineffective resistance or even retreat exposed the Chinese people and the nation to extreme

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danger and suffering. “Collaboration was for them a desperate response to the most severe crisis that the Chinese nation had ever suffered. What they did, in their own eyes, they did for China, not for Japan, despite the apparent loss of sovereignty that this arrangement entailed, because they conceived of that loss as temporary” (p. 160). Brook saw such collaboration as a special kind of nationalism that is “a historically specific form of late colonial ideology that is always bound to declare independence under a condition of dependence” (p. 163).

Prince De’s nationalism shares much similarity with the “collaborationist nationalism” described by Brook, but they differ on one crucial account. Whereas the Chinese collaborators justified their action in the name of saving their nation, thereby emphasizing their tragic heroism, Mongol collaboration was unabashedly both collaborative and nationalistic. Their nationalism was not against the Japanese, as the Chinese nationalism was, but against the Chinese. In other words, whereas the Chinese “collaborationist nationalism” worked in dyadic relation, collaborating with the evil for the sake of self-salvation, the Mongolian “collaborative nationalism” operated in a triangular relationship, collaborating with the Japanese as “friend”, against the Chinese – their common “enemy”. Not surprisingly, some GMD Chinese acknowledged Prince De’s nationalist agency, and were not opposed to Mongol nationalism per se, but apprehended its possible appropriation by China’s enemy – Japan. Even the CCP, which categorically opposed the Chinese collaborationist regimes, looked favorably on Prince De’s collaborative nationalism, hoping to harness this Mongolian nationalist energy, seeing it as a possible wedge they could drive between the Mongols and the Japanese and the GMD.

On July 10, 1937 the CCP Center made a fundamental shift in its policy towards Prince De, changing its slogan from “Down with Mengjian Prince De” to “Demanding Prince De to resist the Japanese”. Some of the important justifications were: 1. Prince De had relatively strong national consciousness in the face of the Great Han chauvinism, and had once represented the will of the Mongolian national independence and liberation. But he became a puppet because he was lured by the Japanese invaders and was driven by the GMD government. 2. He commanded relatively wide support among the Mongolian nation, 3. “He is no longer a Japanese puppet, but since he has relatively strong national consciousness, he has not become completely like Yin Rugen and Pu Yi.”

Sworn Brothers and Menggu Ganbu

In 1926, Mao Zedong made a famous analysis of the classes in Chinese society and spelt out the CCP’s strategy for victory. “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies.” Mao’s theory shares affinity that of Carl Schmitt, Hitler’s theoretician. In his best known book, The Concept

Press, pp. 159-190.


12 Yin was the head of the “Yidong Prevent-the-Communist Autonomous Government” established under the auspices of the Japanese in 1935. Pu Yi was the emperor of Manchukuo.

of the Political first published in 1927, Schmitt argued that “the political” lies in distinguishing between friend and enemy, a decision in which one must not only clarify one’s stand, but more importantly one’s identity. For the political decision to be made when confronted with the real possibility of war or physical killing, “in clear knowledge of one’s own situation, defined by that possibility; and in the task of rightly distinguishing between friend and enemy.”

Thus the CCP decision to suspend calling Prince De and other collaborators Mengjian was a political decision, reflecting not the CCP’s ideological commitment, but its own strategic calculation for survival. Weak and marginal, as well as illegitimate in China, the CCP’s friendly overture to Prince De and his conationalists was meant to win over the Mongols to its own side. However, initially the CCP made little headway in this direction, because Inner Mongolian aristocrats and Buddhist monks had genuine fears of communists, in light of the violent revolutionary activities in the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) targeting aristocrats and lamas. Even in the Ordos region, the only GMD controlled Mongol area, a CCP report in 1939 found that “the Japanese have been quite successful in luring the Mongols; the majority of the Mongols’ attitude is unclear, even pro-Japan.”

It was in this situation that the CCP decided to cultivate their own Mongolian friends (Menggu pengyou) to penetrate the Mongol society. The CCP’s Mongolian friends were not just anybody, but people who had had strong consciousness of one’s own identity vis-à-vis enemy. The worst possible situation was lack of unconsciousness, because people of such kind could become the instrument of enemy, as Hangjian were thought to be. The CCP was prepared, thus, to cultivate and work with, if possible lead what they called Mongolian “xianjue fenzi” (early awakened elements) in their common opposition against Japan.

Throughout its Yan’an sojourn, the only substantial Mongol group the CCP had contact with were the Mongols in Ordos, the CCP’s immediately northern neighbor, from where they acquired much needed salt and war horses, often by trickery or by force. To the majority of the Ordos Mongols, they were no different from other Chinese, especially traders, who were known to be “jalhai” (treacherous). In addition to the CCP, Ordos Mongols faced pressure from the Japanese and Prince De’s Mongolian government from the north in Baotou, and more heavily, the GMD forces that had physically occupied Ordos. In 1941 the GMD sent twenty-thousand troops commanded by Cheng Changjie to garrison the region and flooded it with Chinese agents to closely monitor the Ordos Mongols, the CCP and the Japanese. This was the last Mongolian frontier, so all these external forces jostled to befriend the Ordos Mongols to their own end. Collaboration or cooperation was a necessity for all these groups. Treason or treachery was a normal behavior, rather than an aberration.

The CCP operatives in Ordos initially found the Mongols “backward” in national consciousness and “inconstant” (fanfu wuchang). Soon realizing that their “inconstancy” was caused by their calculation of cost and benefit and “interethnic divide”, the CCP decided to turn this to their

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16 In 1936, in an effort to win over the good feelings of the Mongols, the CCP helped return the salt lakes in the Otog banner controlled by the Muslims and Chinese. But a few years later, realizing the value of the salt, the CCP army attacked the Mongol banner self-defense forces and controlled the salt lakes.
17 In Qing documents, Chinese traders in Mongolia were often denounced as “jian shang” (treacherous
own advantage. Zhao Tongru, the CCP’s main operative in Ordos concluded in 1939 that “It is an undeniable fact that the Mongols would sacrifice anything for their friends, for the collective interests, loyal to a fault.”\(^{18}\) The main method of the CCP to penetrate the Mongols would then be to become sworn friends or brothers (bazi or jiebai in local Chinese, anda in Mongolian) with Mongol officials or soldiers individually, taking advantage of the Mongols’ loyalty to ritual friends. Determined to change the Mongol impression of jianshang (treacherous traders), the CCP operatives began to pose as fair traders, and sent as gifts to their “Mongol friends” large quantities of opium which was grown by the CCP in its controlled southern Ordos. Soon, the CCP had cultivated a lot of Menggu pengyou (Mongolian friends), some of whom were later recruited as the CCP’s Menggu ganbu – Mongolian cadres.

1940 saw a radical change in the CCP’s strategy towards the Mongols. As China was losing ground and the Japanese further consolidating their control of Inner Mongolia and North China, the CCP Center issued a new instruction on what was called “Mongolian Work” (Menggu Gongzuo) proposing a three-pronged strategy: 1. Recruit and foster guerrilla forces with Mongols as core members. This guerrilla force would serve as a “flag to call on and unite the broad masses of the Mongols” against Japan, and the CCP in Suiyuan must “by all means help it politically and organizationally in the areas of cadres and military equipments”. 2. The ethnic Chinese cadres should abandon their own open anti-Japanese organizations, and go underground by penetrating all legitimate organizations in the Japanese occupied region. “In the course of work in the banners of Chahar, Wumeng [Ulanchab league], and Lemeng [Silinggol league], [Chinese cadres] must find all kinds of connections, and develop core Party members within various organizations (tuantì), and establish key points of support.” 3. Particularly important is the instruction on how to foster Menggu ganbu:

The Party from now on must foster core anti-Japanese elements, which means in more concrete terms training and fostering the Party’s Menggu ganbu, preparing the revolutionary core elements in the Mongolian nation to establish Mongolian national anti-Japanese organizations. For now [we] must absorb progressive Mongols (meng mín) to join various anti-Japanese governments. There are two main methods to foster the Party’s Menggu ganbu: the first is to foster and train the progressive elements within the Mongols, and the other is to train [Chinese] party members appropriate for the Mongolian work to become Mongols (jiaru Menggu jì).\(^{19}\) In addition to training them within the local organizations, [we] must absorb large numbers of Mongolian people to get training in Yan’an.\(^{20}\)

In 1941 a nationality institute was set up to train Mongolian, Hui and other minority cadres.

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\(^{19}\) Before 1949, one was a Mongol if one was subject to a Mongolian banner, registered as a tax bearing subject (slüe) of the banner government.

In order to foster good will and to change their political orientation at the same time, the CCP set up a Chinggis Khan Memorial in Yan’an as early as 1939 and brought many Ordos Mongols to tour Yan’an, impressing them that the CCP venerated the Mongols’ ancestor Chinggis Khan. Many ethnic Chinese CCP operatives joined the Mongolian banner garrison corps or the Suiyuan Province Mongolian Political Council based in Ordos.

This CCP tactic was essentially the same as the Japanese Mongolian Work (Mōko Kōsaku) or Inner Mongolian Work, that is, penetrating and controlling the western part of Inner Mongolia. The Japanese Kwantong army, for instance, sent numerous agents to serve as advisors, and cultivated friendship with Mongolian princes and officials. Large numbers of Japanese monks trained in eastern Mongolian monasteries were dispatched to western Inner Mongolia disguised as Mongolian lamas. Similarly, they trained Mongolian army, and took many Mongol leaders and students to Japan to impress them with Japan’s splendor of modernity.

**Menggu Ganbu against Mengjian: Revolutionary Terrorism**

By the early 1940s, the CCP had successfully created their own Menggu Ganbu (Mongolian cadres). As we have seen, Menggu Ganbu and Mengjian are two categories of people, which came into being at the same time as they were invented, and they opened up new possibilities for action. The two invented categories took on life of their own, and assumed mutually antagonistic roles. Initially, as we have noted, they were opposed to each other only indirectly, differing in their stance towards the Japanese, GMD and CCP, but they were not yet at each other’s throat as the Chinese cadres were against Hanjian. This would soon change, as Menggu Ganbu, following the CCP Center’s instruction, took a categorically oppositional stand against Mengjian.

The Japanese surrender in 1945 did not immediately put an end to the political future of Inner Mongolia, as it exposed Taiwanese to the Chinese justice. Prince De and many of his former associates went over to rework with their former enemy GMD government, and the Mongols in eastern Inner Mongolia also sought to seek a legitimate autonomy from the GMD government after a short euphoria of possible unification with the MPR. Moreover, the CCP and the GMD turned again into animosity after a brief fragile wartime United Front, with Inner Mongolia and Manchuria becoming the crucial contesting ground between the two. Neither Prince De’s embracement of the GMD nor the eastern Mongolian desire for unification with the MPR was welcome to the CCP.

In October 1945, two months after the war, the CCP Center issued a new directive on its Mongolian Work, this time instructing its operatives to specifically carry out propaganda among all strata of Mongols, exposing the GMD’s and the Japanese “deceitful and criminal rule of Inner Mongolia historically,” so as to “eliminate the Mongols’ fantasy towards the GMD”. It also instructed to attack Prince De’s faction, and isolate it to “quickly destroy its influence [among the Mongols], so as to prevent the GMD from using them in the future.” More specifically, it called on promoting and fostering local Menggu Ganbu in various league and banner autonomous governments to “expose Mengjian”. What is particularly interesting is the specific instruction that “all the work of executing

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21 Japanese lamas usually obtained native fluency in Mongolian after long time stay in Mongolian monasteries in eastern Inner Mongolia and were then sent to western Inner Mongolia.

and punishing the Mengjian and confiscating the property of the Mengjian must be carried out by the Mongols."

The measures the Menggu Ganbu took toward the Mengjian are akin to what Jeff Goodwin calls “revolutionary terrorism.” Goodwin defines revolutionary terrorism as “the strategic use of violence and threats of violence by a revolutionary movement against civilians or noncombatants, and is usually intended to influence several audiences.” Revolutionaries do not attack just any civilians or noncombatants indiscriminately, but target certain categories of people. Goodwin suggests revolutionaries typically threaten and attack what he refers to as “complicitous civilians”, categories of civilians who are viewed by revolutionaries as “complicitous insofar as they are believed to (1) routinely benefit from the actions of the government or state that the revolutionaries oppose, (2) support the government or state, and/or (3) have a substantial capacity to influence or to direct the government or state.” What complicates the matter is that revolutionaries make strategic decisions to either attack or not to attack complicitous civilians, for although considered collaborators of the enemy, complicitous civilians may also be potential members or allies of the revolutionary movement. Thus the decision to attack them also hinge on calculations of costs and benefits, determining whether terrorism will be effective in achieving the goals revolutionaries desire, namely whether the complicitous civilians would be compelled to move closer to or away from the enemy. Goodwin's theory is also helpful in grasping the revolutionaries' understanding of the political order that they confront and the complicitous civilians associated with, as well as the strategically calculated measures taken against them.

Pitted against each other, the post-war history witnessed Mongols waging a fratricidal war, with many who sided with the GMD being killed for being Mengjian by the Menggu Ganbu. In 1946, Jamyangsharav, a reincarnate lama who was a de facto ruler of the Otog banner in Ordos, was assassinated by his subordinates who were underground CCP members and Menggu Pengyou of the Chinese CCP operatives. On a wider scale, the post-war history indeed witnessed Ulanhu and his fellow Menggu Ganbu from Yan’an valiantly fighting Mengjian, dismantling several pro-MPR or pro-GMD Mongolian autonomous administrations, and setting up an Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government in 1947.

This new autonomous government was, according to the government's political program, an “integral part of the Republic of China,” but opposed to Great Han chauvinism and the GMD government. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government was thus not a constitutionally autonomous government, but what may be called a morally autonomous government, autonomous or independent of the “enemy” – the GMD because they were Han Chauvinists, but under the leadership of the “friend” – the CCP, because they advocated equality between nationalities.

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25 Immediately after the founding of the autonomous government, the delegates of the founding congress sent their gratitude to Mao Zedong and Zhu De, referring to them deferentially as Chairman Mao (Mao Zhuxi) and Commander-in-Chief Zhu (Zhu Zongsiling).
To certain extent, the *Menggu Ganbu’s* revolutionary terrorism against what they believed to be *Mengjian* reflected perhaps what Carl Schmitt characterizes as the most insidious aspect of imperialism: “A people is only then primarily defeated, when it is subjected to a foreign vocabulary, to a foreign conception regarding what is right, especially what is international right.”\(^{26}\) In other words, the latest round of *Mengjian*-bashing, carried out whether by the CCP or by the *Menggu Ganbu* themselves, led to an interesting parallel of heightened ethnic recognition and drastic reduction of Inner Mongolian autonomy, marking the increasing Chinese sovereign “right” to the internal(ized) ethnic frontier.

**Agency, Collaborative Nationalism and the Politics of Friendship**

A superficial study of the records of the *Menggu Ganbu*, as outlined above, might give the impression that they were no more than ethnically uniformed lackeys of the CCP. It has often been whispered that Ulanhu delivered Inner Mongolia to China. Indeed, as I demonstrated elsewhere,\(^ {27}\) post-revolutionary Inner Mongolian historiography and CCP evaluations of Ulanhu often highlight his heroic struggle with Mongolian nationalists-cum-*Mengjian*.

What is interesting is that neither the Mongol denunciation nor the Chinese celebration of Ulanhu and *Menggu Ganbu* deny Ulanhu’s agency. In fact, the reason that Ulanhu became such an iconic/ironic figure is precisely the strong agency he exercised, that is, his own understanding of the place of Inner Mongolia in the wider Inner Asian frontier of both the Soviet Union/Mongolia and China, and his struggle to achieve that. Even the CCP acknowledged Ulanhu’s nationalist agency. Indeed, insofar as *Menggu Ganbu* were the CCP’s mirror image of *Mengjian*, and that *Mengjian* were acknowledged by the CCP to have strong agency, their agency or national consciousness was the precondition for the CCP’s recruitment. Where such agency lacked, the CCP would educate them to develop it. As noted above, the CCP, in its fight against the Japanese, were looking for “early conscious” or “progressive” Mongols.

The prior existence of the “progressive” or “early conscious” elements in Inner Mongolia points to an early history of communism and nationalism in Inner Mongolia. Indeed, in 1925 an Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (IMPRP) was established with the support of the Comintern, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and the GMD.\(^ {28}\) Those early Mongolian members of the

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\(^ {28}\) For a comprehensive study of the early activities of the Inner Mongolia People’s Revolutionary Party, see Christopher Atwood 2002. *Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades, 1911-1931*. 142

CCP, who also joined the IMPRP, went to Moscow for training by the Comintern. Mongols in Ordos formed the bulk of the IMPRP's army. The IMPRP was pan-Mongolist and favored unification with the MPR, a project undermined, however, by two successive events: the hostile turn of the GMD against the CCP in 1928, and the Soviet-Mongolian opposition to Japanese imperialism in 1931-2. Therefore, Mongol communists like Ulanhu acted independently of the CCP, but followed the Comintern instruction, and waged their own underground anti-Japanese operations, often in collaboration with the GMD, which was now seen as lesser enemy than Japan. In the Japanese occupied Manchuria, Mongol communists were in fact largely Soviet Communist Party members, and this led to their petitioning to join the MPR immediately after the war.

The historical experiences and the geographical location, as well as the organizational dimension of the Mongolian communists did not lead to the easy conclusion that they were simple CCP lackeys. Indeed, they had their own revolutionary history, often in parallel to the CCP's. It was not until 1938 that the CCP discovered Ulanhu and invited him to Yan’an to meet Mao, and not until 1941 that a number of Tumed Mongol communists went over to Yan’an, when they could no longer work within the GMD controlled Mongolian cavalry in Ordos. Ulanhu and the early Inner Mongolian communists were thus typical collaborative nationalists. They were nationalists because they were defending their Mongolian nation against enemies, and they did so by relying on external forces, be they Comintern, the GMD, or the CCP. They went to Yan’an, not just because of the communist international brotherhood, but also because of their judgment of the CCP Chinese as being “friends” or “good Chinese”.

It should be clear by now that both Mengjian and Menggu Ganbu were collaborative nationalists, exercising strong nationalist agency, distinguishing friends from enemies, relying on friends to fight enemies. So was the CCP, as Mao’s strategy and the CCP’s operation in Inner Mongolia demonstrated. To some extent, the Japanese were also collaborative, though they may be called imperial nationalists. What resulted was a conglomeration of alliances established in opposition to perceived enemies. These alliances or groupings of “friends” were predicated on their mutual interests in opposition to common enemies. And importantly, national consciousness based on hatred towards enemies was the foundation for such alliances or friendship. Insofar as this friendship was derivative of enmity or enemies, the real question is what to do with the friendship after the original enemies were gone.

Both Mengjian and Menggu Ganbu were confronted with these questions, partly because they were the products of such collaborative nationalism, and they were nationally conscious, as we have seen. Surprisingly, both Mengjian and Menggu Ganbu became hostile to the Japanese and the Chinese CCP members, and the confrontations were often violent. Lin Sheng, a Daur-Mongolian aristocrat, who was instrumental in rallying the Mongolian support for the Manchukuo and was once hailed as Chinggis Khan the second by the Japanese, soon became disillusioned at the Japanese, and was eventually executed by the Japanese. In August 1945 large numbers of Mongolian soldiers in Manchukuo killed their Japanese advisors upon the news of the Soviet-Mongolian declaration of war against Japan. Even Prince De was deeply at odds with the Japanese, at one point contemplating to
As for Menggu Ganbu, their relationship with the CCP was no less stormy. Large numbers of them were punished as landlords during the Land Reform in 1947-48, as Minzu Youpai (nationality rightists) in 1958, and almost all the Mongolian CCP members were denounced as secessionists, Mengjian, and for committing other heinous crimes during the Cultural Revolution, a witch-hunt costing tens of thousands of lives. The Mongolian CCP members were accused not simply of harboring evil thoughts against China and the Chinese, but suspected of being the underground members of an imaginary New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, thereby having “organizational” structure in opposition to China.

How do we explain this inter-friend violence? I argue that a plausible answer should be found not primarily in the logic of ethnic differences, but in how to deal with trust and friendship. As is seen above, friendship or friendly overtures were central to the collaboration of two Mongol groups with Japan and the CCP respectively, and vice versa.

The most important element in any friendship is perhaps “trust”. According to Russel Hardin, trust is an expression of “encapsulated interest”: “To say that I trust you with respect to some matter means that I have reason to expect you to act in my interest with respect to that matter because you have good reasons to do so, reasons that are grounded in my interest.”30 In other words, your interest encapsulates my interest. However, when one trusts, one also risks potential harm. “Where one depends on another’s good will,” writes Annette Baier, “one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when one trusts, and also shows one’s confidence that they will not take it.”31 Paradoxically, friendship, especially political friendship, involves two parties with different identities, which enter into friendship out of their own interests, and yet one expects the other to act in one’s own interest. Consequently, there are at least two important elements in any friendship or solidarity pact: expectation and judgment.

There were important, oftentimes conflicting, differences in the expectation of friendship. Mongols, either the so-called Mengjian or Menggu Ganbu, chose their Japanese or CCP friends in opposition to chauvinism of the GMD or Chinese in general; therefore, equality with the Chinese enemies was what they expected from their association with the Japanese or CCP friends, and they also expected to be treated as equals by their friends. Friendship was, for the Japanese and the CCP, on the other hand, not for the purpose of “equality” with the Mongols, but of subordinating them into their own sphere of control, taking advantage of the Mongols’ vulnerability. This latter friendship is driven by desire of appropriation, reminiscent of Nietzsche’s insight: “Our love of our neighbor – is it not a lust for new possessions?”32

Interestingly, the Japanese and the CCP’s lust for new possessions came through offering an alternative to the Mongols. The Japanese insisted they were better than the Chinese, because the latter were colonizing the Mongols. So did the CCP insist that they were better than either the Japanese or the GMD, who were, in the CCP’s language, intended to exterminate both the Mongols

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and the Communists – fāngōng mièmèng, whereas they alone were able to not only help Mongols from such a miserable state, but also build a better society in which Mongols would suffer no more and enjoy prosperity and equality with the Chinese.

Common to both the Japanese and the CCP strategies to win over the Mongols was not really the promotion of lofty human principles of equality, freedom, democracy, but their being "better" than their enemies. It might be a good strategy to win the heart of the Mongols, but it also became a burden to the Japanese and the CCP to prove in unequivocal terms that they were what they said to be. In other words, they had subjected themselves to Mongol judgment. In concrete terms, in order to win over the Mongols, the Japanese and the CCP made some important promises, including dismantling the Chinese provinces and counties established on Mongolian territories, returning natural resources taken by the Chinese to their rightful Mongolian banners, and so on. These solemn promises or oaths made at the friendship rituals may not be legally binding, but failures to deliver them were, however, the best recipe for driving Mongolian indignation. “Half friendship is the bitterest enmity.”

*Mengjian* and the Japanese, or *Menggu Ganbu* and the CCP had fundamental differences in their vision regarding the place of the Mongolian minzoku or Mongolian minzu in the Japanese empire or in China. Autonomy for the Japanese and the CCP was not an end itself, but a means to integrate the Mongols into the Japanese empire or China. Autonomy was, as outlined above, never meant to be autonomous of the CCP, but the CCP’s enemy, who was supposed to be simultaneously Mongols’ enemy. So was the Mongolian autonomy under the Japanese control. Such autonomy had its own structural constraint, as it was necessitated by the existence of enemy. Its mission was over as soon as the enemy was extinguished, and so was that of *Mengjian* or *Menggu Ganbu*. Any continued autonomy within the Manchukuo or the People's Republic of China, where the former enemies were eliminated, could no longer be justified without posing a moral affront to the Japanese or the CCP, treating either as an enemy.

To be sure, some kind of autonomy might still be tolerated, and *Mengjian* or *Menggu Ganbu* might still be needed, not because of the intrinsic goodness of such a polity or such categories of people, but because of the existence of serious opposition within that nationality. The following instruction by Mao Zedong on November 14, 1949 soon after “the Liberation” to train large numbers of minority nationality cadres is emblematic of such reasoning: “In order to thoroughly solve the nationality question, to totally isolate the nationality reactionaries, it is impossible without large numbers of communist cadres of minority nationality origin.” These cadres were supposed to be the CCP’s attack dogs unleashed to defeat any resistance of their nationalities to the new Chinese state.

The new role of *Mengjian* and *Menggu Ganbu* in what may be called “post-nationalist” situation not as friends, but as subordinates, not to fight for autonomy from their former friend-patrons, poses important questions for both parties of the friendship. It requires unwiring of all the charged energy of national consciousness. It demands unarming of the nationality before the

friends, and it means even the total collapse of the boundary between the former allies. Most importantly, it means the demise of the nationality as an entity. This state of affairs is brought about by both the logic of friendship and the logic of class struggle. In the latter logic, since nationalism is resistance to discrimination, inequality, and all the properties of enemy, now that enemy is gone, so must have those properties, hence the need to put a top to nationalism. Any refusal to comply with this logic now constitutes “the nationality question,” for the CCP, as much for the Japanese.

But the prospect of the demise of a nationality in the hands of the friend, the moment it is liberated from the enemy, poses perhaps the most fundamental challenge to the collaborative nationalists. This violence from the friend is more morally devastating than attacks from known enemies, because it constitutes a profound sense of betrayal. We have already seen that Mengjian were not hesitant to turn against their former friend Japanese when they saw a possible emancipation from another, presumably better friends – the Soviet Union and the MPR. But Menggu Ganbu did not enjoy that luxury of having another external friend. They were now an internalized minority in China. Nonetheless, in the early 1950s they still had some leverage against the CCP-China, not least because China needed Inner Mongolia as a model for other minorities who had not been fully integrated into China.

The long and arduous struggle for Inner Mongolian liberation from enemies determined that Menggu Ganbu had an entirely different understanding of what constituted the nationality question or problem. Far from their demise as a nationality, they envisioned a better future and prosperity as a nationality within a new China. That future must be based on justice, i.e. getting back what they had lost to the Chinese, including the entire Inner Mongolian territory. They remembered the CCP’s wartime solemn promises and then obliged the CCP Center to fulfill their promises. Whether or not the CCP was willing to deliver what they had promised became the litmus’ test of whether the CCP could prove whether they are really any better than the GMD.

This kind of autonomy based on justice was profoundly uncomfortable to the Chinese, who already constituted the majority there. To them, Inner Mongolian autonomy was not a matter of leaving the Mongols alone to run their affairs, but reversing the power structures, putting the Mongols on the leadership positions throughout Inner Mongolia. Indeed, the Chinese fear of the Mongol backlash was so strong that Suiyuan province, for instance, refused to integrate with the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region until 1954, and when it finally buckled, the Suiyuan Chinese CCP leadership raised the condition that the central government agree to create two administrative prefectures – Pingdiquan and Hetao – as reserves for Han Chinese autonomy within the now Mongol dominated unified Inner Mongolia.35

What all of this had achieved was to grant the Mongols, especially Menggu Ganbu to judge the CCP in two areas: whether the CCP Chinese were really better than GMD Chinese; and whether the CCP could transcend its own ethnocentrism and become truly universalistic. What is crucial in this Mongolian judgment is that the CCP’s efforts to become universalistic, i.e. truncating autonomy or reducing the number of Menggu Ganbu has been criticized precisely as a clear manifestation of Great Han chauvinism, the CCP behaving no differently if not worse than the GMD. Indeed,

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throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s, there had been a tug of war between Menggu Ganbu and the CCP each accusing the other of being either “Great Han Chauvinists” or “Narrow Local Nationalists.” In 1966-7 the tension finally exploded when the CCP determined that these two nationalisms were no longer contradictions among the people (renmin neibu maodun), but contradictions between enemy and us (diwo maodun). The enmity between former friends was perhaps stronger and more lethal than enmity between conventional enemies. As noted above, in 1968-9 Inner Mongolian cities, towns, and grassland were littered with tens of thousands of corpses, many being those of Menggu Ganbu, who were incriminated as secessionists and/or Mengjian – the super-sign of the absolute enemy of the China-CCP.

**Conclusion**

It should be clear by now that Mengjian and Menggu Ganbu are a pair of alterity, but insofar as they are opposed to each other, the enunciator or denunciator always expresses one’s own identity as the defender of the Mongolian nation/nationality. What complicates the matter is that the defense of the Mongolian nation could not be achieved by the Mongols alone, and they always have had to rely on an external power, (mis)recognizing it as a friend, not least because it presents itself as a friend. The trouble with collaborative nationalism, notwithstanding its virtue, is that it is compromised not by its opposition to the enemy, but by the friendship that is derivative of the enemy. Once the enemy is gone, a collaborative nationalist feels that he is betrayed by the friend – usually a more powerful one having its own calculation in entering the friendship – for not keeping the promises.

There is a profound irony and even tragedy in collaborative nationalism. It is ironic because it violates the basic principle of nationalism as imbedded in group sovereignty, keeping itself from any others, be they friends or enemies. By aligning with a friendly power, collaborative nationalists close the front door to enemies but open the back door to friends. It is tragic because nationalists, especially those of small and weak groups, could not accomplish their task by themselves not only because of the sheer power asymmetry, but more importantly they themselves also subscribe to some of the best ideas humanity has produced, that is, civilization, equality, fraternity, human rights, nondiscrimination, which are ideas that transcend national boundaries. Nationalism is never an aspiration to shut one’s door to do whatever one likes, but is informed by an aspiration for having the freedom to enjoy those universal goods which are presumed to be enjoyed by independent nations. In other words, nationalism is a box wrapped with national skin, filled with desirable objects or ideas which come from outside, and which are universal. Nationalism is prone to collaboration with “friends”.

Thus, universalism is the double-edged sword, serving both to bolster nationalist closure and to crack open the boundary to align with like-minded nations or powers. Universal ideals are the foundation of any nationalism, enabling nationalists of weak groups to seek external supports, thereby rendering their nationalism collaborative or their collaboration active.

Prasenjit Duara\textsuperscript{36} has rightly pointed out the intricate relationship between imperialism and civilization, the latter serving imperialism to establish political domination by transcending

nationalism. Uday Singh Mehta similarly argues that imperialism stemmed from liberalism, which is a set of ideas committed to political rights, the limited authority of the state, and self-determination.\textsuperscript{37}

Indeed, the recent formulations such as eco-imperialism and human rights imperialism, moral imperialism all echo Proudhon’s claim which was frequently quoted by Carl Schmitt to critique western liberalism: “Whoever says humanity, wants to deceive.”\textsuperscript{38}

What we have seen is that universal principles and ideals become tools of both nationalism and imperialism, and they form the basis of collaboration or friendship between the two. They become friends because there is a common enemy, whatever it may be. Politically, what is most problematic is not perhaps the opposition between friends and enemies, but how to deal with the friendship forged in opposition to their common enemy, especially after the enemy is defeated. It is the failure to solve that friendship by the Japanese and Mongol nationalists like Prince De that afforded the opponents, even Mongol communists, to call the active Mongol collaborators Mengjian. It is the betrayal of friendship by the CCP forcing Menggu Ganbu to become mere servants of the Party’s sovereignty over the Mongols that enabled their Mongol critics to denounce Menggu Ganbu as Mengjian. My point is, however, that such accusations do not capture the nature of the so-called Mongol treason, and I have argued that these activities are symptomatic of collaborative nationalism. This analysis does not privilege the enunciators of the super-sign, for they do so by relying on alternative, and presumably better, more virtuous, friends.
