

时，客体也会受到主体的影响，这是一个能动的过程。加加美光行先生所提出国别研究中的“去东方主义”，这不仅仅是一种对中国研究的情怀所致，更为重要的是对社会科学研究方法的西方中心主义的反思。当然，无论出于什么目的，这一倡导对国别研究乃至社会科学的研究都有一定的重要意义，尽管能在多大程度上去东方主义还有待于观察。最后，我要说明的是，加加美先生提出共同态度性，它的所谓的贡献，就像金先生刚才谈到的，是对我们社会科学家所研究问题的再一次的引起，而且让研究者明确了自己的态度，正如我前面所讲到的，但是在研究当中，由于社会化的因素，方方面面所决定的每个人的态度，要想完全达到共同性的态度，我觉得这是一个至少目前还不太可能，或者说在目前的国际形势和社会背景下面还是一个很漫长的过程。谢谢！

●—司会 それでは、カリフォルニア大学サンディエゴ校のリチャード・マドソン先生、お願いします。

●—リチャード・マドソン Professor Kagami's paper offers an extraordinarily thoughtful critique of contemporary Chinese studies, particularly as practiced in Japan and the United States, and it presents us with an inspiring vision of how area studies might be reformed and renewed in the 21st century.

The paper is especially timely. Because of the rise of Chinese wealth and power, the structure of Asian economic and political relationships is being reconfigured. At the same time, both the hard power, that is, the effective military power, and economic power, and the soft power, global moral authority, of the United States has deteriorated, particularly because of the Iraq war. And all this takes place in the context of intensifying globalization. In this new situation,

to help find the way toward mutually beneficial and peaceful global interdependency, we will need new intellectual disciplines. Professor Kagami points us toward a new type of area studies.

There are two parts to his paper. The first and by far the longest is a critical account of the history of the development of Chinese area studies in Japan and the United States. The second is a vision for a new way for doing China studies. This vision is derived from the implications of the historical critique, in the light of a philosophy of intersubjectivity. I will briefly discuss these in turn.

I learned a great deal from Professor Kagami's account of the development of China studies in Japan, a subject about which I knew very little. I will limit my remarks here to a subject with which I am more familiar, the development of China studies in the United States.

As Professor Kagami says, China studies in the USA was a product of the Cold War. The programs and eventually research centers for China studies established at Harvard, Columbia and the University of Washington in the late 1940s, eventually joined by other important centers at the University of Michigan, the University of California, and so forth, were oriented toward state policy research in the sense that their leaders wanted to help the US government construct more effective policies toward China. But because they were located in universities, these centers had only an indirect and sometimes tension-filled relationship with the government. Their initial funding came not from the government but from private foundations, such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundation. The

Ford Foundation was especially important in the development of China area studies.

The people who worked in these centers had to at least partially meet the standards of the university as a whole, which stressed basic research over applied research, and nurtured an ideology of autonomy from political pressure, even as universities were becoming increasingly dependent on government funding. These tensions with the government reached a critical mass during the McCarthy Era, when China scholars like John Fairbank came under attack for being pro-communist. I would slightly disagree, however, with Professor Kagami's characterization of Fairbank as having pro-communist sympathies. Fairbank was one of my own teachers at Harvard, and as far as I could tell, he had no sympathies with Marxism, Leninism, dialectical materialism or any part of communist ideology. Owen Lattimore, who Professor Kagami mentions as a pro-communist, was a different matter, but I believe he was an exception among China scholars at the time. Fairbank saw the Chinese revolution as a part of Chinese nationalism. He thought that the Chinese communists had prevailed in the civil war because at the time they were better organized and were closer in touch with the grass roots than the incompetent and corrupt Kuomintang. The implications of this were, first, that the United States should not see Chinese communism as part of a global communist conspiracy, and, second, that the United States should not rely on the Kuomintang to roll back the Chinese communist regime. Such views did not support the more expansive notions of a global crusade against communism that some proponents of the Cold

War wanted to wage. Joseph McCarthy and his followers wanted to destroy the influence of intellectuals who stood in the way of this expansive notion of the Cold War, and they slandered Fairbank and other such intellectuals. In the name of protecting academic freedom, Harvard helped to defend senior faculty like Fairbank, although to their shame, they did not come to the defense of another teacher of mine, at the time a junior professor, Robert Bellah. Thus university-based research centers stood at least partially in opposition to state policies, and they tried to provide an understanding of China that would be policy-relevant but objective. Research on China was carried on outside of university based research centers of course, in institutions like the CIA and State Department, institutions oriented directly toward policy formation. During the McCarthy era, however, many of the China experts were purged from these institutions, leaving US policy toward Asia vulnerable to being driven more purely by ideological considerations. This contributed at least partially to the disastrous slide into the Vietnam war. During the late '60s, university-based China research centers became the sites of strong opposition to the Vietnam war, and strong opposition to US policy toward China. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars was formed by young Asian scholars at the convention of the Association for Asian Studies in 1968. Many of these young scholars were indeed communist sympathizers who supported Mao Zedong's cultural revolution. They engaged in strong debates about this with more senior scholars like John Fairbank. Unfortunately, many of these self-proclaimed Maoist scholars actually

knew little about China or Mao Zedong, and some of them quickly became disillusioned, and even swung to the right wing when they gained more knowledge. Other scholars of that generation, who were better grounded in their knowledge of the real world, strove to develop new self-critical approaches to studying Asia. Paul Cohen, whom Professor Kagami cites as an important critic of orientalism in China studies, was a good example of such a scholar. But he was by no means an outsider to China area studies. The support for his research came from the Harvard Fairbank center for East Asian Research. This account of the development of China area studies in the United States differs slightly from Professor Kagami's, because it suggests that, first, university-based area studies was not in a simple direct way oriented toward state policy research, and, second, that it facilitated critiques of orientalism as well as support for orientalism.

What are the implications of this for Professor Kagami's inspiring vision of a new paradigm of co-behaviorism in China studies? I agree with him that orientalism persists in the area studies that is based in China research centers at American universities. I would, however, have more confidence that critiques of such orientalism could arise from within such research centers. In the United States at least, the strongest base of orientalism is not within area study centers, but within the mainstream specialised social science disciplines: economics, political science, sociology. Very often these disciplines seek to develop universal theories that are in fact based particularistically in American conditions. Area study centers tend to support more inter-disciplinary approaches with more of an

orientation toward the languages and cultures of China. They also inform and encourage kinds of research based more on practical reason than theoretical reason. This is more likely to foster genuine intersubjective encounters with China than research in mainstream social science. One sign that area studies could possibly harbor threats to the hegemonic ethnocentrism, — orientalism—in American social science is that under present circumstances, universities and funding agencies are no longer willing to support such centers. Pushed out of the mainstream, they are a good place to begin swimming against the tide.

●—司会 それでは、愛知大学の馮昭奎先生、お願いします。

●—馮昭奎 加々美先生の現代中国学の「現代中国学の新たなパラダイム：コ・ビヘイビオリズムの提唱」は、大変に重要な問題提起をなされて、示唆に富んだ論文だと思います。私は、論文のなかに提起されていた、いくつかの問題をめぐってコメントをさせていただきます。

第1は、中国問題の特殊性です。中国国内変化の速さは、現代中国学研究を難しくさせる面があると思います。改革開放前後の変化の激しさを言うまでもありませんが、改革開放以降の中国も目まぐるしく変化してきました。特に文化大革命です。中国の日本研究に対して非常に大きな影響を与えました。

加々美氏の論文で指摘されているように、中国の改革開放以降は、日本の中国研究界では、かつての中国文化革命支持者、毛沢東支持者が「文化革命の実像を見ずに、一方的に中国の毛沢東を美化した」と激しい批判を被るようになりました。そのなかで、彼らは沈黙を強いられるようになりました。