A New Paradigm for Modern Chinaology

A call for co-behaviorism

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Introduction: Focus of this Article

In March 2007, I was invited to participate in a symposium on “Probing knowledge at the frontiers of ‘area studies’”, hosted by the Science Council of Japan, where I had the opportunity to debate the issue of ‘area studies’. The opinion of the majority of speakers was that, unlike other academic fields of study, it is almost impossible to define ‘area studies’ in terms of its own theoretical discipline, and that ‘area studies’ is interdisciplinary, serving as an ‘arena’ where various academic sciences meet. I advocated an alternative opinion, arguing that not only was a specific methodology distinct from other academic fields necessary for ‘area studies’, but also that the establishment of such a methodology was possible. However, it has to be admitted that ‘area studies’ at present does not have its own academic methodology. In fact, there is probably a reason why, in English, ‘area studies’ or ‘regional studies’ are known as ‘studies’, and there is no such term as ‘regionology’. Of course, Chinese studies, which has come to be seen as one genre of ‘area studies’, is no exception.

In that sense, it would seem that, if Chinese studies did have an established research methodology, its name should be changed to China-ology (hereafter Chinaology). Applying the same principle to ‘area studies’ as a whole, we would end up with terms such as ‘Indonesiology’, ‘Thaiology’, ‘Iranology’, ‘Iraqology’ and ‘Kenyaology’. In that case, the term ‘area studies’ itself would become redundant.

However, I argued for the establishment of a specific methodology for ‘area studies’ because there are several well-grounded reasons for doing so. The first is that, since the end of World War II through to the present day, biases caused by orientalism (undeveloped East, civilized West, western-centric), which is deeply rooted in ‘area studies’, have been apparent and in fact continue to worsen with the passing of the years. This issue is the central focus of the present article.

1. The Birth of ‘Area Studies’ and State Policy Research: Political Implications

In terms of the relationship between the world and Asia/Africa (hereafter abbreviated to AA), the twenty or so years from the late 1940s to the early 1960s saw former colonies in the AA region gain political independence one after the other, while at the same time American military and economic presence in the former suzerain states increased dramatically. Simultaneously, this period signaled the dawn of the Cold War, which diametrically opposed the socialist eastern world and the liberal western world.

It is within this context that, just after the end of World War II in 1946, John K. Fairbank, Don McKey and others set up the ‘Faculty Committee on International and Regional Studies’ at Harvard University, thus creating the research field known as ‘area studies’. As Fairbank was a Chinese scholar, research on

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1 Tokushuu 1: Chiiki kenkyuu no saizensen: chi no sousen (Special issue 1: Probing knowledge at the frontiers of ‘area studies’); Gekkan: Gakujutsu no doukou (Monthly magazine: Trend of Academy), Science Council of Japan SJC Forum, June 2007.
2 It was Takeru Hayashi and Hiroichi Yamaguchi of the Institute of Developing Economies who promptly argued for a methodology for ‘area studies’ after the war. Hayashi Takeru, Gendai ‘chiiki kenkyuu’ ron (Contemporary theories of ‘area studies’); Institute of Developing Economies in-house research department, March 1969; Yamaguchi Hiroichi, ‘Chiiki kenkyuu’ ron (Theories of ‘area studies’), Institute of Developing Economies, March 1991.
3 AA is being used here not as a geopolitical term, but as a conceptual term to cover the entire developing world, including Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Central and South America.
China became the cornerstone of ‘area studies’.

Looking at the history leading to the birth of ‘area studies’ in the USA, it is said to have been spawned by necessity during war, particularly World War II. For example, the following comment was made by James B. Conant, president of Harvard University, in 1949, on the creation of ‘area studies’ at Harvard by Fairbank.

The various roles we served for the armed forces during the war included the training of students sent to us to be prepared to govern occupied territories. This included study of the language, culture, geography and economics of a particular country or region. Having seen that this method of research is of great value, similar types of programs are already being undertaken at graduate school level, and several more are being planned.

The post-war birth of ‘area studies’ was thus a continuation of the process necessitated by war, and as such was heavily influenced from the start by the rapid development of the post-war international political situation. In particular, it was influenced by and embraced America’s anti-communist policy of containment after the establishment of Cold War structures and the People’s Republic of China in October 1949. Furthermore, Secretary of State Acheson’s January 1950 speech, entitled ‘Crisis in China—An Examination of United States Policy’, led to a debate questioning responsibility over the issue of ‘who lost China?’, and strong criticism of American policy on China during the Kuomintang-Communist civil war from 1945 to 1949. Riding on the wave of this criticism was the ‘McCarthyism boom’, an anti-Communist movement started by J.R. McCarthy, senator from 1948 to the mid-1950s. In this general mood, the pro-Communist sympathies of those such as Fairbank, Owen Lattimore and Edgar Snow, a journalist best-known for his book ‘Red Star over China’, came under attack. The Korean War, which began in June 1950 and continued until the signing of the Panmunjeom Armistice Agreement in July 1953, only reinforced this trend.

At about the same time as the end of the Korean War, President Eisenhower took over power from President Truman, and there was a change in security policy. The policy adopted in Truman’s presidency by George Kennan and others had been a relatively moderate containment policy, but under Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Dulles advocated the ‘domino theory’ policy, further strengthening anti-communist sentiment in Asian and Chinese policy. At the same time, military commitment was bolstered throughout the AA region in the former colonies and suzerain states of the UK, France and the Netherlands.

From another perspective, the colonies of the AA region gained independence one after another throughout the 1950s, and in April 1955, the first Asian-African conference (Bandung conference) was held in Bandung, Indonesia. From the late 1950s, beginning with the former French Indochina, America strengthened its military commitment in AA, necessarily providing economic aid in conjunction with military support, and thus increasing the dependency of AA countries, a method which was known as ‘neocolonialism’.

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As ‘neocolonialism’ was occurring synchronously with the Cold War, the AA region along with Latin America (hereafter referred to as AALA) was transformed into a picking field, where the two superpowers, the USA and Soviet Union, sought to extend their power. The result was a series of regional conflicts in many parts of the AALA region, fought on behalf of the two superpowers. The use of the concept of ‘region’ in ‘regional conflict’ is striking. It implies not only that the pre-existing countries or lands of the AALA people were not recognized as equivalent political entities to western nations prior to colonization, but even after achieving independence and establishing sovereignty after the war, although they were recognized formally, they were not recognized in practice in global consciousness as independent units of international society.8

When Fairbank first instigated ‘area studies’, the concept of ‘region’ naturally referred to western as well as AA areas. During the Cold War, however, once ‘region’ had started to be used as a political concept, it was almost exclusively used in reference to AALA countries, and the west was effectively excluded from the description. For example, from the end of the 1950s through the 1960s, the Sussex University in the UK focused research on ‘area studies’. At first, Europe, America and ancient and medieval studies were included, but gradually the focus of research became limited to South-east Asia, Africa, East Asia and the Soviet Union.9

At almost exactly the same time as the establishment of the ‘Faculty Committee on International and Regional Studies’ at Harvard University, the Far Eastern Institute was founded at Washington University in 1946 (renamed the Far Eastern and Russian Institute in 1949), and at Columbia University, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the East Asian Institute was opened in 1948, with a scope of research covering the whole of East and South-east Asia. In this way, there was a sudden blooming of ‘area studies’ in various parts of the USA, with ‘Chinese studies’ taking center stage. In 1955, the year of the Bandung conference and the beginning of an intervention in Indochina by America, Chinese Economic and Political Studies was introduced at Harvard University under the leadership of Fairbank as a successor to the ‘Faculty Committee on International and Regional Studies’, and this was subsequently used as a base for the establishment of the Center for East Asian Research (later renamed the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research). Responding to the demands of the times, therefore, ‘Chinese studies’, within the framework of ‘East Asian area studies’, made a fresh start.10

With the change of government from Eisenhower to Kennedy, the Cold War system became still more deeply entrenched, and the concept of ‘region’, altered accordingly. Within the rubric of ‘area studies’, Chinese studies, which from its outset had been embroiled in the American government’s security policy practical demands and concerns, deferred many of its basic research issues and intensified its role as an

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8 The history of the usurpation of the lands of indigenous peoples by western powers is not limited to AALA, but also can be seen in the usurpation of the land of the indigenous people of America (American Indians). Koyama Susan, Amerika Indian: Shitou no rekishi (American Indians: History of their struggle), Sanichi shobo, November 1995.
10 Ishikawa Tadao, Haavaado daigaku ni okeru chuugoku kenkyuu (Chinese studies at Harvard University), Nihon Gaisei Gakkai, Kikan Gaisei (International Politics Quarterly), Vol. 4, April 1957; Ibid., Coronbia daigaku no chuugoku kenkyuu (Chinese studies at Columbia University), Kikan Gaisetsu (International Politics Quarterly), Vol. 6, July 1957; Ibid., Washinton daigaku no chuugoku kenkyuu (Chinese studies at Washington University), Kikan Gaisetsu (International Politics Quarterly), Vol. 8, January 1958.
organ of state policy research. That is to say, America, as the leading power of the liberal camp, sought to defend liberalism and bolster its power, while the Soviet Union did the same with socialism. Sometimes opposed, sometimes in collaboration, the end result was that this period heralded the division of the world into spheres of control of the two camps. To achieve the goal of world division, ‘area studies’ vis-à-vis AALA constituted vital state-level research. It is naturally easy to see how the ‘orientalism’ worldview (undeveloped AALA, civilized west) fitted into this equation.

It can be seen from the above that this first stage of ‘area studies’ was conceptualized in relation to post-war period demands, especially the demands of the time to respond to the international political and economic climate controlled by the two great powers of the USA and the USSR. I would like to ‘define’ area studies in this period as essentially a research field biased toward ‘state policy research’.

2. The Birth of ‘Area Studies’ in Post-war Japan and its Political Implications

(1) The establishment of the Institute of Chinese Affairs and the starting point of post-war ‘Chinese studies’: the eve of ‘area studies’

In Japan under the American military occupation, the first post-war Chinese research institution to be established was the Institute of Chinese Affairs in January 1946. This was followed by the creation of the affiliated Association for Modern China Studies in May 1951. Many of the key researchers in these two research bodies had been members of state policy research institutes such as the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company and the East Asian Research Institute, studying Japan-China relations collaboratively before and during the war. Many of these founding members resumed Chinese studies engaging in ‘sinology’ from a Marxist left-wing perspective or pro-communist perspective, with a sense of expiating guilt after the war. However, post-war ‘Chinese studies’ undertaken by the two research bodies could not be categorized in character as ‘area studies’. The reason was not to do with the pro-communist, left-wing nature of the research of the Institute of Chinese Affairs. In the early days of ‘area studies’ in the USA, Fairbank’s research in the late 1940s was highly pro-communist in nature. The problem was that post-war research by the Institute of Chinese Affairs and the Association for Modern China Studies, unlike the ‘sinology’ undertaken in the pre-war and wartime periods, was not supported by the Japanese government in terms of personnel or capital. Unlike the early American ‘area studies’, Chinese studies in Japan no longer had a function in state policy research.

Having said that, in its early period of formation, the Institute of Chinese Affairs did intend to start its research with the backing of the Japanese government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim was to establish a research institute that would continue, as in the pre-war period, to conduct state policy research, yet would be a left-wing, communist-leaning institute. Specifically, the plan was to establish the Institute of Chinese Affairs using the funds of the “Japan-China Association”, a state policy institute which had been set up with Fumimaro Konoe as president in March 1945, shortly before the war.

Further details on the state policy bias of ‘Chinese studies’ in the US in this period can be found in: Kokubun Ryousei, Amerika no chuugoku kenkyuu (Chinese studies in the USA). In Nomura, Yamauchi, Uno, Takeuchi & Okabe (eds.), Iwanami kouza: Gendai chuugoku: Bekkan 2: Gendai chuugoku kenkyuu annai (Iwanami lectures: Contemporary China Volume 2; Guide to contemporary Chinese studies), Iwanami shoten, August 1990.
was lost, and had been forced to shut down by GHQ just after the end of the war.\footnote{12} A point which has to be noted is the fact that many of the founding members of the Institute of Chinese Affairs had had close connections with Konoe during the war. Prince Fumimaro Konoe was the head of the Konoe family, one of the five regent houses (gosekke) of the Fujiwara clan, directly related to the Imperial family. As a student at Kyoto Imperial University, he was ideologically influenced by Hajime Kawakami (then professor of Kyoto Imperial University), an early Marxist scholar, and he exhibited strong pro-communist leanings even after entry into the political world. For example, Konoe appointed as aides people such as Hotsumi Ozaki (part-time member of the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company), who was later arrested and hanged for his involvement in the Sorge case.\footnote{13} Through such connections, people such as Takeo Ito and Yoshitaro Hirano also came under the patronage of Konoe, and engaged in state policy research.

In actual fact, the plan to take over the funds of the Japan-China Association was refused by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (still the Ministry of Greater East Asia at the time) and did not materialize, so the Institute of Chinese Affairs began life on a grant of 100,000 yen instead. This was because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was still under the control of the American military occupation immediately after the war, and could not ignore the will of GHQ or make independent decisions.

Of the founding committee members of the Institute of Chinese Affairs, five were Communist Party members and left-wing Marxist researchers, who in the early 1930s had belonged to the Proletarian Science Research Institute, a left-wing research institute. They were Yoshitaro Hirano, Michio Iwamura, Shotaro Ozaki, Kenji Asakawa and Isao Nakamishi. The other four committee members were pro-communist but not Marxist, and were relatively liberal researchers. They were Takeo Ito and Kanesaburo Gushima, formerly of the ‘Japan-China Association’, and Shiro Nohara.\footnote{14}

As a result, the Institute of Chinese Affairs in its early days did not really fly the flag of left-wing Marxism, but rather started out by adopting a middle-of-the-road stance. For example, before the civil war broke out in August 1946, the first director of the Institute, Yoshitaro Hirano, along with others, still supported Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang as well as Mao Zedong’s Communist Party, as is evidenced by this extract from a lecture given at (old system) First High School, “The CPC and KMT will never fight against each other”.\footnote{15} Around this time, in May 1946, Wataru Kaji, who was well-known for having set up the ‘Anti-war alliance of Japanese people’ in Guilin, China, in September 1939, and for having participated in Chinese anti-Japanese war activities, returned to Japan and joined the Institute of Chinese Affairs, where he provided information on the KMT and the actual situation of the civil war. From this time, the stance of the Institute of Chinese Affairs gradually started to become more left-wing, critical of

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\item 13 Miyanishi Yoshio (ed.), Mantetsu chousabu to Ozaki Hotsumi (The Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company and Hotsumi Ozaki), Akishobo, September 1983.
\item 14 Itou Takeo and Nohara Shirou, —san no gakumon to shisei: Chunken 30 nen soukatsu ni sokushite (The work and stance of Shiro Nohara: A summary of 30 years of the Institute of Chinese Affairs), Ajia Keizai Jumppou (Asian Economy Bulletin), Vol. 1186, 1st May 1981.
\end{itemize}
the Kuomintang and supportive of the Communist Party.\(^{16}\)

As the Institute of Chinese Affairs went through these changes during 1947 and 1948, international society was also undergoing rapid transformation as it formed itself into East-West Cold War structures. This also had a significant effect on the Institute of Chinese Affairs’ shift to the left. With the division of Berlin into east and west in May 1949, and the birth of the People’s Republic of China in October that year, the left-wing shift of the Institute of Chinese Affairs was confirmed. The exact same period, however, was also marked by 180 degree volte-face of American military (GHQ) policy in Japan, from pro-communist, democratic and anti-militaristic policies to anti-communism and remilitarization. As this reverse course policy took hold, response to the McCarthyism of 1950s America, led to Red Purges even in Japan.

On the other hand, the Japanese government at this time was undertaking the first post-war transactions under American rule, aiming to free Japan of occupation and restore sovereignty through a peace treaty, an aim which was nominally achieved by the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (September 1951, effective from April 1952). In reality, however, the independent sovereignty of the Japanese nation was achieved in name only, since the Japan-US Security Treaty concluded at the same time, bound Japan into dependency on the US, and anti-communist sentiment became more apparent in both domestic and foreign policies.

By this point, there was absolutely no place for the research activities of the pro-communist, left-wing Institute for Chinese Affairs in relation to Japanese government policy. There was also very little awareness of the trend of post-war American ‘area studies’. And so, Japanese researchers had no consciousness of themselves as ‘area studies’ researchers.

(2) The formation of the Japan Association for Asian Studies and the birth of ‘area studies’

The first voices of ‘area studies’ in Japan came to be heard after the establishment in June 1953 of the Japan Association for Asian Studies (formerly the Japan Association for Asian Political and Economic Studies: hereafter JAAS). At this point, just over a year had passed since the implementation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and Japan was no longer under American military occupation and had regained independent sovereignty. In addition, it was just the stage when the government was trying to display autonomy in both domestic and foreign policy. As stated above, the demand for restoration of autonomy was practically impossible to achieve due to being compelled to dependency on the US through the Japan-US Security Treaty and the rise of the East-West Cold War world structure, but the fact that some of the leaders of the nation at least possessed a subjective desire for autonomy, cannot be denied.

From 1952, with sovereignty formally restored, the Japanese government was in a situation of increasingly having to depend on and follow the US, which meant that in policy-making, of necessity, they were blocked from following roads such as Fumimaro Konoe’s pro-communist government, and had to choose the path inclined to more anti-communist policies. JAAS was formed at the height of this period. The aim of JAAS as an association was to recognize and work both with the Japanese government leaders who had a subjective desire for the restoration of autonomy in domestic and foreign policy, and with the real situation in which the government was heading on a path of America-dependent, anti-communist

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policy. It is this fact, together with the subjective intention to carry out state policy research that provides the grounds to claim that JAAS was the pioneer of ‘area studies’ in post-war Japan.

The main members of the first committee of JAAS were researchers such as Toshio Ueda, Nagamichi Hanabusa, Keishiro Irie, Yoichi Itagaki, Kakuten Hara, Shigeto Kawano, politicians such as Toru Nakagawa, head of the Asia Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Heishiro Ogawa, section head of the same, and business leaders such as Shigeo Mizuno, vice-president of the National Pulp Company. Financial support was obtained from the Research Office of the Cabinet Secretariat and the Asia Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It therefore had all the necessary requisites to be oriented to state policy research.

In a roundtable discussion reminiscing 30 years of JAAS, one of the founder members, Nagamichi Hanabusa, touched upon the process preceding the formation of the association before and during the war. He recollected how, from about the time of the Fumimaro Konoe cabinet of 1937, the trend of ‘prioritizing Asia’ arose, and how this trend was led in the national education sector by Toshio Ueda of the Institute of Oriental Culture of Tokyo University, and in the private education sector by himself at Keio University. The Konoe cabinet actually instigated the ‘prioritizing Asia’ policy from 1938, when the Asia Development Board (Kouain) was established as a central government agency, and Konoe made a famous speech on ‘Theory of the New Order in East Asia’. In other words, under Konoe’s patronage, Ueda and Hanabusa were in the position of leading research on Asia in Japan. Using this connection between Ueda and Hanabusa that already existed before the war, from about the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, Ueda worked on Hanabusa and they planned the organization of JAAS. In this process, Ueda became the first chairperson of JAAS. Before the war, from 1930 to 1937, he had been a professor at Toua Doubun Shoin University in Shanghai, and after that was employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on state policy concerning Manchuria, but was also engaged in mainly contemporary Chinese studies (Sinology) while employed in the Institute of Oriental Culture of Tokyo University.

Another of the founding members, Yoichi Itagaki, was employed as an Associate Professor at the Tokyo College of Commerce, where he lectured on ‘colonial policy’. In December 1942, he joined the college’s ‘Research Institute of East Asian Economies’ (headed by Kaname Akamatsu) and went to Singapore, and from there took part in the Malaya military administration as a military headquarter’s intelligence personnel. His career also included involvement in organizational support for the Malayan People’s Liberation Movement.

In light of the above, the fact that most of the main committee members of JAAS at the time were engaged in research connected to national Japanese policy before and during the war, it may make it seem quite natural that JAAS began with the structure and nature it adopted.

On the other hand, as discussed above, many of the founding committee members of the Institute

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18 Ueda Toshio kyouju ryakureki/chosaku mokuroku (A brief biography of Professor Toshio Ueda and index of his works), Tokyo University Institute of Oriental Culture, Toyou bunka kenkyujo kiyou (Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture), Issue 37, March 1965.
19 Itagaki Yoichi, Jiko no naka ni eien wo (Eternity in self), Bungeisha, April 2004.
of Chinese Affairs had also had careers in state policy research under the patronage of Konoe. The difference between JAAS and the Institute of Chinese Affairs was in the issue of whether the research was inclined toward a Marxist, left-wing or pro-communist stance or not. Among the early committee members of JAAS, there was no notable inclination to left-wing or pro-communist research. This point is explained by Tadao Ishikawa, one of the representative young (in his 30s at the time) founding committee members of JAAS, who recalls in his autobiographical ‘Memoirs’ how, when the People’s Republic of China (hereafter abbreviated to new China) was born in October 1949, the general trend among Japanese researchers was to ride on the wave of what was seen as historical inevitability and praise of the Chinese Communist Party. In contrast, he had a much less emotional view of the Chinese communist government, and maintained a stance of researching it objectively and critically. He goes on to explain how he and other young researchers with a similar stance, such as Shinkichi Eto of Tokyo Institute of Technology, Masataka Banno of Tokyo University, and Yuji Muramatsu of Hitotsubashi University, gradually came to have their voices heard as the tide of criticism of the Chinese communist government gradually began to swell from 1955 onwards.20 Like Ishikawa, Shinkichi Eto was also one of the young researchers included in the founding committee of JAAS.

The tide of criticism of the Chinese communist government mentioned here by Ishikawa probably refers to the following situation. Influenced by the Chinese revolution immediately after the birth of new China, the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter abbreviated to JCP) adopted Mao Zedong’s battle strategy of an ‘agrarian people’s war’ from the 1950s. As a result, divisions within the JCP (between the ‘soft-line faction and the ‘internationalist faction’) intensified, and lynchings and inquisitions ensued. At the 6th JCP Congress in July 1955, a change of policy rejecting the militant path and adopting a peaceful path was made in order to quell the situation, but this only augmented the impact within the party (6th Congress neurosis) and caused a number of members to resign. In this situation of disorder, a regular tide of doubt and criticism mounted vis-à-vis communism, or more specifically vis-à-vis the Japanese Communist Party. This was followed in February 1956 by a speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress by Khrushchev criticizing Stalin, who had died 3 years previously. Facts concerning the large-scale purges of the Stalin dictatorship were made public, and this caused even greater waves of doubt about communist political groups and political power.

Concurrently, as discussed above, this was the period when Cold War structures were solidifying and American security policies were being strengthened, particularly anti-communist and anti-Chinese policies in AALA countries (Domino theory). This situation, together with the escalating anti-communist stance adopted by the Japanese national government, which was locked within the confines of increased dependency on the US in the Japan-US Security Treaty, only accelerated the waves of doubt vis-à-vis communism.

It goes without saying that the adoption of a critical, objective stance toward communism is quite different from the adoption of an anti-communist stance. At a roundtable discussion reflecting on 30 years of JAAS, Shinkichi Eto summarized the situation as follows:

At the beginning of the 1950s, many of the academic organizations formed immediately after the war, such as the Association of Democratic Scientists, the Historical Science Society of Japan, the Institute of Chinese Affairs and the Association for Modern China Studies, accorded positions of authority to

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20 Ishikawa Tadao, Kafuku wa azanaeru nawa no gotoshi (Good and bad fortune are next-door neighbors), Shougakkan, December 1997, pp. 78–80.
communist or Marxist members, undertaking social activities with a clear political stance. I heard that, in contrast, the idea of JAAS was to create an academic society that would maintain a certain distance from politics and provide a place for Asian researchers to carry out more positivist research.

Responding to this comment by Eto, Yoichi Itagaki said, “That’s true, but not excluding Marxist scholars is also a matter of freedom”, and Nagamichi Hanabusu added, “We didn’t try to exclude them. While we had power as leaders, it was fine to admit Marxist members”. In other words, although many researchers in JAAS examined communism rationally and critically using a positivist approach, this approach was not necessarily anti-communist, and if anything, was sympathetic to communism.

However, the realities of the political situation within and beyond Japan meant that, in JAAS, political dynamics pushed the pro-communist stance to the background, and there was no real option but to side with anti-communism. However, this actually may have worked to draw JAAS’s research closer to ‘area studies’ in the sense of state policy studies as it originated in the US. In fact, since the beginning, JAAS had demonstrated a keen interest in movements in Chinese studies and Asian studies in the US. For example, shortly after the founding of JAAS, its first chairperson, Toshio Ueda, spent one year from September 1953 to August 1954 traveling and studying in the USA, UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland and India. After his return, he soon published an article entitled ‘Chinese studies in America’ in the journal ‘History Education’ and another article entitled ‘Asian studies in America’ in the journal ‘Americana’. The following is a summary.

After the war, while intensification of confrontation with the USSR led to an upsurge of Soviet studies, America itself saw as failure the fact that it allowed the emergence of a communist government on the Chinese mainland, and American Chinese studies began as a necessity to search for ways to deal with the Chinese government after the war, in line with Soviet studies. The article describes how the increasingly dominant conclusion drawn by a large number of Chinese studies scholars, incorporating the views of pro-China researchers such as Fairbank and Benjamin Schwartz, is that Chinese communism is inevitable and there is little chance of China adopting ‘Titoism’ or becoming a member of the non-aligned movement.

Shortly after Ueda returned to Japan, in 1955, the Center for East Asian Research was established at Harvard University, and Chinese studies in the USA took off in earnest. Approximately one year later, from July 1956, one of the young committee members of JAAS, Tadao Ishikawa, spent a year researching abroad at Harvard University. After his return, he too introduced in detail the activities of ‘area studies’ and particularly ‘Chinese studies’ at the main American universities. In this way, JAAS from its very conception had a keen interest in ‘area studies’, especially ‘Chinese studies’ in the USA, and built the foundations of ‘area studies’ in Japan as a continuation of this movement. In the period immediately after the foundation of JAAS, the Japanese economy was experiencing the benefits of the special procurements boom provided by the Korean War, and was gradually but steadily on the road to post-war recovery. At the same time, as Japan’s economic power increased, the idea that it was now time to respond to the need for

21 Ibid., Saiki/zadankai: ‘ajia seikei gakkai’ no sanjyunnen (Reflections/roundtable discussion: thirty years of the Japan Association for Asian Studies, pp. 37–38.
specialist research on Asian issues in the various academic fields of politics, administration and finance expanded, and this also served as motivation in the role of JAAS.\(^{23}\)

However, the first use of the term ‘area studies’ in the Japanese academic world was not by JAAS, but by the ‘Institute of Developing Economies’ (hereafter abbreviated to IDE), which was established at the end of the 1950s.

(3) The foundation of the Institute of Developing Economies and the growth of ‘area studies’

In July 1957, several of the key committee members of JAAS, including Yoichi Itagaki, Kakuten Hara and Shigeto Kawano, who had all been involved in a network of personal connections with Nobusuke Kishi from involvement in the Association for Research into Asian issues in the Manchurian years, arranged for a meeting to be held in Hakone with Prime Minister Kishi via Nobuyuki Fujisaki, Kishi’s secretary. At this meeting, plans for the establishment of the IDE were drawn up.\(^{24}\) The plans drawn up by Itagaki et al envisaged the IDE as a state policy research institute. From the time he had been involved in Malayan military strategy, Itagaki had been the kind of Asian scholar who was not happy to just engage in armchair theory, but also was actively involved as a state policy ‘practitioner’. This point is clearly depicted in Itagaki’s ‘Asian nationalism and economic development’, published in 1962.\(^{25}\)

Itagaki told Nobusuke Kishi that post-war Asian economic development was sustained by nationalist motivation for ethnic independence and autonomy, that Japan’s economic and technical cooperation with Asia should reflect and be based on this spirit, and that, in order to promote cooperative activities, there was a need to develop personnel who understood Asian history and contemporary society, and who had passion for the work. Kishi accepted this request and established the ‘Institute of Developing Economies’ in November 1958 under the jurisdiction of the Minister of International Trade and Industry, thus instigating the first serious undertaking of AALA-related research and personnel development in the form of ‘area studies’.

Immediately after this, Itagaki went abroad on a Rockefeller Foundation grant, and so the first president of the IDE in 1959 was Seiichi Toubata, who had just retired from his post at Tokyo University. Compared to Itagaki, Toubata’s concept of the IDE accorded greater priority to basic research. He thought that the journey to becoming a researcher should begin with experiential knowledge of AALA history and the present, gained through living abroad and fieldwork, and that theory should be developed from this experiential knowledge, with the final stage being implementation at policy level.\(^{26}\) In actual fact, from the later 1950s to the mid-1960s, with the exception of Chinese studies, the number of academic researchers in AALA fields was extremely limited. This was why Toubata did not adopt the idea of ‘state policy research first’. It is said that Toubata accepted the position of president from Kishi only on this

\(^{23}\) Toubata Seiichi, Wagashi, wagatomo, wagagakumon (My teachers, my friends, my research), Kashiwashobo, August 1984, pp. 175–176.

\(^{24}\) Itagaki Yoichi (ed.), Ajia ni michi wo motomete: Fujisaki Nobuyuki tsuitou bunshuu (Looking for a path in Asia: essays in memory of Nobuyuki Fujisaki), Ronosha, 1985. Kobayashi Hideo, Manshuu to jimintou (Manchuria and the LDP), Shinchosinsho, November 2005, especially Chapter 4 on the return to power of the Manchurian network.

\(^{25}\) Itagaki Yoichi, Ajia minzoku shugi to keizai hatten (Asian nationalism and economic development), Toyo Keizai Shinpousha, April 1962. Reading this book in 1963 was the definitive influence on my entry to a career in Chinese studies.

\(^{26}\) Toubata Seichi, Ajia keizai kenkyuusho no kenkyuuyu puran (Research plan for the Institute of Developing Economies), Keidanren geppou (Business federation monthly bulletin), Issue 7, no.9, July 1959. Toubata Seichi, Wagashi, wagatomo, wagagakumon (My teachers, my friends, my research), Kashiwashobo, August 1984, pp. 175–176.
It is a well-known fact that Kishi wanted to lessen Japan’s dependence on the US after the restoration of independent sovereignty gained in the San Francisco Treaty, and that he planned to try to rebuild a nation that is able to develop independent policies with regard to security and international relations as well as internal affairs. In his memoirs, Kishi writes the following:  

As a nation and people located in Asia, Japan was in a position where it needed to positively develop international relations with Asia. To fulfill that purpose, I believed it was necessary to understand the real situation in the newly developing nations, to talk in depth with the respective heads of state, and to find out what their aims were, what they hoped for, and what they were trying to denounce. I believed that the discussions during my visit to the US would be more fruitful if they were based on such knowledge and experience. I judged that creating a place for Japan in Asia, carving out a place for Japan as the center of Asia, would strengthen my position in re-negotiating an equal Japan-US relationship when I met [President Eisenhower]. (emphasis and text in parentheses by Kagami)  

It can be seen from this that the reason Kishi approved Itagaki’s request was that it fitted with his far-reaching plan to reduce dependency on the US by making Japan a leading power in Asia. This plan went as far as remilitarizing Japan through revision of the Peace Constitution (Article 9).

In the end, these plans to reduce dependency on the US never saw the light of day, foundering when Kishi was forced to resign over the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. In this train of events, JAAS and IDE, which were originally intended to have a role in state policy research, ended up without this function.

Although JAAS and IDE had been supported by the Japanese government and the business world since their conception, the early ‘area studies’ researchers were not in a position of having any direct involvement in drafting the government’s external security policies or economic aid and cooperation policies. In this respect, they were able to engage in research much more freely than the pre-war and wartime researchers employed in state policy research institutes such as the South Manchurian railway research department. The only reason the early research of JAAS and IDE can be labeled ‘area studies’ is that the creators of these organizations, represented by figures such as Ueda, Hanabusa and Itagaki, subjectively had a keen sense of the times in the post-war world, alongside pragmatic designs and clear aims for state policy research.

(4) Theories of ‘area studies’ at IDE

About ten years after the start of IDE, from about 1969, the issue of the methodology of ‘area studies’ came to be a topic of active debate. The first person to lay out the issues was a Middle East Arab researcher, Takeshi Hayashi, who at that time was vice-chief of the research department. I would like to...
examine Hayashi’s argument below.  

Hayashi asserted that in the middle of the Second World War, western scholars and university people mobilized to carry out research on various peoples and areas of the world in order to carry out the war effectively had inaccurate understanding and exceedingly poor judgment, and thus could not produce useful results. This was a source of chagrin after the war, providing the impetus for the start of ‘area studies’. There were two reasons why judgment and understanding of various peoples and areas was so meager during the war. The first was that social science disciplines had become very specialized and segmented (many-sided) from the 19th to early 20th centuries, resulting in the phenomenon of ‘a breakdown in the ability to grasp the whole picture of contemporary society’. The second reason was that most of the people and areas which became subjects of research in the war were in the ‘non-western world’, and there was insufficient existing research in this area in the social sciences.

In other words, social science disciplines, in line with modern science, had focused on modernized, homogeneous ‘western societies’, and increased specialization and segmentation was useful in analyzing these societies. However, the subject of research during the war became ‘the world’, and ‘the world’ was different in character from ‘the western world’, being a heterogeneous, diverse ‘non-western world’. The ‘isolated understanding/isolated science’ approach which had been developed in the specialized, segmented social science disciplines proved to be useless in understanding the reality of these new areas of research. Accordingly, ‘area studies’ became a way of researching ‘the non-western world’, and it required an interdisciplinary understanding which involved a grasp of the ‘area’ as a whole.

Furthermore, Hayashi argued that the limitations of these modern social science disciplines lay in their original organization, whereby the meeting of ‘the western world’ (western modern capitalism) with ‘the non-western world’ (eastern societies) concurred with the expansion of ‘the western world’ to take in ‘the non-western world’. In other words, the ‘theory and structure’ of understanding the world that was formed in this process was flawed by its pan-Atlantic centeredness and Olympia complacency. This resulted in a practically invalid understanding of ‘the non-western world’. In order to construct perfect ‘area studies’, therefore, it was first necessary to conquer the bad influence predominant in the general understanding of the world until then, whereby modern social science disciplines had dichotomized ‘the western world’ and ‘the non-western world’, and assumed the superiority of the former and demoting the latter to a lower rung in the system hierarchy.

It is worth noting that Hayashi had already here identified the issue that would be raised by Said and others in the 1970s as ‘orientalism’.

3. ‘Area Studies’ and ‘Chinese Studies’ from the Late 1960s to the Beginning of the 1980s

(1) Criticism of existing ‘area studies’ and new perspectives: Pax Americana and Orientalism

As Takeshi Hayashi was first problematizing theories of ‘area studies’ in the late 1960s, ‘area studies’ in the US was also experiencing a period of upheaval.

At the height of the Eisenhower/Dulles government in the mid 1950s, the tendency within ‘area

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29 Hayashi Takeshi, ‘Chiiki kenkyuu’ron ni yosete: gendai no shakaikagakuteki kenkyuu no tame ni (Theories of ‘area studies’ for modern social science research) Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Ajia/Afurika gengo bunka kenkyujo tsushin (Newsletter of Asian and African studies), No. 8, 25th December 1969.
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studies’ to view contemporary China as ‘a model of totalitarianism’ intensified, and anti-communism was clearly visible. However, Kruschev’s criticism of Stalin provided an opportunity in the later years of the administration at the end of the 1950s to start seeking peaceful US-China coexistence, and anti-communism temporarily went into recession, expanding opportunities for freer research. The Hundred Flowers Campaign in China from 1956 to 1957, when freedom of cultural thought was encouraged, together with Mao Zedong’s rejection of personal adulation at the Sixth Chinese Communist Party National Congress, encouraged this trend further. However, the subsequent Anti-Rightist Movement, Great Leap Forward and People’s Communes were sudden changes which exacerbated demands from political and financial sources for more thorough research on contemporary China which led to an unprecedented surge in ‘Chinese studies’, within the framework of ‘area studies’. This included immense funding from the Ford Foundation for ‘Chinese studies’, rising to 4.47 million dollars in 1961 alone.30 In the same period, the Ford Foundation granted 173,000 dollars (equivalent to 62 million yen at the time) to the Toyo Bunko Oriental library as expenses for collecting materials and information on contemporary Chinese studies. This caused a major debate in Japan’s ‘Chinese studies’ academic circles, with opinion divided on acceptance of the grant.31

In this situation, the analytical framework used in ‘Chinese studies’ expanded beyond the ‘totalitarianism approach’ to encompass a wide variety of analytical approaches, some of which were positive.32 However, the underlying ‘modernity theory’ view which took western modernity as its model remained unchanged and common to all approaches.

The turning point in the academic world came with the intensification of the civil rights movement, which had begun in the late 1950s but increased in power from the beginning of the 1960s, together with the rise of the anti-war movement as the US was mired in the Vietnam war which started in 1965, and also the Chinese Cultural Revolution which began in 1965. Nothing is more symbolic of this turning point than the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), which was formed in 1968. For example, one of the CCAS members, James Peck, developed the critical argument that interpretation of China through western-centric ‘modernity’ theory had been a way of supporting Pax Americana (imperialistic) strategies vis-à-vis AALA, and a way of rationalizing policies regarding China, such as the Domino theory.

There are two problems here. The first is that the nature of ‘area studies’ in the USA necessitated deep involvement in state policy research, and state policy in the USA in the Cold War world system meant security policies, especially security policies concerning AALA countries. Involvement in state policy could incorporate negative involvement, or criticism of state policy, but for the main part it meant positive involvement to support state policy. Once that state policy itself has been proved to be mistaken, it is natural that the ‘area studies’ that was actively connected with the policy should also be subject to criticism. The second reason is that the unshakeable aim of the American Cold War policy, especially vis-à-vis AALA countries, was to defend and expand liberalism on a global scale. This liberalism was heavily tinted with a world view of western modernity, in which orientalism—the dichotomization of the civilized western world and the barbarian non-western world—served the fixed purposes of Pax Americana, to transform old AALA colonialism into a new colonialism. The Vietnam war and the oppression of black

people in the US were seen as symbols of this. Existing ‘area studies’ based on this western modern worldview needed to be subjected to criticism.

Using these two points as their main basis of argument, the new academic tide represented by the CCAS did not restrict itself to criticism of American state policy, but also targeted criticism of ‘area studies’ itself, which had been used to support and justify American state policy since the war.

For example, James Peck even made Fairbank a target of criticism, arguing that, in spite of the fact that Fairbank was a liberal who had continued to defend China, he was in the final count a ‘modernist’, who had conspired with the hegemonic (imperialist) American state policy of defending and expanding liberalism. In response to this criticism, Fairbank naturally maintained that, far from siding with American state policy on China, his position had been one of criticism of this same policy. Nevertheless, Peck continued to problematize Fairbank as a defender of western modernism.

The theory of ‘area studies’ developed by Takeshi Hayashi of the IDE, described above, was influenced by the rise of these new movements within American academic circles, and also by a similar trend which arose in Japan at the same time (the revival of the theories of ‘overcoming modernism’ and criticism of post-war democracy).

Whether it was CCAS or Takeshi Hayashi, however, the target of criticism was the approach and content of ‘area studies’, not the existence per se of ‘area studies’. This was because, although CCAS and Hayashi could not avoid the nature of the existent ‘area studies’ research, they themselves had a pragmatic concern and intention to develop new policies through criticism of existing policies. In other words, although they did not want to conspire with mistaken state policies, they wanted to overthrow the evil of eurocentrism (orientalism) and the hegemonic world structure, and develop a new, practicable ‘area studies’, aiming at new policies built on a new viewpoint.

Such new movements from the late 1960s through the early 1970s paved the way for deconstruction and the criticism of orientalism that were to come in the late 1970s.

(2) Views of deconstruction and criticism of Orientalism, as reflected in ‘area studies’

In the field of Asian studies, in 1978, Said (1935–2003) published ‘orientalism’, in which he outlined in detail the wide-ranging biases of eurocentrism. This was followed in 1984 by P. A. Cohen’s ‘Discovering History in China’, in which the author applied the same kind of critical analysis to ‘Chinese studies’. Over the past four and a half centuries, there have been myriad publications on the theme of ‘orientalism’, not a few of which proposed ‘contemporary Chinaology’ or ‘Asianology’ as a new methodology. Still, the fact remains that, even now, a real ‘Chinaology’ or ‘Asianology’ methodology that could break the chains of ‘orientalism’ has yet to be seen, and the general worldview adopted in Chinese studies, Asian studies and ‘area studies’ remains unchanged, and a continuation of ‘orientalism’. What is the reason for
this situation?


Husserl conceptualized the structure of people’s understanding of the world and the structure of the world being in itself as ‘structure of the being on inter-subjectivity’, and, in relation to this, outlined the importance of the method of suspending judgment (epoché), in order to reduce (return to its original pre-structured state) the ‘structure’ which has been consolidated at the subconscious level, in order to bring it to consciousness. 37 ‘orientalism’ could have arisen as one type of this ‘intersubjectivity of being a structure’. The methodology that began with Husserl’s epoché is usually called phenomenological reductionism, but an extension of this chain of reductionism may be seen in the work of Derrida, Said and Cohen. 38

Accordingly, it is possible to link the thought of Said’s criticism of ‘orientalism’ with his contemporary Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’. As is well-known, the primary object of ‘deconstruction’ is to break free of the restraints of existing structures of thought, or to dismantle structures. And, the construction of new structures of thought after this process of breaking free or dismantling was in itself a target of criticism.

In this sense, Cohen’s 1984 ‘Discovering History in China’ does not exactly fit the concept of Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’, as there was a clear intention to construct a new methodology of Chinese studies after dismantling and breaking free from the ‘orientalism’ of existing research.

Much of the existing Chinese studies research had one-sidedly stressed the discriminatory spatial structuring (horizontal axis) resulting from the ‘western impact’ of viewing modern world history in terms of ‘the eastern world’ and ‘the western world’. Cohen’s ‘discovery of history’ criticized this view harshly, arguing that this one-sided emphasis on spatial structuring arising from the ‘western impact’ resulted in the overlooking or loss of the vertical axis, temporal structuring, resulting from the development of specific histories in the eastern world as well as the western world. He also argued that the discovery of China’s temporal axis (vertical axis), in the form of ‘the process of historical development’, could be a valid method to use to overcome ‘orientalism’.

However, although the ideas in Cohen’s work became common sense among the academic community within less than 10 years, and were talked about, failure to actually overcome ‘orientalism’ became the normalized state of affairs. As a result, the bad influences of ‘orientalism’ persist, both in the academic world of ‘area studies’, and in ordinary people’s consciousness.

As well as Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’, Said and Cohen used this reductionism method to try to dissipate the distorted epistemological structures of the conceptual world of orientalism, but they never showed a particularly strong interest in actually overthrowing the orientalist structure of being of the real

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36 Hori Eizo, Fussaaru no genshougakuteki kangen: 1890 nen daisu ‘Ideen 1’ made’ (Husserl’s phenomenological reductions: from the 1890s to ‘Ideen 1’), Koyoshobo, February 2003.
38 As explained in the next section, the position taken in this article is that ‘intersubjectivity’ emphasizes the static elements of subjectivity too much, thus ignoring or neglecting the dynamic and intentional concepts. While adopting most aspects of the concept, I would therefore like to re-label it ‘co-behaviorism’, and make it a core concept in the methodology of contemporary Chinaology. Kagami Mitsuyuki, Kagami no naka no Nihon to Chuugoku (Japan and China in the mirror), Nippon Hyoronsha, August 2007.
world. That is to say, there was a lack of practical action to overturn the actual western-centric political structures associated with the Pax Americana. This may partly be due to the fact that postmodernism and poststructuralism throughout the 1970s and 1980s, to some extent influenced by Derrida, was characterized by its lack of practical application.\(^{39}\) The arrival of the ‘period of non-philosophy’ from the late 1970s may also have had some relevance.

In fact, looking at the actual structures of being of the world, it appears that, in spite of the rise of the NIEs and ASEAN in the 1970s, the structural dynamics (epistemological structure and structure of being) of ‘dependency’ and ‘marginalization’ have not weakened at all, but rather seem to be becoming stronger and more complex. Today, it seems that real resistance to ‘dependency’ and ‘marginalization’ is almost exclusively restricted to the Islamic world, and that the negative influences of ‘orientalism’ continue to be powerfully ‘reproduced’, even in the academic world.

What this state of affairs proves is that ‘deconstruction’ of ‘orientalism’ as an epistemological structure of the conceptual world has been unable to overpower the ‘power of enduring universality’ of ‘orientalism’ as the state of being of the actual world, and has been forced to admit defeat. This is becoming an increasingly serious problem as the generation of the 1960s and early 1970s ages, and the subsequent generations from the late 1970s onwards, who do not know the ideas or reality of the struggles over the Security Treaty or the 1968 student protests, rise to positions of power.

Some time ago, Yoshimi Takeuchi predicted that ‘western modernism’ would continue on its path of ‘self-expansion and ‘self-realization’, and that Asia would be made to conform to its role of ‘continuous defeat’. He drew the conclusion that without resistance (dissension) based on a deep awareness of ‘defeat’, Asia would no longer be able to be Asia, and would end up as a ‘no-self’.\(^{40}\) Yoshimi Takeuchi’s ‘resistance, dissension’ undoubtedly was intended to go beyond the conceptual (epistemological structure) level to include resistance to ‘western modernity’ at a practical (structure of being) level too. The collapse of the Cold War structures from 1989 and trends of the international society since then prove the accuracy of Takeuchi’s predictions. Rather than proving that Asia has overthrown ‘western modernism’, the economic ‘take-off’ phenomenon seen in the NIEs, ASEAN and Asian countries with high economic growth such as India and China from the late 1970s to the beginning of the 21st century just serve to confirm the ‘self-expansion and self-realization’ of ‘western modernism’.

Naturally, ‘area studies’ has also been deeply influenced by the transformations of these times.

\((3)\) Reasons for criticism of ‘orientalism’ in the temporal context

In the mid-1960s, both the Vietnam war and the Chinese Cultural Revolution redirected attention to the original paths of development being adopted in Asia, Africa and the Third World\(^{41}\), and raised critical questions about the tendency to see western modern liberalism as a universal value, which had been the relatively widely-accepted view until then. This tendency was also spurred by the black civil rights

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\(^{39}\) For instance, Akira Asada’s *Tousouron: sukizo kizun no bouken* (Theories of escape: adventures of a schizo kid) and *Kozou no chikara* (The power of structures), as well as Japanese National Railways (JR)’s *Ii hit tabidachi* (Good days out), *Disukabaa Japan* (Discover Japan), followed in the late 1980s by Hiroyuki Itsuki’s slogan *Ekizochikku Japan* (Exotic Japan) are typical examples.

\(^{40}\) Takeuchi Yoshimi, *Kandai towa Nanika; Nihon to Tyugoku no bawai* (What is ‘Modern’; In the case of Japan and China), *Gendai Tyugokuron* (Discus about Modern China), Kawade Shobo, September 1951.

\(^{41}\) The concept of Third World was first proposed by Alfred Sauvy, a French demographer, in 1952. Sauvy Alfred, *Trois Mondes, une planete, L’Observateur*, 14th August 1952.
movement in the US and new left-wing movements, which had started to spread to a global scale from the end of the 1950s. In Japanese society too, the student protests that swept over universities nationwide from the end of the 1960s to the beginning of the 1970s included harsh criticism of post-war democracy as a fiction.\(^{42}\)

At this time, the idea surfaced that Japanese post-war democracy was a product of Japan’s path of modernization following American liberalism. The countless societal contradictions brought about by Japan’s post-war path of following the US from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s—from large-scale redundancies in the name of high industrial ‘rationalization’ causing disputes in places like Miike and Yubari, through major pollution, drug-related and medical malpractice disasters such as Minamata disease, Itai-itai disease and thalidomide babies, to significant contraction of the farming, forestry and fishing industries and disputes over the forced purchase of agricultural land in Narita, and intensification of the double-standard structures separating city and countryside—began to appear. These were some of the reasons for the intense criticism of Japan’s post-war policy of following the US.

In the same period of the latter half of the 1960s, a massive Vietnam anti-war movement appeared in Japanese society, while many Chinese researchers jumped on the bandwagon of supporting (approving) Mao Zedong and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. This was because the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Vietcong) and the Red Guards and anti-establishment faction in China seemed to be a new type of person, willing to confront face on the hegemony (Pax Americana) and deceitful democracy that existed in the background of American modernism.\(^{43}\) The rapid acceptance of postmodern thought from the 1970s can also be seen as part of this tide of the times of criticizing modernism.

Looking back to the late 1960s, Gunnar Myrdal was already criticizing the development aid\(^{44}\) policies then on the increase from developed countries, the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank to developing countries, saying that development judged solely from a simple economic perspective was insufficient, and asserting the necessity of viewing Asia from a holistic perspective, including political, social and cultural factors.\(^{45}\) This was the starting point for a movement that swept across the global academic world through the 1970s, from Amin and Frank’s theories of ‘capitalism at the periphery’ and ‘dependency’,\(^{46}\) to Wallerstein’s theories of ‘the center and the periphery’,\(^{47}\) criticizing and problematizing the distortions (economic, political and conscious structural distortions) caused by the pressure of

\(^{42}\) Oguma Eiji, Minshu to aikoku (Democracy and patriotism), Shinyousha, October 2002. See especially chapter 13. Matsuda Michio, Sengo minshushugi ha kyobou ka: Kyuheiwa mondai danwakai no kaiin toshite (Is post-war democracy a fiction?: perspectives of a member of the former Peace Issues discussion group), Sekai, November 1987 issue, Iwanami shoten.

\(^{43}\) Of course, during the 1960s and 1970s, there were also people like Takaaki Yoshimoto, who continued to express doubts about post-war democracy, but at the same time was against the Vietnam war and maintained a critical stance against support for Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution.

\(^{44}\) In 1960, as 17 African countries gained independence, under the leadership of the US and increasingly under the control of pro-American nations, the UN declared the ‘Decade of Development’, the strategic aim of which was to gain the support of the newly independent Third World countries through development aid. Myrdal’s assertion was a criticism of this trend.

\(^{45}\) Myrdal, G. Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations—3 volumes, Pantheon, 1968. The original version was published in 1963, but Myrdal revised it over the next few years and published a revised version in 1968.


externally-instigated ‘dependency’ and ‘marginalization’ in Asia and Africa, which originated in western countries.

This period was a time of unmasking and calling for the overthrow of the structures of the 350 years or so of western colonial control of Asia and Africa, which had begun with the slave trade in the 17th century. In fact, the ‘1st Asia-Africa Conference’, held in Bandung in April 1955 as many Asian and African countries gradually gained political independence, had called for the abolition of the colonial control system. It was against this trend of political independence that theories of ‘dependency’ and ‘marginalization’ were developed, emphasizing that postcolonialism was being skillfully manipulated in newly political independent AA countries to create structures of increased dependency forming neocolonialism.

However, the criticism of ‘orientalism’ developed by Said and Cohen in the latter half of the 1970s was impatient with the ‘theories of dependency’ and ‘theories of marginalization’ developed by Amin and Frank, arguing that even though they criticized western imperialism and neoimperialism, they still retained many eurocentric viewpoints in their view of the world. In other words, the problem is the dilemma that criticism of ‘orientalism’ necessarily entails engagement with its internal ‘western-centric’ epistemological structure.

Applying the issue to Chinese studies, moves were made not only to expose epistemologically the structures of ‘control and dependence’, ‘center and periphery’ forced on the east by the west since the Opium wars and Taiping rebellion of the 19th century, but also to destroy them in actuality. The deep influence of Maoist thought on Amin and others was reflected in the practical intention to subvert the world structure of dependency/non-dependency through dependency theories. In contrast, the Said/Cohen version argued that, precisely because the ‘dependency theory’ and the ‘marginalization theory’ had this practical intention to destroy, they were unavoidably based on the conscious assumption of the world structure as spatially divided and classified as east and west, and cemented this assumption.

In the ‘Chinese studies’ world in Japan in this period, many of the members of the ‘Institute of Chinese Affairs’ and the ‘Association for Modern China Studies’ were supporters of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. This was because, in Japanese society at that time, they were exposing important aspects of Japan’s compliance with the dependent/non-dependent global structures of control dominated by American hegemony (Pax Americana), and had a strong critical consciousness against this. Atsuyoshi Niijima, Masahisa Suganuma, Toshiro Fujimura, Akio Saito and Kazuo Yamaguchi can be counted among the advocates of this position. In 1983, after the death of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Tomio Yoshida explained that ‘at the time, Japanese society seemed to be bloated with powerful contradictions, so that we were constantly demanding new human creativity’, and in this situation, they could identify their own feelings in ‘the dreams of new human creative potential seen in the Chinese Cultural Revolution’.

Although the word ‘orientalism’ was not used in connection with this critical consciousness, it was to all extents and purposes criticism of ‘orientalism’. It cannot be denied that, like Amin and Frank, the fixed discriminatory structures of spatial awareness of east and west, or fixed structures of the understanding of the world, were in operation.

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(4) The post-Vietnam, post-Cultural Revolution and the decline of criticism of ‘orientalism’

Looking at the facts again, it becomes clear that the majority of researchers who supported the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong did not see themselves as ‘area studies’ researchers. At the time, it was probably only researchers in JAAS and IDE who saw themselves as ‘area studies’ researchers.49

The end of the Vietnam war and the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970s, though, marked a sudden but major turning point in the tide of the academic world. After reunifying north and south, Vietnam took up arms against neighboring Cambodia in December 1978, to which China responded with a massive military offensive in the name of punishment, forcing Vietnam to pull out, all of which was later seen as collusion with an American conspiracy plot (use Asians to fight against Asians).50 Then, at the end of 1978, at the Third Plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of Chinese economic reform, but the reality and cruelty of the Cultural Revolution were made public, causing a definitive turning point.

The Doi Moi (renovation) in Vietnam and Chinese economic reform marked the abandonment in both countries of the original socialist path and a virtual 180 degrees switch to a liberalist market economy. It was no longer possible to see the previous stance of rejecting western modernism in favor of an Asian model of modernism. In this situation, in the Chinese studies world from the end of the 1970s through the 1980s, those researchers who supported the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong were subjected to severe criticism for ‘failing to see the realities of the Cultural Revolution and one-sidedly idealizing China and Mao’, and were effectively forced into silence.51 In roughly the same period, a large number of young researchers who held skeptical views of the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong, joined JAAS, and all at once, much of the research done in Chinese studies came to fall under the umbrella of ‘area studies’. At the same time, the very existence and significance of the Institute of Chinese Affairs and the Association for Modern Chinese Studies were brought into question.52

Through the above process, the situation concerning ‘area studies’ methodology underwent a sea change. The following are especially significant

First, as Asian studies and Chinese studies researchers had gone too far toward idealism, tending to criticize liberalism and be against the war in Vietnam and for the Cultural Revolution, their research was dichotomized into good and bad ideologies or subjective value judgments, and this led to the domination of the debate over major errors made in ‘objective factual understanding’. On the other hand, realism, which stressed positivism and rejected subjective value judgments and was considered to have a high rate of predictability, excelling in factual cognition through objective research, became the leading contender in terms of methodology.

49 Of course, there were researchers who supported the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong, while seeing themselves as ‘area studies’ researchers. For example, Reietsu Kojima, Fumio Kobayashi, Susumu Yabuki and Mitsuyuki Kagami of the Chinese studies group in JAAS fitted into this category.


51 Representative participants in the development of criticism were Mineo Nakajima, Noboru Maruyama, Yoshiyuki Nishi, Younosuke Nagai, Akira Tsujimura and Yutaka Nozawa.

52 From the latter half of the 1980s through the first half of the 1990s, when Shinji Kojima was president of the Institute of Chinese Affairs, the Institute was in a precarious situation in terms of its existence and significance, and reform was a frequent topic of discussion at committee meetings. I participated in these discussions as a committee member of the Institute of Chinese Affairs at the time.
This viewpoint had been apparent in state policy research units before and during the war, such as the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company and the East Asia Research Bureau, in the research of scholars such as Gentaro Suehiro, Isao Nakanishi and Yoshitaro Hirano, and was particularly emphasized in the viewpoints of the ‘Northern China Rural Customs Research Department’ and the ‘Sino-Resistance Research Department’. After the war, similar viewpoints were maintained by major researchers, particularly those with a liberalist viewpoint. As we have already seen, the young committee members of JAAS at the time of its foundation, such as Shinkichi Eto and Tadao Ishikawa, were notable for their viewpoint of stressing ‘positivism’ and ‘rejection of value judgment in favor of objective understanding of the situation’.

In actual fact, as has already been demonstrated in this article, the founding members of JAAS were all, in some way or other, through their experiences before and during the war, researchers with a strong preference for involvement in state policy. However, from 1952, even though Japan was freed from US military occupation and had regained independent sovereignty, dependency on the US increased and autonomous domestic and foreign policies could not be satisfactorily developed, which resulted in JAAS transforming from a state policy organization into an association which attracted a large number of researchers using positivist methodology.

In spite of this, in 1970, one of the founding members of JAAS, Yoichi Itagaki, made an appeal re-stressing the importance of core objectiveness in area studies, in an apparent criticism of this trend. He said:

For the researcher to set a particular research issue in a particular area determined by his own practical and independent research interest and awareness is hardly important. … For area studies researchers, the most important thing is to discover what the specific issue of concern in the area is. What Itagaki was saying was that it is necessary in area studies for the researcher to participate in the situation of the country of research with subjectivity or a certain consciousness of aim. This was clearly a targeted attack on positivist research, with its one-sided bias rejecting subjective and purpose-oriented research.

Still, as the season of political transformation dawned in Vietnam and many other places in the world from the 1960s to early 1970s, the researchers advocating ‘positivism’ were not immune, and it cannot be denied that much of the research done in the field contained purposeful value judgments (specifically liberalism) based on understanding of situations.

The second and more important thing was that the researchers who professed to adhere to ‘positivism’ started to subjectively deny the fact that their own research contained purposeful value judgments, as if it were possible to carry out non-ideological evidence-based research or exclude purposeful value judgments. This tendency became particularly prevalent from the end of the 1970s, in the post-Vietnam, post-Cultural Revolution period.

Naturally, this trend in Japanese area studies was different from the circumstances of area studies in the USA. In the USA, area studies was carried out in line with state policy objectives, and there was no need to deny that the value judgments of liberalism underlay the research methodologically. Having said

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53 For further details on this point, see: Kagami Mitsuyuki, Kagami no naka no Nihon to Chuugoku (Japan and China in the mirror), Nippon Hyoronsha, August 2007, especially Part 1.
that, the issue of how the intervention of liberalist value judgments into area studies in the US related to positivism methodologically is a major issue that was not sufficiently recognized.

4. A New Paradigm: a Call for Co-behaviorism

1. The reproduction of orientalism

Since the late 1970s, orientalism as it exists within ‘Asian studies’ and ‘Chinese studies’ has been repeatedly attacked, and the fact that it has somehow managed to survive unscathed as a powerful structure to the present day, is probably due partly to the limitation of criticism to orientalism as an epistemological construction, partly due to the flaws in this criticism, and partly due to the fact that the theory did not have sufficient power of realization to overthrow the structures of being.

First are the insufficiencies in the criticism of the epistemological construction of orientalism.

In many cases, researchers engaged in ‘area studies’ do not consider themselves to be ‘area studies’ researchers, but instead have a sense of affiliation to specific specialist disciplines, such as politics, economics, business administration, education, sociology, anthropology, history and so on. Accordingly, it is difficult for them to escape from the tendency to see their own engagement in ‘area studies’ as anything more than ‘a place to apply theory’ or ‘a place for evidence’. As I remarked at the beginning of this paper, ‘area studies’ is seen merely as an ‘arena’ where various disciplines can meet, and there is still a widespread view among researchers that this is not enough to make a stand-alone specialist discipline. The number of researchers who are willing to identify themselves as ‘area studies researchers’ is gradually increasing, but is still extremely limited, and most researchers write in their CV under ‘specialist field’, ‘Contemporary Asian theory’ or ‘Contemporary China’ rather than ‘area studies’.

The relation of this point to orientalism is that criticism of orientalism has mainly been directed at ‘Asian studies’ and ‘Chinese studies’, together with other disciplines that border ‘area studies’, such as ‘anthropology’ and ‘history’. In contrast, little if any criticism has been directed at disciplines such as ‘politics’, ‘economics’, ‘business administration’, ‘sociology’, ‘education’ and other similar specialist disciplines. This certainly does not mean that specialist disciplines such as ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ are free of the distorted epistemological structures of orientalism. What it does mean is that, in longstanding specialist disciplines which have essentially so far escaped criticism, such as economics and politics, researchers are able to dabble in area studies as a ‘place to apply theory’ or ‘a place to collect evidence’(arena), but are also able to beat a quick retreat away from the arena back to the safety of their disciplines should they be subjected to criticism regarding orientalism.

To put it differently, criticism of orientalism needs to be applied not only in ‘area studies’ but in all existing specialist disciplines. If not, the epistemological structures at the entry to criticism of orientalism cannot be overthrown, and that is exactly what has happened in reality.

The second problem is the rigid durability of the structure of being of orientalism.

I have defined ‘area studies’ in this paper as having the following two characteristics: (1) the focus of research being on AALA countries and (2) in principle, research has a state policy objective nature, including demands for change of state policy.

If this definition is taken as a prerequisite, the danger is that ‘area studies’ will include consistent participation in the internal and external affairs of the AALA country in question, as well as the subjective purpose of changing the direction of events in the focus country in line with state policy in one’s own country. In the case of intending to change the situation, the researcher’s own individual purpose value
judgments are constantly at work. Furthermore, those value judgments generally point in the same direction as the basic value judgments and the direction of one’s own country, although details may vary.

The important point is that the central figures in reforming the internal and external situation in the AALA of research should be people of that country, and that the area studies researcher, as a foreigner, should not be at the center of the reform body. The role of the ‘area studies’ researcher should be limited to aiding the process of reform of the situation based on the purposeful value judgments of the people originally of that AALA country. However, in practice, many ‘area studies’ researchers overstep this boundary, not restricting themselves to proposing ideas orally, but also tending to become centrally involved in changing events in the focus country. In that case, insofar as ‘area studies’ has a state policy objective, what often ends up happening is that the researcher ends up trying to change the situation in the area of focus by referring to the value judgments of his/her own nation.

The more serious problem is that, in such cases, the value judgments of the country of the researcher are often incompatible with the value judgments of the people in the focus country. Alternatively, there may be alternative or conflicting value judgments held by different groups within the target country, but where one of those central value judgments matches the value judgments of the researcher’s own country, s/he supports this view one-sidedly, ending up going to the extent of participating in civil war, or even playing the role of inciting civil war.

In this way, it is quite common for ‘area studies’ to objectify the existence of people in the country of research, while simultaneously excessively amplifying the function of their own body. The reason for the occurrence of this amplification of one’s own group is the reflection of the methodological distortion apparent in modern science (natural science as well as human and social sciences) of dichotomizing the subject and object of research and habitually according priority to the subject (researcher). In modern science, the target of research is rarely taken to be an equivalent body to the researcher, but rather is seen as an object of research to be reconstructed by the researcher through manipulation (processing). In other words, recognizing oneself as a conscious, autonomous being, but not recognizing the conscious, autonomous being of the focus of research, is the prevalent attitude (behavior).

This division of researcher and researched in the epistemological structure of modern scientific disciplines was reflected at the same time in the structure of being of the world, in which the US, Europe and Japan lined up was perceived as the subject and the AALA countries as the object. Here lay the source of the structure of orientalism. From the 20th century, with the amalgamation of modern science and modern technology into modern science and technology, the tendency for this structure to inflate beyond being an epistemological construct to also become a structure of being was apparent. The rapid development of modern science and technology actually cemented the epistemological structures and structures of being of orientalism.

In the above situation, the countries to which ‘area studies’ researchers belonged developed a highly hegemonic nature, which caused serious problems when these researchers tried to manipulate and change the situation of AALA countries according to their own value judgments. One example, taken from the time before ‘area studies’ existed, are the powerful European, American and Japanese ‘Asian studies’ and ‘Sino-studies’ researchers of the pre-war and wartime period, whose purpose was to administer colonies and exert military control in the AA region. The same tendency was also notable among American ‘area

The term AA region is used in preference to AA countries here as, before and during the war, much of the Asian and African world was under the domination of colonial powers, lacking national sovereignty.
A New Paradigm for Modern Chinaology

However, looking at Japan after losing the war, it can be seen that researchers with this kind of attitude of self-aggrandizement ceased to exist (at least publicly) as Japan’s national hegemony was blocked as it was subordinated to following the US. As we have already seen, though, there was research containing purposeful value judgments and advocating change in the internal and external situations of AALA countries, even under American control. Of course, this was mostly limited to verbal opinion. However, from the 1990s, especially after the Gulf War and the debate over Japan’s contribution to international society, area studies in Japan finally took the leap from restricting itself to verbal debate to start showing interest in developing research with a certain practical objective state policy focus. Still, as area studies in Japan continues to advocate non-ideological, positivist research, there is still a dearth of recognition of the methodological importance of the researcher’s own purposes and value judgments in much of the research.

There are 2 problems.

The first is that the purposes of ‘area studies’ researchers who want to change the situation in AALA countries naturally include certain value judgments, and these judgments tend to reflect orientalism and modernism.

The second is that, since entering the post-Vietnam, post-Cultural Revolution era, many researchers believe that they have to rid their work of epistemological distortions caused by ideology and value judgments, and many researchers think that this is possible. Naturally, such researchers are unable to recognize that their own work inevitably contains certain purposes and value judgments, and they are unable to actualize any methodological self-awareness or self-restraint in regard to orientalism.

(2) Conclusion: call for a new paradigm, co-behaviorism

The reason that orientalism has stubbornly persisted through to the present day is that now, compared to the past, the number of people questioning the victory of liberalism’s ‘self-realization, self-expansion’ project has declined significantly, and with that as a result, orientalism is enjoying a strong revival not only as an epistemological construct but also as a structure of being beyond the western world and deep into the heart of the developing world. From the 1960s, Said and Cohen claimed that structures of eurocentric orientalism were embedded even in the anti-modernism movement that had arisen on a world scale, and in the very debate over the concept. From the 1990s, there is hardly even any criticism of modernism, and orientalism is making a powerful comeback.

Turning this trend from within ‘area studies’ will be extremely difficult, as ‘area studies’ itself has several bottlenecks, including the two points outlined above.

It is for this reason that I would like in this article to call for the re-establishment of ‘nation-studies’ to replace ‘area studies’ as a way of researching AALA countries. For example, research on China would be classified as ‘Chinology’, research on Indonesia would be ‘Indonesiology’ and so on. The prerequisites for this would be as follows.

The first is that the various groups in a country which is the focus of research—specifically government, businesses, individuals, organizations (community organizations, NGOs, academic organizations etc.)—should have the autonomy to aim for innovation and reform in their own country according to their own purposes and value judgments, and this autonomy should be equivalent to that of the foreign ‘nation-studies’ researchers. In this case, the foreign researcher’s own purposeful attitude (value judgments and actions) should be recognized in relation to the make-up of the various bodies.
Secondly, the conscious stance (value judgments and actions) of the researcher and the research subjects should be mutually compatible, so that no subject can dogmatically dominate or manipulate the position of another. This mutual interlinking is referred to here as ‘inter-subjectivity’ or ‘structure of the being on inter-subjectivity’. Naturally, the foreign researcher will also be influenced by this inter-subjectivity.

Thirdly, in the mutual interlinking among the intended positions (actions) of the various subjects above, there will be mutually cooperative and mutually binding functions, and there may also be mutually conflictual functions. These arise from the fact that orientalism blends eurocentric value judgments into mutual understanding as if they were a reflection of mutuality in mutually interlinking ‘inter-subjectivity’. The task of the foreign researcher is to find a path through this packed inter-subjectivity of mutual interlinking, clarify the epistemological constructs and structure of the being of orientalism, discover research issues from within this situation and aim to resolve these issues.

‘Nation-studies’ can only be established once the above three points have been centrally placed within a methodological framework. This methodology will be referred to here as ‘co-behaviorism’.

Chinese studies has had the same problematic issues as ‘area studies’ in the past. Japanese researchers, who are foreigners from the Chinese perspective, have drawn a division between themselves as researchers and China as a research object, and have mistakenly adopted a superior position vis-à-vis the Chinese research objects. In this process, the fact that Chinese people and society are autonomous subjects with their own aims and intentions has been overlooked, and this has led to a situation in which there is a lack of methodological awareness about the workings of ‘inter-subjectivity’ or ‘inter-subjectivity on being’, which attend the mutual interlinking effects of Japan and China ‘reflecting each other in a mirror’.

An even more basic problem is that this mirror-like ‘inter-subjectivity’ or ‘inter-subjectivity on being’ does not remain unchanging and static throughout the process of history, but is dynamic, constantly changing with the times. What this means is that inter-subjectivity (as a mirror) is always, to some extent, distorted by the time in which it exists. At present, the ultimate ‘distortion’ has to be ‘orientalism’. This ‘distortion’, by its very nature, cannot be complete, and neither can it be of a permanently irremovable nature. The mirror, namely ‘inter-subjectivity’, is constantly transforming. Accordingly, there is a need for a new methodology that can rectify ‘distortions’ as they arise in this process of change. This is what the ‘nation-studies’ methodology, co-behaviorism, can achieve.

‘Behavior’ can be translated into the word ‘taido’ in Japanese, but ‘taido’, is usually translated into English as ‘attitude’, includes a person’s stance and conduct, as well as their viewpoint or position. In other words, it is the intention a person has in a given situation based on his/her value judgments. I will explain this with reference to the concrete issue of pollution in China.

In a number of cities and counties in 2005, there were incidents involving large-scale water pollution by chemical companies who had been attracted by county governments to chemical factories located on the banks of tributaries of the Yangtze river, and who discharged factory waste including nitrogen.

56 Wataru Hiromatsu extracted the importance of the concept of ‘inter-subjectivity’ from Husserl’s philosophy and started to use it at the beginning of the 1970s, but did not pay sufficient attention to the aspect of dynamic change. Hiromatsu Wataru, Sekai no kyoudou shukan-teki somai konzou (Intersubjectivity of being in the world), Keiso shobo, October 1972.
compounds through drains into the river. Naturally, local residents suffered damage to their health, and protest movements sprung up. However, for the county government, the same factories were an important source of tax revenue income, and losing them would be a major financial blow. The county government knew, of course, that the central government had strict policies on environmental pollution, and so the county’s Environmental Protection Bureau started to play the main role in actively dealing with the problem, on the surface at least, by conducting investigations and drawing up regulations. Researchers in county universities specializing in environmental protection also took part in the investigations. At the same time, the county government adopted the policy of suppressing the local residents’ protest movement.

By chance, a group of foreign researchers from various countries happened to visit the county at the time, and the county Environmental Protection Bureau made arrangements for them to carry out a survey into environmental issues. The results showed that the levels of water pollution in the county grossly exceeded environmental standards, the solution would be to apply pollution control legislation strictly, but that this would be difficult due to the low administrative efficiency inherent in the general practice in China of ‘if there is a policy at a higher level, our job is to take countermeasures’. The researchers presented these results in the academic circles of their own countries.

The main parties making up this situation are the chemical factories, the residents, the county government, Chinese university researchers, the Chinese central government and the foreign researchers. All these different parties bring to the situation their own various stances, actions, value judgments and positions, or a certain intention-oriented behavior (taido). One of the problems is that while there were some mutually cooperative elements in the intentions of the various parties, there were also sharply conflictual elements between the parties. The government and factories clearly had a closely-bound relationship, so much so that there were occasional doubts about corruption. On the other hand, the intention of the group of foreign researchers was subjectively to help by improving the situation, and they claimed in academic circles in their own countries that the main point of the research was to make a ‘contribution’, but they had no interest in the dynamics of the relationships between the various parties collected together in this issue. For the county Environmental Protection Bureau, who had helped to arrange the investigation by the foreign researchers’ group, the results, although presented in relation to specific cases, were a common Chinese problem, and it did not seem to matter that the results of the survey were being presented in academic circles abroad rather than in China. On the contrary, it meant that they could make a claim for funds for environmental protection from the higher government or the central government.

To summarize, there are cases in the academic world where the researcher’s aims will conflict with the aims of other researchers in the target country, or where there will be a conflict of intention with the policies and politics of national or regional authorities. In this case, even in the world of academic research, depending on the researcher’s position and the movement of political power, it may be difficult for the researcher to avoid restriction or sometimes even oppression.

‘Co-behaviorism’ is a research methodology which weaves together and constantly centers on the mutual interlinking effects of cooperation and conflict between the stances of various parties in situations like the above. In this process, the researcher’s own stance also needs to be included in the same way as the stances of the other parties. It is only then that the research results will be able to address the question of ‘social responsibility’ in a methodologically aware manner.

This perspective, ‘co-behaviorism’, can be applied not only in local issues such as the safety of nuclear power or the Fukuchiyama line railway disaster in Japan, but also in wider spheres such as
Japan-China relations, international economics, issues of international politics or issues such as cultural friction.