
总结分组答疑

高桥 感谢诸位进行了非常有意义的发言。我是爱知大学的高桥。刚才加加美教授也提到了一些，我想就市场经济原理与环境 and 农业方面提一些问题。一个就是，诸位都知道在9月份墨西哥的坎昆会议上世贸组织的农业谈判破裂了。如果大致上进行划分的话，可以说日本与欧盟、日本属于瑞士和瑞典的集团，另外是以巴西为首的21国再加上中国，还有美国的一派，会议上混乱的争论导致了没有解决任何问题，以破裂告终。如果在2005年1月以前达不成什么解决办法的话，原定的时间表（就有问题了），其中最大的问题就是农业问题。农业问题上（谈判）破裂了。上午环境问题中也提到了，比如定方教授提出生产高附加价值产品是否可以解决贫困问题的思路，但是高附加价值农业用一句话说是需要消耗大量能源和资源的。要是从这个话题说起的话，市场经济在农业里到底渗透到什么程度。邹教授是市场原理主义者，我基本上也赞成。陆丁先生也是市场原理主义者，他说的问题明快清晰，我也赞同。但是一旦牵扯到农业生产上问题就不是那么简单的了，为此，世贸组织才常常会在农业问题上止步不前。所以在这里我想问问诸位同仁，市场原理到底在多大程度上已经渗透进了中国的农业生产领域、需要通过什么形式将生产与经营结合才能推进市场原理。听所有同仁（的回答）可能时间不够，就请邹先生和时殷弘先生回答我的问题吧。

加加美 Chow先生，请。

Gregory C. Chow I am not sure I understand the question, but let me try to interpret it. You are asking me about the market principle. Now that term has to be interpreted. Let me try to interpret this. We all know about privatization in Chinese

agriculture from collective farming under the communes to allowing the farmers to farm their own land and make as much money as possible; that was a big driving force in increasing productivity in Chinese agriculture in the 80s. We all agree with that, right? So at least, at that time, if you call that the market principle, it worked. However, the increase in productivity in later years was not good as it used to be. So I think the Chinese government has been paying more attention to this. I think in the last 5 to 7 years, the Chinese government has put more emphasis and is trying to put more government investment to help the farmers. I do not want to talk too long. I think you have to believe in the market, but also I think there is a role for the government to intervene. Taiwan is an example. I think it is very illustrative. Everybody knows that Taiwan's economic development has been very successful. There was a commission for the countryside which helped introduce new technology to the farmers, told the farmers how to market, and gave more education to the farmers. So just summarize in one sentence, you let the farmers make as much money as they can, using their sources and motivation, but at the same time, the government should help the farmers improve technology, improve marketing skills etc. That seems to be the solution.

加加美 谢谢，接着请时殷弘先生。

时殷弘 在具体的细节层次上完全不懂这些问题。但是它在一定意义上也是一个中国对外关系问题吧，外交问题吧。我想可能做几点简要的，非常宽泛的，非常简要的这样一种观察。我想中国政府在会议上采取这样一种立场如果

从宏观层次上是很好理解的。一个就是，它最重要的就是，中国政府清醒的认识到这个关系到中国的非常实在的，非常重要的现实利益。比如说，大家可能如果了解的话，知道在中国加入 WTO 谈判的时候，国内其实有很大争论。其中一个争论就是，中国，实际上也是中央，中国政府在相当长时间内，对加入 WTO 还没有下定最后决心的原因之一，就是说，加入 WTO 以后，农业上的问题，“三农”问题，可能会变得更加困难。农产品的价格啊……。特别是这个现实意义，还不但仅仅是在经济意义上，农业意义层次上。它马上会想到如果农民收入碰到困难，社会稳定就会遭到影响。所以，中国在这方面的利益，在目前来看还是非常具体的。中央意识是非常强烈的。但另外一方面呢，也不完全是从这个来考虑。象这样一个场合，特别容易使中国作出类似这样决定。它几乎是比较自然的就显出一种阵势，就是中国比较多的同世界上的欠发达国家，发展中国家站在一起。那么这里有情感的因素，也有意识形态的因素。还有一种外交利益。有的时候中国为什么，譬如说在中东问题上，总是站在巴勒斯坦一边，比较多的谴责以色列。中国有许多具体外交利益。你譬如说，据一个例子，台湾问题。中国大陆要造成一种很不利于台独的这样一种局面。就是在外交上孤立台湾当局“拓展国际空间”，它就需要很多小国家，很多第三世界国家支持。国际之间，你不能光叫人家来支持我，我有些问题不站在你的方面。那么，另外还有，譬如说，美国去年没有提起啊，在日内瓦人权会议上，几乎先前每年美国和欧洲国家都提出谴责中国的决议。那个时候要投票的话，中国就需要很多票来否定这个决议。这只是举一个例子。就是中国在考虑问题的时候，特别是领导人，他全盘考虑。同欠发达国家，不管是出于利益，还是出于情感，还是出于意识形态，比较多的有的时候靠在一起。但是还有一点，我觉得，国际谈判总是，特别是

比较难的谈判，差距比较大。有利益差距，立场差距。国际谈判一般来说总是比较需要一个时间的。这个问题在坎昆了一次，但是我觉得要是一谈就能达成协议，倒是变成一个奇迹了，倒使我们奇怪了。也就是说，一时达不成协议的，完全不意味永久达不成协议。我想关于农产品的这个问题的国际多边谈判，它本身就是一个讨价还价的过程，*bargaining process*。同时在这个过程当中呢，对中国人来讲，也可以说是一个 *constructivists process*，构建中国人对问题想法的，中国人对问题的想法，有的时候会变化。那么我觉得中国在改革开放以后多边谈判的历史，很多历史都证明了这一点。我完全不认为坎昆达不成协议，就永久达不成协议。仍然有达成协议的很大的希望。

加加美 定方先生请。

定方 刚才（高桥）教授的提问中有一些会引起误会的内容，我想就此解释一下。高附加值农业并不需要那么多的能源，今后也会朝着节省原料的方向发展。比如，利用农产品作为原料生产高附加值的产品，没有必要生产很多，产出少受益高即可。举一个很有意思的例子，以稻草和麦秆为原料制作裙子和女性的服饰在巴黎服装展上大受欢迎，发明者和生产厂家每年都能赚取数以亿计的收入。还有一件我想说明的事是，我所说的附加值农业是指用农产品作为原料的工业。因此我想特别指出的是，我认为仅靠农业是不可能富裕的，应该在农村引进具有附加价值的产业。但是附加值农业到底是什么呢？就是具有附加价值的农业、就是说在农村的工业。像我说的，我以前就一直想有必要引进以农产品为原料的工业，比如说日本的农村，以前和中国的农村一样非常贫瘠，但现在变得富裕了，其最大的理由我认为就在于农村引进了企业或者工业。诸位也知道在中国的乡镇企业，我想这可能也是政策的一环吧。但是乡镇企业造成了很严重的公害问题，就是说农村（的发展）带来了环境破坏。在这

个意义上我认为如果有了高附加价值工业那么对环境的冲击就会非常的小。可是这里有些条件，中国农村的能源供给体制几乎没有，只有生物能源的利用；还有一点就是交通基础设施也非常落后。但是我想能源（供给）的基本建设和交通的基本建设是两个非常重要的条件。
加加美 谢谢。

一般 昨天开始听了政治、经济、文化等方面的发言，我认为这次的研讨会非常成功。昨天开始直到今天我一直在想，我觉得大家在讨论的问题就是今后中国学应该在哪些课题上进行研究，从这个 COE 研究重点项目的角度考虑，谁也没有提到教育的问题。如果明年还有这样的研讨会的话可能（教育问题）会成为一个议题。但是在此，包括台上台下的同仁，如果我们要谈起今后的研究要包括什么课题时，进入 21 世纪了，当然是我们如何与下一代人进行沟通的问题。如同加加美教授反复强调过的那样，今后是 IT 时代，今天软件产业也开始逐渐摆脱了国境的束缚，目前的工业立国、工业立地论正在变得不适用、完全不适用了。考虑到这一点，可以想象日本的大学、中国的大学恐怕要从根子上产生动摇了，因此我想请问诸位教授，为了现代中国学的构筑你们认为需要什么样的教育体系呢？由于时间的关系，我想请邹教授和环境问题的刘昌明教授回答这个问题。另外想请问很了解日本的老师，在日本的大学里日本人研究中国问题时希望做些什么工作呢？

加加美 我想在稍后进行发言，首先请邹先生。
Gregory C. Chow There are two questions. One is about the study of China, I am not going to say anything about that; the second is about education in China. Now, I am so happy to have all the experts who live in Chinese mainland with us. Let me just say a couple of things, and see if they can correct me or not. The main thing in Chinese education to me in the last 25 years is the widespread increase and flourishing of private

education at all levels. The Chinese villagers, the farmers want to get their kids educated, and they spend money. There are high schools, there are colleges established privately. I think that is the driving force behind Chinese education. Now of course, the government, you asked about government policy, well, we believe in the market, we believe that the government should do something. The Chinese government does do something. You know, at the beginning of the reform, I think in 1978, almost 100 percent of education expenditure was by the government, but now, according to a study in 2002 by UNESCO, 42 percent of Chinese total expenditure was private. Now actually, some people say 42 percent is too low. That is my impression. I can talk for 2 hours on this, but I will stop here. And I think market has been working. This is part of Confucius' tradition, the Chinese want to have their own kids educated, they are willing to spend money and so I think this system will be working quite well. That is my understanding, so I am optimistic. Some American scholars criticize the Chinese education system. There is not enough money. If you just look at government expenditure over GDP it is only 2 some percent which is low as compared with 4 and half percent for other countries, but if you include all this private investment, it is actually quite high. Now, one more thing I want to say is that the education is more than schooling, family education is extremely important. I think the accumulation of human capital in China depends to a large extent on family educations. I think, by and large, family education in China is quite good. Thank you!

加加美 谢谢。刘教授有什么意见吗？那好，我简单地讲两句。作为 21 世纪 COE 研究项目之一的国际中国学研究中心的这个项目，不光

是进行研究工作，进行教学工作也是一个重要的方面。当然，本次国际学术研讨会于教育事业也是紧密相关的，实际上今后我们可能还要有求于这次参加研讨会的老师和学者，请求大家能帮助我们大学的博士课程的教学工作。像刘新先生和其他各位同仁强调的那样，随着现在 IT 的发展，我们的这个教学还有研究工作、我们的大学院的博士生教育想首次全面地引进利用卫星、电视卫星会议、利用卫星电视的会议、或者利用电脑的互联网进行的教学，通过 on-demand 方式用电脑进行的教学等教学形式，说得极端一点，要把不仅仅是中国的，还有全世界的老师都请到画面上来，通过多边、或者双向交流的方法，通过交流促进教学工作。在研究工作上，今后我们也会召开像这次一样邀请美国、英国的学者远道而来的国际学术研讨会，同时在我们开展研究工作时，还考虑使用我们称之为 RMCS，就是远程多边通信系统、既通过卫星电视和计算机的联网将全世界的中国研究学者组成“关系网”，在这个“关系网”中，努力去构筑新的中国学研究，并且在新中国学的构筑过程中，在世界范围内培养优秀的人才。就是说我们不仅仅是要把日本青年培养成优秀的人才，还要通过这个“关系网”将各方的青年、学生网罗到一起，进行教学。这其中自然就包含中国人，中国的学生了。还有，尽管不知道能不能够实现，比如说加利福尼亚大学的学生也能够加入这个项目，通过这个系统培养全世界的人才。确实这里面既有积极的一面也有消极和负面的成分。我们清醒地知道从多种意义上（这个项目）肯定会出现一些负面的东西，但是我们想这个时机已经趋向成熟了，就是说技术革新正在飞速发展着，如果根据邹教授的说法，尽管市场不是万能的，但是应该将市场原理的积极因素作为普遍标准予以推广，我们的教学也要（和这种趋势）结合起来。这就是我现在考虑的关于 COE 教育事业的一个方面。我就先说这些，下面请时殷弘教

授。

时殷宏 我想教育的问题非常重要，我用四句话（来回答），非常短。从一个非专业，我不是搞教育学的，但是作为住在中国的中国公民，我自己也有儿子，也有学生，我自己也上过小学中学大学研究生等等。从个人体验来谈一谈我的观察。第一，中国在学校里的教育，小学中学大学，就是所谓狭义的教育。近年来从量上从规模上，有巨大的扩展。这是一个非常好的事情。但是，从质上来说，特别是在大学，特别是在研究生院，我想虽然有进步，但是离国际先进水平的差距，总体来说非常大。第二，中国还有教育，就是周先生说的在家里的教育。但是我的图景不太乐观。家里的教育完全是高考导向的。完全是为了考大学。孩子负担过重。我想很多孩子进入大学以后，他的元气都在中学耗光了。其中一部分在家里辅导。所以，在家里的教育，特别是对年轻人，小孩，其实我觉得是中国目前很大的缺陷。第三，有一个东西非常好，特别是我们跟十年以前相比，五年以前相比，中国出现了非常多的在职教育，短训班。从省委书记，部长，一直到下面训练厨师，这样对中国，我想这样的一种技术训练，当然也有政策，非常非常重要。还有一点，最后，这是我非常遗憾的，也是中国几乎正是同感的就是公民教育。就是对所有人的包括对学生，学校以外的，对年轻人的，对小孩的，也包括对年纪大的。公民教育，教育基本的道德，教育对基本的伦理。也许我们这些年来改革开放以来，过去就是不讲伦理，只要政治，改革开放以来，只要生产力，只要技术。这个东西我觉得所有人都痛感中国今后除了环境治理之外，如果现在不抓紧公民教育的话，会有非常巨大的道德问题。

加加美 下面请台下的同仁。对不起，先请陆丁教授。

Lu Ding Thank you. In the past 2 days, I have learned a lot from panelists and from this

conference, especially from professor Chow, so I'd like to take this last opportunity to learn from professor Chow about the environmental problem. Just now you said the environmental problem is actually no problem. Oh, OK, it is a secondary problem compared to economic growth. Economic growth actually is about everything, I know, it is just like Deng Xiaoping said, growth is the hard principle (硬道理). So, but this morning from Professor Sadakata, he presents the diagram, shows, you know, the relationship between the environment to cleanness and per capita GDP is not a kind of linear relationship, OK? In the process of economic growth, there is a certain stage at which industrialization may lead to deterioration of the environment. So look around the world, in the richest countries, the cities have the cleanest environment, and poorer countries are usually the dirtiest places, but there is a process to get from point A to point B. That is the reason why Professor Sadakata mentioned that we should find the tunnel route to that point B, OK? So Professor Chow is a high profile advisor to the Chinese government, I would like to learn from you how would you advise Chinese government about dealing with environment problems, should they put all their resources into economic growth, just regarding the environmental problem as temporary, to be dealt with afterwards.

加加美 现在订正一个错误。隧道路径是定方先生提到的, 不是榷根教授提起的, 订正一下。好, 接着请。

Gregory C. Chow First of all, I agree with you on the fact that often when a country starts to industrialize, then the environment gets worse before it gets better. I agree with that. You know, I went to Taiwan in the 60s, when it first developed, and they had built the factories that smoked all

over the place, OK? Finally, they got richer and they cleaned up the thing. I agree with you on that. Now, is that fact bad? Not necessarily, because it was the choice of the Taiwanese people. They were so eager to get rich when they were very poor. They'd rather be rich, and they'd rather breathe in some bad air. It is their choice. So who are we to tell them that they should not have some smoke in the street, it was their choice. The air looked dirty, but they could clean it up in a few years. So give them the chance. My position is that if the Taiwanese people are willing to let the environment deteriorate a little bit than improve it, I am not going to say anything. It is their choice. So I think that Americans like to go to the poor countries and tell them the standard of workers' condition. You know, for example, the workers' standard in the U.S. is much higher than that of developing countries, but it is not right for Americans to criticize these people because they are poor. So in general, it is their choice to allow some bad air, I am not going to say anything.

Now, secondly, you asked me how to advise the Chinese government. Up to now, I have not been asked by the Chinese government to advise them on environmental policy, if they asked me, I would find some way to do it, because before you advise the government, first of all, you have to study. I have not studied Chinese environment problems sufficiently, and I never give advice without careful study, so I can not answer this. However, if they ask me, if I have time, I think I will find a way because there are a lot of economic tools for analysis; I would consult with experts from the technology side, and I know some of the economic analysis already. There are ways to do it, and I can give you a lot of references, but I do not want to apply it to Chinese case at the moment

without very careful study of the Chinese situation.

加加美 刘新教授。

刘新 我是刘新，从加利福尼亚来。坐在底下听，我就感觉好像中央政治局在北戴河开会。基本上没有触及到真正要解决的方法论的问题。就是办中国研究现在怎么办。这个方法论，根本没有碰到。只有里查德·巴姆老师提出了两个方法论方面有关的问题，在一开始他非常雄辩的总结里。但是他这两个问题实际上我觉得都是有很大毛病的。都是提供了一个不是很正确的方向。从我的角度来讲。第二个问题，我觉得很直接的，大家记得，他讲了很多我们要做政策研究，中国学的话。我们谈的是不都是政策研究吗？我觉得政策研究不是太少，而是太多了。没有一个人刚才我讲的东西不是跟政策研究有关的。那么第二个呢，就是他实际上讲了很多的要交叉学科，要跨越传统的学术边界来搞中国研究。也许和我念书的过程的关系，这个问题，我觉得不是一个最紧迫的问题。因为这个说法是在西方的社会科学里面是非常流行的。但是这个东西实际上想做的是还是要检验我们自己的学术领域的边界怎么样能够跨越。但是我觉得我们现在面临的核心是实际上有一点是刚才萧老师说话的时候提到的一个问题就是中国现在实际上是一个四不像。所以光要去解决这个交叉学科或跨越边界的问题，它解决的问题是我们应该怎么做的问题。但是现在我们面临的最大的中国问题是中国是什么。就这么一个基本的问题。现在我们能提出来的答案呢，都是它不是这个不是那个，谁能够提出一个最简单的中国到底是什么。在共产里的废墟上在长出来的到底是一个什么东西。如果要做未来中国学研究的，我觉得这个问题要先解决掉。

周长城 我是武汉大学的周长城，因为第一天没有足够的时间，我们讨论这个问题，所以今天我想借这个机会要把我要说的话简单说一下。

刚才听了刘新教授的，我也有同感，我也正想表述这个问题。好像我们关于方法论的讨论都变成了关于中国问题的一个非常广泛的问题。教育没有谈，这个没有谈，三农问题没有谈，好多问题都没有谈。所以我想我们的根本问题还是要解决一个中国研究方法论的问题，中国研究向何处去的问题。那么从我的角度来看呢，我首先要站在爱知大学的角度来看。他们为什么要研究中国问题。就是我上次谈到的研究的动机是什么。我相信爱知大学或者投入 COE 研究的更重要的他关心，研究中国的问题我相信他一定有他的目的。或一定的重点，除了一方面养活我们这邦人之外，可能还会有其他的事情。用我的观点来看，可能需要两国的人们相互的和平共处。或者说让生活在我们出的一片爱心让世界上的所有人都能够提高生活质量，让我们生活得更好。这样理解就是个很根本的问题。我想，我们现在的研究，就是我上次谈的，在这个全球化的事业下面，研究中国问题，或者进行国别研究，我觉得这个全球化的影响非常之大。我们要研究中国的年轻的一代，我的研究要想有前瞻性战略性意义的话，我想我们更要关注未来的一代和我们下一代他们是什么思想，他们是什么状况。我们在不同的代之间的鸿沟是比较大的，他们对日本的想法或对世界的看法。我相信比方周教授这一代包括我这代或者我的儿子这代，我相信我们的看法肯定有很多不同的视野。比方说就是西安出的这个事情。那么肯定对现在的年青人他们可能开始没有想到这是日本人在做这个事情。可能美国人做这个事情英国人做这个事情在年轻里可能都是一样的。可能受某些舆论的导向或者我们上一辈或者某种年龄的特定的情感因素的人，他一谈到这个问题就会自然而然的从众，觉得怎么是日本人在干这个事，好像觉得不可理喻。我想说的就是我们中国学的研究更多的是要关注中国的社会结构，或者在全球的视野下面中国不同的社会结构不同的社会阶层

不同的生长代，他们对世界的看法。比方像我的十几岁的儿子，他们对日本的了解往往完全不像我们这一辈的了解。可我的理解和我的父母又完全不一样。所以他们了解的日本，就是日本的动画片，机器猫，彩虹乐队等等。所以我有一个观点，当然也许是太偏激了，将来的年轻的一代的价值观会有趋同的趋势，在年轻的一代。这是在因特网国际化的影响非常大。那么如果我们再对中国学的研究在这样一个视野下去研究的话，我们要站在很高的角度可能就要关注这样一个问题，那么也就是关注不同的人群，或未来的新生代的他们的想法。在我们的背景下面来研讨中国问题。用我们中国话来讲叫与时俱进。这是我的观点，谢谢。

加加美 还想做一些评论，但还是先请台下踊跃发言吧，台下优先，请。

一般 我是北海道大学的家田，进行斯拉夫亚欧大陆研究，现代中国学的构筑这个题目，最初在加加美教授的问题意识中也提到了，就是我们作为日本人研究中国学，如何尽到我们的责任。我想最后进行发言的同仁非常强调这一点。就是说不是中国学的构筑，而是（研究）被赋予“现代中国学”这个名字的背景、以及在构筑它的时候我们要超越“自我”的意识和“他人”的意识，这可能是加加美教授所要表达的。就是说日本的研究者和中国的研究者能够在一个平台上进行中国研究，换句话说中国人、中国的日本研究者在进行日本研究的时候也要实现同样的超越吧。就是说这里讲的现代中国学的构筑是要被作为一个综合性的问题予以关注的。如果是这样，那么难道不应该是停止现代中国学的构筑，而是从中国学中解构出来，创立可以称之为东亚学的学说吗？现代中国学接着不会提出这样的课题吗？对于这一点我的印象很深。正如最后一位发言者所说的，现在的孩子们的认识难道不是已经朝着这个方向变化了吗？因此我（通过这次研讨会）感觉到了一些新的气息，就是现代中国学的构筑实

际上就是现代中国学的解构、就是要去掉中国学的框框，不知大家怎样认为？

加加美 正如您所说的。这里并不是要对中国学、现代中国学这样相对狭义的课题进行最后的整理，而是要超越它，至少扩展到发展中国家的整体研究中。尽管还没有和我的同僚商量也没有取得共识，但是我个人是很希望如此的。因此我很希望能有一些影响力。还有一点，和自我印象与对他人的印象有很大关系，这实际上和互联网的发展也密切相关。比如，当中国的青年在网上大力进行反日议论的时候，可以说当然他们实际上是造出了一个和日本人对日本人的印象不同的、中国青年的对日本的印象。反过来说也是一样的，日本的青年，说是我们日本人也可以，我们对中国的印象和中国人自己对中国的印象之间的差距决不会随着互联网的发展而被简单弥合的，相反还存在矛盾激化的危险，矛盾更加激化了。与其这样，还不如由政府控制着从上到下（告诉国民）说“中国是这样的国家”，如果遇到一位好的决策者。一个漫不经心的执政者当然会出问题，一个认真的决策者的话，这样的方式可能会更好。但是，现在已经无法期待这样的事情了，就算是有一两位有良知的外交官，现在也已不是靠他们就能轻易地在很大程度上改变日本人对中国的印象的时代了。所以教育的问题才会变得非常重要。尽管已经反复强调了好多次，这不仅仅是中国一家的问题。好，接下来请 Madsen 教授。

Richard Madsen I am just going to give a comment on the question of the methodology issue. And maybe I could introduce it by quoting from a letter that I got from Professor John Fairbank, who was one of my teachers, and who is one of the greatest sinologists in America, really a founder of modern sinology in the United States. When he was 80 years old, he wrote one of his last books, and he sent me a copy of the book, since I contributed to one of his projects, and a letter. In

the letter, he said, we scholars try to understand China, and try to understand in a systematic way to predict the future, yet he had come to realize now he was 80, that history was full of unpredicted consequences, accidents, sometimes plain craziness. And it was probably impossible to predict at all, yet we have to try, he said. So I think one of the first lessons I got from that about methodology is that we have to be skeptical about linear projections of the Chinese future because there are too many parts, you know, different regions, different dynamics going on, that are in a kind of very uneasy balance right now. And I do not think that you can, you know, realistically assume that things are going ahead in a linear direction or even in a kind of direct progression. I, in my recent publication, use the word chaos theory to say that balance is very delicate. So I think what we have to do is to have healthy skepticism, and in our policies to be very flexible in a tentative way. Another reason for this instability and this need for tentativeness is that there are many things intellectuals of our generation do not notice.

And just one very brief example in China, because I also work on it, is religion. There are mammoth movements like the revival of Islam and groups like Falungong that no one would have anticipated. And the international connections go beyond the state, I think we do not have tools to really understand these things. It is difficult for us to stabilize the whole processes in a way we can predict for better or for worse. So I think the one thing we need is healthy skepticism. And the second is to increase our repertoire beyond even those represented here. I think for instance we need more experts on media studies, with experts on sociology and religion, experts on other

transnational flows.

Gregory C. Chow I'd like to make two remarks about methodology. I am just making these remarks to tell you what I have been doing, I am not advising you people. You have your way doing things; I am just reporting to you the way I do things.

Number 1, I heard some discussions about general approaches, big principles. In my own study of China, I do not think in those terms. In physical sciences, for example, you study a lot of cases, and then you come to generalization. Generalization comes after studies of concrete cases, this is known as the scientific method of induction. Now, I think in some way, to me, it is similar in the study of economics of China or anything, in my own experience. You find an interesting problem to study, including China, a certain aspect of China, and so you study it; you try your best, sociology, politics, economics, whatever you know and in combinations. So you make the study, and people appreciate this as a good piece of work. After so many of them, then your group, your research group, or I, myself, may come to some generalization, some lessons. Now I feel that I am entitled to make some generalization in my own studies, because I think I have studied many, many economic problems of China. I have a whole thick book, *China's Economic Transformation* behind me. You can look at it. And finally, I came to certain methodology conclusions, but only after 25 years' study. I did not come to cite principles first. You learn from experience first, so I am just telling you my own experience.

Richard Baum Let me say a little bit about methodology. I would agree with what Dick Madison just said, but I would also draw a

distinction. Not everything is unpredictable. The processes that we are witnessing in China today are not unpredictable. There are consequences that are unpredictable. We do not know where it is heading. We know what is happening, but we do not know where it is going. And I think that is the chaos theory; there is a kind of determinant physics. Chaos is not chaotic, it is ordered. There are principles underlying the chaos. There are tipping points that we do not understand, that exist in all phenomena, physical, natural, biological, the start of a market crash or a revolution and so on, and so forth. But you are right to be agnostic on the question of consequences and skeptical, but not on the processes. No. I do not agree with that.

I want to go back to the question that Kagami sensei raised earlier about this, and its pertinence to one of these predictable processes while we look at China and the U.S. What kind, what kind of, what sort of feedback mechanisms are we looking at in Chinese society? Apart from the market in allocating economic resources, there is economic supply and demand, but there are also a lot of other processes going on, information processes; even sub-political processes. So what is happening, and what needs to happen is the pluralization of interests, you know, in Chinese, it will be 利益的多元化, pluralization of interests. This has not been generated in China, it exists. We have pensioners, we have unemployed workers, we have 流动人口, migrants, a growing number of migrants. We have lots of different groups, religious groups, lots of NGOs, lots of social organizations and social activity. But what we do not have is this generation of pluralistic interests. Remember the other day, I mentioned that Zhao Ziyang had been promoting the ideas, somebody's idea of softening terrorism before he was moved

from power. One of the most important things, perhaps the important things he tried to do in 1987 was a reform proposal to acknowledge that different people and different groups of people have different interests, and they should be given avenues for expression. He said that pacifically. But that has never been repeated. There are still, if you read Hu Jintao's speeches, the same old tired references to the unified will, unified spirit. Society is made of a number of contesting of smaller units. And it is precisely in this, the Europeans called it the pivot in the midair in the mediate towers, that the social organizations stand between the naked individual and state. It is precisely in this space that, the politics of development take place. That is happening in China, it is happening when we sit here and talk about it. But what has not been happening? It is the recognition of the giddiness of the process; they are allowing the political space to religious organizations, to organizations of pensioners, to farmers who, you know, have been cheated out of their meager incomes. It is giddiness of the political space. That has not yet happened, but I think it will happen. But again, going back to what Professor Madison said, its consequences can not be predicted. It will happen, but its consequences can not be predicted. Thank you.

Gregory C. Chow Let me say something about prediction. My profession is econometrics, and there are certain things you can predict by econometrics, but in this audience, it is very hard for me to explain what in economics can be predicted by econometrics, and what can not be predicted. That is a pretty deep discussion. In fact, 2 years ago, I was asked by an academic group in Taiwan to give a keynote speech at an academicians' meeting, and my topic was *Are*

Economics Events Predictable. If anybody is interested, I will be happy to send you a print out of that. But I think all of you, even you are not econometricians, you probably have heard people know about some economics. Things are predictable. Not everything. The storm of the market is not predictable, not by econometrics, right? But there are certain things in econometrics, for example, in my case, let me just give one example. I did my dissertation on the demand for automobiles in the United States. I had an equation to predict automobile sales, and General Motors used it. I finished that in 1955. General Motors used it for a number of years, and the forecast was good. When I worked for IBM, I had an equation to predict computer sales. IBM used it, and the forecast was good. I can give you a number of examples of successful economic forecasts. But that is a complicated thing.

Now the second thing I want to say is in the study of history, there are certain unique events. Econometrics is somewhat regular, you know, automobile sales seem regular. But what happens? For example, after Deng Xiaoping started market economic reform, could we have predicted it that the reform would be successful? Let us say that is a historical event, you can not use econometrics. It is not repetitive data. I announced that I hated it in my book. I discuss China's economic transformation, and I have a chapter on the predictability of historically unique events. I mean the consequences, I mean whether it is successful or not successful is a consequence, and I try to discuss. It does not mean I know the answer, but at least I try to give an answer as to how you can predict the consequences of unique historical events. I give the conditions under which you can do it. I did not say every time you can do it. So I

want to spell out, the conditions under which you can predict unique historical events but this is a big subject. I'd better stop here.

加加美 只剩下一分钟时间了,这一分钟里就不进行提问了,如果有什么意见请提出来。一分钟,有两位同仁举手,我们请先举手的那位,对不起就是坐在后面的那位,请您在一分钟内发言。

一般 我谈一下个人感想,我觉得大家对于一些表象性的问题谈的很多,但对于方法论的问题谈的很少。所谓的中国学,我觉得我在前些日子在金观涛先生的中文大概也说过了,现在中国学实际上就是中餐和西餐的结合。我们摆上来一桌餐,发现,我有时需要用筷子有时需要用刀叉。筷子是什么,筷子就是中国真正的东西,原来的东西。刀叉就是外来的东西。外来的东西在这里边我们就发现,我们要认识中国是什么的时候实际上面对了两个困境,第一个 authenticity 的时候,我们要追究这个问题的时候,我们发现我们根本找不到它。为什么呢,所谓的中国学就是被它转化的一个过程。一直到今天为止都是这样的。但是在这个情况下我们就只能把中国学作为一个分析性的概念来使用而不是作为实体性的概念来使用。但作为一个分析性的概念来使用的时候又面临一个困境,把中国给解消掉了。中国变成什么都不是了。我们作为中国学者的立场上,我们要回到我们的本土意义上的中国学里面的时候我们发现,我们要找真正的 authenticity 的东西是根本找不到的。前一段时间我在北京发表了一个谬论,我说我们中国学研究现在已经进入了一个死胡同。80年代 Scott 提出了 *Discovering History in China*, 沟口雄三先生提出《方法论的中国》,现在中国学的研究已经面临一个什么样的问题呢。*Discovering History in American Chinese study* 变成这样一个很奇怪的产物。作为留日的中国学者或者是日本学者,他们是 *Discovering History in Japanese Chinese study*。变成这样一

个东西。所以我觉得应该回到原点上来。重新讨论什么 authenticity, 什么是一个概念性的分析框架。

加加美 时间到了。不说大家也明白, 就算再好的朋友, 对于中国人, 日本人就是外国人。美国人也是一样, 对中国人美国人还是外国人。就是说不仅是中国研究, 地区研究基本上就是外国研究, 方法论实际上并没有成熟, 这是因为每个国家、日本和美国都有各自的立足点。我们对各自的立足点如何进行扬弃、这可能有

点困难, 或者说我们能否稍许超越一些, 提出新的方法论呢? 实际上这已经作为问题被提出来了, 但是还没有深入地谈下去。剩下的话题还有很多, 但是我作为会议的主办者的一员, 我认为我及我的同事一同组织的这次研讨会是一个“野心勃勃”的研讨会, 这个“野心”是否取得了我们想要的成果呢? 我想自己也需要会后慢慢地再冷静地思考一下。感谢大家关心和参加我们的这次研讨会。现在最后的分组讨论就结束了。请主持人。