

■ 特別講演会 ■

政 冷 経 熱

——日中関係におけるナショナリズムの衝撃——



講 師

フィル・ディーンズ



質疑応答

司 会

山 本 一 巳

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●司会（山本一巳）— それでは特別講演会に移らせていただきます。愛知大学は、2006年3月に、イギリスのロンドン大学東洋アフリカ学院（SOAS）と学術交流協力協定を締結いたしました。それを記念して、SOASからフィル・ディーンズ（Phil Deans）さんをお招きしました。簡単にフィル・ディーンズさんの略歴をご紹介しますと思います。

現在、フィル・ディーンズさんは、ロンドン大学東洋アフリカ学院現代中国研究所所長兼上級講師であります。そして同時に、テンプル大学（米国）日本校の客員教授も務めています。また、ニューキャッスル大学（英国）で博士号を取得しています。

そして、1991年から1993年に文部省の外国人研究員として東京大学に滞在し、2005年から2006年にかけて日本学術振興会外国人研究員として上智大学に滞在しています。

主な研究分野は、日中、日台関係を中心とする東北アジア国際関係です。近年は、日中関係を取りまく両国の愛国心に関する研究プロジェクトに従事するほか、靖国神社をめぐる論争についてまとめた専門書の編纂にもあたっておられます。

主な著書としては、『東アジアのナショナリズムをめぐる靖国問題』、その他多くがあります。

それではフィル・ディーンズさんには、「政冷経熱～日中関係におけるナショナリズムの衝撃～」をテーマに講演いただきます。1時間ぐらい講演していただきまして、そのあとディスカッションにしたいと思います。それではフィル・ディーンズさん、よろしくお願いします。

◆特別講演◆

政冷経熱——日中関係におけるナショナリズムの衝撃——

フィル・ディーンズ

<ロンドン大学東洋アフリカ学院／テンプル大学>

Thank you very much for that kind introduction. I will begin with something personal which is more of a thank you, a thank you to Aichi Daigaku for inviting me and for all the hard work that I know that many of the organizers have put in to putting this conference together 【SLIDE 2】. I realize how difficult it is and a special thank you to the translators. It is an extremely difficult task they have, especially when they have to deal with a person such as myself, who does not provide their paper in advance.

I am going to be giving a very personal view of the relationship between China and Japan. I've spent almost my entire adult life looking at this issue, trying to understand it and trying to help it. But very much as a concerned outsider, as someone who is not Chinese or someone who is not Japanese. I sometimes feel uncomfortable about offering opinions, suggesting ways of changing the relationship. But I hope that as an outsider, I can come at this relationship without carrying historical baggage, in some sense concerned, but not overly involved. But I will make a prejudice of mine very clear at the

outset. I do not like nationalism. As a European, I am very conscious of the tragedy of nationalism in Europe over the last 150 years and of the great horrors and destructions that it wrought on Europe and European civilization. As a concerned outsider looking at the relationship between China and Japan, I worry. I worry about the role that nationalism is playing, about the way that it is exploited by politicians and by the way that it is mobilized by certain groups to pursue their own, often selfish, interests. And so, with that prejudice of mine made clear at the start, I will move on with my paper.

I am concerned with this common phrase you hear today about relations between China and Japan, the phrase economically hot/politically cold. There is a strong belief that interaction – especially economic exchange, leads to improved political and social relations 【SLIDE 3】. This belief is very deeply embedded in western liberal traditions. You can see it in economics, in Adam Smith. You can see it philosophically with Immanuel Kant and much of the Western tradition and Western social sciences take this as a given. You see it especially in theories of international relations. I won't cover international relations theory in detail but functionalism, the democratic peace hypothesis, many of the dominant approaches to understanding international relations are premised on the idea that more trade means better relations.

Here is a fairly classic statement of this view from the former American treasury secretary, John Snow referring directly to the relationship between China and Japan 【SLIDE 4】. I will not read the slide. Here he is clearly saying, “Politics is less important than economics, doing business will overcome political problems”. If that is the case, as so much Western theory suggests that it is, why is it that the political relationship between China and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years? I'll argue that nationalist narratives in China and in Japan present a direct challenge to the rational, liberal assumptions. And these nationalist narratives also challenge other approaches, such as the realist assumptions which suggest that countries pursue their self-interest in international society, and that the pursuit of self-interest is also rational.

On the issue of methodologies, I believe very much that to understand China, we need to understand its ideas and understand its ideologies. And that understanding ideas is as important as material issues, if we are trying to explain this relationship 【SLIDE 5】. It cannot be understood simply in terms of volume of trade or a series of historical facts.

So, to overview my paper, I will consider what the evidence is for economically hot and I suggest that actually the relationship is probably hotter than we realize 【SLIDE 6】. I'll look at the evidence for politically cold, what the causes of cold may be and I will do this in the context of two ideas I developed. One, a term I am developing called Japanese revisionist nationalism which I will explain, and its counterpoint, a Chinese reactionary nationalism. I do not believe there is only one form of nationalism present in China and Japan today. I think they have many forms, multiple forms. But these two are perhaps the most troubling and the most worrying, particularly in the context of this bilateral relationship.

One of the arguments I make for this change is because of the evolving nature of ideology in China, the move from social class to nation as the key explanatory variable has undermined the 1972 consensus in Sino-Japanese relations. And I will give three cases. I will talk about the Yasukuni Shrine, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and the Taiwan question. I will be presenting some ideas here which many people may find offensive. I certainly do find some of the opinions I will be showing you today upsetting, but I do so entirely for academic purposes.

Economically hot. We are all familiar, I think, with the expansion of the Chinese economy and its changing economic place in the world. This graph shows the significant increase in trade between Japan and the PRC **【SLIDE 7】**. And as a comparator, I have included in trade between Japan and Taiwan. I include Taiwan because it is a particularly important subset of Sino-Japanese relations and also because much of Japan's trade with Taiwan is connected now to its trade with the People's Republic.

Here we have bilateral trade showing that since the mid-1990s, the trade surplus has very much been in China's favor and that China enjoys quite a significant and healthy trade surplus with Japan **【SLIDE 8】**.

This graph is in fact market share **【SLIDE 9】**. And we can see how increases of China's share of the Japanese market have occurred over time. In 1994, around 10% of the Japanese market was taken by Chinese goods. In 2005, this had risen to over 20%. So it doubled in a little over a decade. And I have added in Taiwan as a contrast and you can see that this has remained fairly solid and fairly constant. Remember also, Japan is in a recession for much of this time, so the market in some senses contracted.

These charts show China's major trading partners at 10-year intervals **【SLIDE 10】**. So in 1990 Japan took just under one quarter of China's trade. But since 1990, this figure has been lower, down to around 15%. So Japan's absolute trading relationship with China has declined as a proportion since the 1980s.

If we contrast this with Japan's trading partners, we can see that China occupied a relatively small position, only 3% in 1980, and again, in 1990. By the year 2000, it had risen to 10%, and in 2004, was as high as 16% **【SLIDE 11】**. So while China's economic relationship with Japan as a proportion has remained constant, for Japan, China's significance has increased markedly. This, of course in turn raises issues of vulnerability, of dependence and of inter-dependence.

Another issue that receives considerable political attention is Japan's overseas development assistance to China. The sources here are JICA, and as we can see large amounts of money that increased steadily over time, you have the blip in 1990 following the Tiananmen student reform movement **【SLIDE 12】**. And it grows up until the early 2000s when, for political reasons, a decision is taken to bring aid to China to an end. And this money has been extremely important in key areas of the Chinese economy, and in particular with regard to issues such as pollution control and environmental regulation. So, I think I don't need to labor the argument that the relationship is economically hot.

But political cold, what evidence do we have? The key factor that's normally given is the cancellation of very high level contacts, especially under Prime Minister Koizumi **【SLIDE 13】** . We could also point to various government statements and pronouncements, the changing status of China in Japan's Defense White Paper, criticisms of Japan in Chinese government announcements. Also opinion formers, various forms of commentary that you get, especially in the popular media and the popular press.

We can look at opinion polls. Opinion polls are always problematic. I try not to rely on them but they do give us another form of measuring the coldness of the relationship. Media coverage and internet use. Is the Chinese media, the state-controlled media hostile to Japan? Is the Japanese media hostile to China? I remember a few years ago, the Japanese media was full of stories of a Chinese crime wave and a genuine sense of unease was clear. Internet use in China in particular is a fascinating way of considering how certain sectors of Chinese society view Japan. And, of course, the most prominent issue that we've seen are the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China that occurred in 2005 and on a smaller scale in 2004. None of these are very easily quantified. This is qualitative evidence. And as such it is problematic as much depends on the opinion of the observer.

Here, we have opinion polls showing how perceptions in Japan of China have changed since 1978 **【SLIDE 14】** . What causes this?

One argument that is put forward is that China is perceived now as an economic threat to Japan, that the Chinese economy will somehow lead to the hollowing out of Japan, will increase unemployment in Japan, and will cause significant problems **【SLIDE 15】** .

Another factor often suggested is that of military spending, cited by both sides. Here, we appear to have a classic problem from international relations of perception and misperception. The so-called security dilemma where both sides lack of trust leads to increased defense spending and this creates a vicious circle of deteriorating relations. And the area that I am most interested in, changing nationalist dynamics in the two countries. I argue that in the last 15 years, in Japan, you've seen the growing strength of a revisionist nationalism which has come to confront in China a popular reactionary nationalism. And I think these occur not so much at the elite level where you do have a degree of antagonism, but these are very much rooted in popular understandings, popular misperceptions, and popular or mass politics.

Here's a chart of military spending by country using figures from the CIA (who I assume we can trust on these things - their maps are very poor but their figures are useful) **【SLIDE 16】** . The United States clearly in a league of its own, followed by China. (I wonder why France is spending so much on its military.) Japan and the United Kingdom are in a similar bracket. But there are a lot of arguments over defense figures. No one can agree how much China is really spending on its defense.

As a percentage of GDP, the official figure is 1.4%, SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute suggest 1.8%; the American Department of Defense, 4.2%; and the CIA, 4.3% **【SLIDE 17】** . Partly this is because of different measures of

calculating these figures, partly it's because of a broad uncertainty or even distrust of the official figures. But as you can see, the Americans can't even agree on what their own defense spending is.

Here we have defense spending, as a chart **【SLIDE 18】**, the blue line at the top is Taiwanese defense spending as a percentage of GDP, declining from around 5% in the late 1980s to around 2.5% today. China's defense spending as a percentage of GDP has remained fairly steady, at around 2% to 2.5% and Japan of course is always the easiest to follow, remaining more or less on the 1% line.

But, of course, as a percentage of what? If we look at this in dollar terms, we have a huge variation in figures **【SLIDE 19】**. From just under 30 billion for the official figure to a Department of Defense estimate of over 90 billion. But again, look at the United States, the CIA has found \$100 million that the Department of Defense didn't know it had. This suggests huge problems in the way we measure military spending.

And here we have it in dollar terms over the same time period **【SLIDE 20】**. Japanese defense spending is still significantly higher than that of the People's Republic of China. But in dollar terms, defense spending in China is increasing significantly, especially since the mid 1990s. Defense spending in Taiwan – the yellow line – remains fairly constant. These figures are not discounted for inflation.

So to nationalism. In Japan since 1945 I suggest that a conservative nationalism has been the dominant form, and I call it conservative because it does not seek change. It broadly accepts the verdicts against Japan that were passed in 1945. Broadly, it supports the constitution or does not regard revising the constitution as a priority. There is support for the US-Japan alliance and for the security treaty, and there was a belief that Japan should maintain a low international profile. In particular, Japan should avoid military involvement. And this is the line that you usually would associate with Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and it's been the dominant position within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party since its formation in 1955. However, this is not the only strand of nationalism in Japan. There is a significant revisionist nationalism **【SLIDE 21】**.

Revisionism here is the term I use because they seek to change, to rewrite and to reconsider the facts and interpretations of Japan's imperial past and Japan's present. They also seek to revise the 1947 constitution.

They focus on what they regard as the many benefits that Japanese imperialism brought to Asia, in particular the end of Western imperialism. They reject the verdicts of the Tokyo war crimes trial and they reject the view that Japan was guilty of aggression before 1945. Some of the more extreme revisionists deny the importance or the significance or even the historical veracity of issues such as the Nanjing massacre, comfort women and many of the other atrocities that we associate with Japan's wars against China in the early 20th century **【SLIDE 22】**.

The revisionists call for Japan to play a much more significant international role. Some of them even call for an end to the US-Japan security relationship to allow Japan to

stand on its own. It is strongly anticommunist and invariably anti-Chinese. Revisionists have developed a special relationship with Taiwan and especially with those groups on Taiwan that support independence. Revisionist nationalism has always been present in post-war Japan. Kishi Nobusuke is a very clear example, it's been suggested that the current Prime Minister Abe is also associated with the revisionist position, but revisionism has usually been less influential than conservative nationalism. And in some ways, the most successful Japanese prime ministers (Sato, Nakasone and Koizumi) have been those who have been able to bridge both camps 【SLIDE 23】 .

There are also a significant and vocal section of Japanese commentators we can associate with this view. Those of you that ever read the *Sankei Shimbun* will be familiar from its editorials of variations of the revisionist position. But revisionism has grown more significant since the 1990s and it's grown more powerful. Partly, I think this is the result of the recession in Japan and the growth of political and economic uncertainty here. People are unsure the confidence of the 1980s has disappeared. People are concerned, they are worried, they are uncertain, and the worries of China's economic power, its political power has been turned into a fear of China, often by populist politicians and commentators. The Mayor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, is perhaps one of the most obvious examples of this trend.

This is how this period is viewed by the revisionists. This is a poster produced by the Japanese from the late 1930s and this is how they see Japan's imperial past 【SLIDE 24】. It is one of friendship and community of Japan helping China, helping Manchukuo to stand up and support. One of the most prominent revisionists is this man, Kobayashi Yoshinori. I wouldn't worry too much about – this is how Kobayashi draws himself in his cartoons. He's a very interesting writer. He's a very skilled cartoonist and he's extremely popular. His cartoons sell very large numbers and he developed a very right wing revisionist agenda.

And this is how we would draw himself 【SLIDE 25】 .

This is what he really looks like 【SLIDE 26】 .

As you can see, there is quite a contrast between his cartoon and himself. And I think this is what Kobayashi does to history. He beautifies it. He changes the historical record. He changes Japan's past to make it beautiful just as he changes his own appearance in his cartoons. I realized this is slightly cruel and unkind but he deserves it.

In this period as well, we've seen changing nationalist dynamics in China 【SLIDE 27】 . David Shambaugh has talked about the emergence of a defensive nationalism in China, one that seeks to protect Chinese borders. Zhao Suisheng talks about a pragmatic nationalism, a nationalism that the Chinese elite use in order to solve particular problems and in pursuit of a particular agenda. But both of the nationalisms identified here are elite nationalisms; the nationalisms associated with the communist party.

What we've also seen since 1989 - and 1989 may be the first emergence of this in communist China - is a popular *reactionary* nationalism. It's not controlled or directed by

the Chinese Communist Party. It presents a direct challenge to other countries, especially to Japan and the United States: we see this in the “*China that can say NO!*” phenomenon of the 1990s. It uses new and unusual methods of mobilization and activity. The Internet in particular is a very important vehicle for this new nationalism.

It is predominantly urban, it exists within the Chinese cities and the people engaged in it are predominantly well educated: college level education and above. Mao Zedong would have termed them intellectuals. And again, it's a product of uncertainty and insecurity. The reform and opening of China since 1978 has brought massive benefits to the overwhelming majority of Chinese people. But at the same time, it has destroyed many of the certainties and the confidence that people had. And people are looking for new things to believe in, and ways of understanding themselves.

Reactionary nationalism in China has changed the discourse of China from being a victim into a discourse of a China that must seek revenge, must seek to correct the wrongs of history. And interestingly within this, significant numbers of reactionary nationalists have studied in Japan and are familiar with Japan. There's a belief that travel opens the mind, sadly, it's not always the case. Chinese students who come to Japan and suffer discrimination, suffer racism, who are confronted with problems adjusting to life in Japan, return home with prejudices reinforced and not removed.

There's nothing new about nationalism in Communist China **【SLIDE 28】**. The communist party has always relied on nationalism and on anti-Japanese sentiment to generate and bolster its legitimacy. However, since 1989, nationalist dynamics have escaped from party control. And now they are significant to the extent that they even pose a potential threat to the communist party. The Communist Party fears anti-Japanese protests. There is, certainly in the western media, a rather simplistic view which suggests that anti-Japanese demonstrations are created by the communist party to serve its ends. I don't believe the evidence supports this. Sometimes the demonstrations are tolerated, but as in 1989, the communist party fears that these demonstrations may take on their own dynamic, that a protest against Japan could turn into a protest against the Foreign Ministry, which could turn into a protest against China's Japan policy. And increasingly, the communist party is losing autonomy. It's finding its ability to make and implement policy constrained by anti-Japanese feeling. And it's interesting that state controlled media in China often downplays public anti-Japanese protests and also avoids or downplays important issues which may lead to public anger. And you can see evidence of the Chinese government trying to diffuse the situation because of its concerns that demonstrations may run out of control.

One way of explaining this is with the changing role of class as an analytical framework in China. Before 1976, class-based analysis dominated official discourse on the war and on Japan **【SLIDE 29】**. The war was understood and interpreted in class terms. Anti-Japanese official sentiment at the official level was expressed as warnings over the revival of Japanese militarism. The war was caused because a clique – a militarist

group which seized power in Japan and led Japan astray. The ordinary Japanese worker was a comrade and therefore was not responsible for Japanese militarism. And this analysis is at the heart of the compromise reached between Mao and Zhou Enlai in 1972. It's not the Japanese people that are to blame. It's the small class of people and therefore we can establish a friendship with Japan on that basis.

However, after 1978, you have the massive transformations initiated by Deng Xiaoping **【SLIDE 30】**. Class, as a way of analyzing Chinese society, as a way of analyzing international relations begins to fade. Nationalism reappears both at an elite level amongst senior politicians, amongst academics, and at mass levels. And the discourse on Japan and the war is increasingly framed by reference to the nation. And this de-legitimizes the compromise of 1972. The space for class analysis collapses and is replaced by discourse on the nation and nationalism. And this means you can no longer blame the war on a small group of people. Rather than it being a small social class, it is the Japanese people who bear responsibility for the war.

I always enjoy posters **【SLIDE 31】**. Here's a classic statement of China's position from 1965. You can see on the bayonet of this soldier he has an American army helmet, a nationalist Chinese (Guomindang) flag and a Japanese flag. But the text is important. It's imperialism and reactionaries who were the paper tigers and who are to blame.

From 1971, it's the revival of militarism. It's a small group of people, Sato Eisaku in particular was the concern in 1971, who are going to lead Japan astray. It's not Japan itself, not the Japanese people, it's a particular subset or class **【SLIDE 32】**.

On the left, changing times, this poster is from 1983 encouraging farmers to come and invest in the special economic zones **【SLIDE 33】**. Look at the prominence given here to the Japanese flag along with other 'imperialists', the British, the Americans (maybe not the Swiss) inviting foreign capital and in particular the Japanese to come and help China to develop. On the right, this is an unofficial poster from 2003. See how the discourse has changed and the way in which Japan is presented has shifted over those 20 years.

A concrete example – the Shanghai World Financial Center will be the tallest building in the world, replacing the 101 Building in Taipei **【SLIDE 34】**. The original was design by the Mori Construction Company had the top of the building containing this large circular motif to help it cope with high winds. Furious protests on the Internet led to the change of the design to this prism. It was said if the sun shines through this hole on Shanghai, what does that say about Japan and Japanese imperialism. This debate is fascinating and I will come to a Taiwanese example later. Please remember this slide.

My cases: Yasukuni. The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has become one of the most controversial issues in the relationship. And here are a series of images: the shrine itself, the religious center, photographs of ordinary Japanese soldiers who died fighting against China and the West **【SLIDE 35】**. Protestors complaining about Prime Ministerial visits, far right extremists, celebrating Japan's imperial past, and most strangely of all, these cartoons produced by the Yasukuni authorities to invite you and say, "Welcome to

Yasukuni.” Clearly not a Japanese person here. This lady has blue hair, I have no idea where she is from. Yasukuni opens itself up to many interpretations, many readings; it is a very complex place.

This chart shows visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers **【SLIDE 36】**. Important dates, are 1959 when the Class B and C war criminals were interred; 1972, normalization of relations; and 1978, the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and the date when the Class A war criminals were enshrined. Research I have done recently in Tokyo has shown me that the war criminals were enshrined the day before the Treaty was signed. And it appears that this was done as part of a deal to get rid of opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party to the signing of the treaty.

Public opinion in Japan is unclear on this issue and every poll I read says something slightly different. People will support the visits. They will oppose the visit. I think really, everybody is in the “don’t know” category in Japan **【SLIDE 37】**.

Chinese government responses **【SLIDE 38】**. The protests began in 1985 following Prime Minister Nakasone’s visits. There were no protest regarding the 18 visits that took place between 1978 and 1984. There was no official level of complaint from the Chinese government over this. Why? The immediate causes were a strong concern over Nakasone. He had a nationalist agenda. He was increasing military spending and he was deepening Japan’s relationship with the US. There was concern over revisionism, in particular the textbook controversy of 1982.

There were also important conflicts taking place within China at the time over the correct policy towards Japan. Hu Yaobang was beginning to advocate a more mature, more developed relationship with Japan and was facing problems as a consequence. As I mentioned, the nationalist dynamics within China were changing. And Yasukuni has become a litmus test of any Japanese political leader. The Chinese side views a visit to Yasukuni as a statement of whether an individual takes China seriously or not. And it has become extremely important for those reasons.

As I have said, the CCP has always relied on anti-Japanese sentiment **【SLIDE 39】**. And since 1989, the nationalist dynamics having escaped party control and now pose a threat. There is fear of protests and constraints to policy and we see this to an extent in the demise of the new diplomacy initiative – a very brave initiative to try to improve the relationship with Japan undermined by popular antipathy in China, and a failure on the behalf of Japanese diplomats to seize a very important opportunity to develop the relationship.

I will go now to the – the Diaoyutai or Senkaku issue. I will use both terms. I do not know who the islands belong to. I think most people would be happier if they disappeared, to be quite honest. And I will explain that controversial argument to you. Here is a map, locating them, a Japanese map for balance, and a picture of the islands themselves **【SLIDE 40】**. We very rarely see what they look like.

China and Japan both have excellent claims to these islands **【SLIDE 41】**. But

both sides fail to respect the other's position and this is especially true I think of Japan, it refuses to even acknowledge that China may have any case at all over ownership of these islands. And if any resolution is to be made, both sides have to accept that there is some legitimacy in the other's position. Another thing I think is important is that the dispute is not about natural resources. It is not about oil. It is not about gas. It is not about fish. We tend to use the resource explanation because it is simple. Why would people argue so much about four small islands which have no value? So we look for natural resources to give meaning to the dispute. Sadly, the dispute is not rational. If it could be proved that tomorrow 100% that there is no oil on or near the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands, would the dispute disappear? No. The dispute would remain. The argument would remain, because it is not a rational argument. It is an argument about nationalism and about passion.

At the highest levels, governments since 1978 have tried to keep the ownership issue off the agenda. They have tried to downplay it. However, nationalist groups on both sides, whether far right groups like the Seinensha in Japan or various nationalist activists from Hong Kong have repeatedly taken provocative steps to ignite this dispute, because they are pursuing their own nationalist agendas at home. It is not the governments necessarily in conflict here, it is governments being entrapped by nationalist activists.

I love this slide **【SLIDE 42】** . I am often asked by students, whether I am in London or whether I am in Tokyo, can you explain why Taiwan matters so much to China? This slide explains the feeling of so many people in China better than any description I could give. It is breaking China's heart. Reunification will make China whole again. It will be an emotional, a personal, reunification. This is why Taiwan matters so much. And that is why I find this image incredibly useful.

Taiwan highlights both Japanese and American aspect of China's humiliation. Taiwan was a colony of Japan for 50 years. It was American intervention that prevented reunification in 1950, so it brings together key elements in the story of China's humiliation. For the Communist Party, reunification is a key to its legitimacy; it has promised reunification to the Chinese people repeatedly. It is not negotiable. Changing approaches in the Communist Party to reunification reflect variations in radical and conservative agendas in the party elite. The radicalism of 1957 in the Great Leap Forward iterates with a crisis in the Taiwan Straits. The rationality and pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping sees the emergence of a new agenda. The new reactionary nationalism in China could generate pressure to return to radicalism and to put more pressure on the Chinese government to seek a quick or military solution.

This was the view towards reunification in the 1950s and 60s **【SLIDE 43】** . Taiwan must be liberated. And we can see here the Kuomintang oppressing the ordinary Taiwanese and their desperate search for freedom. We must liberate Taiwan.

What a different picture we have in 1990, attempting to entice Taiwan and China

to come together [SLIDE 44] . The question of course is which ladies are Taiwanese and which ones are Chinese. My friends tell me that the Chinese ladies have more clothes on. I do not know if it is true. See how the rhetoric and the discourse changes because of economic rationality.

I will talk now briefly about Taiwan for Japanese nationalism and for Japanese revisionist nationalism [SLIDE 45] . For Japanese revisionists, Taiwan is evidence and Taiwan is proof that Japanese imperialism was welcomed. It proves that Japan bought benefits. It proves that Japan does not wage a war of aggression. It proves that Japan should assert leadership over Asia. And it proves that Taiwan is not a part of China. I do not accept this position.

But remember Shanghai. This is the Presidential Palace in Taipei built by the Japanese, completed in 1990 [SLIDE 46]. This building here is the Mitsukoshi Shin Kong department store completed in 1993. This was the tallest building in Taiwan up until a few years ago. The architectural features are identical. There were no complaints. There was no disagreement. There were no arguments. There was no discussion. It was completed. Japanese Imperialism in its earliest variant; Japanese economic imperialism (if you want) in the 1990s. Nobody minded, nobody complained.

Nobody represents the fears of Chinese nationalism or the aspirations of Japanese nationalism as much as Lee Teng-hui. When Lee Teng-hui left office, he wrote this book [SLIDE 47] . He wrote it in Japanese. He did not write it in Chinese. He published it in Japanese before he chose to publish it in Chinese or in English. What other Asian leader could you imagine dressing up in the clothes of his former imperial master in quite this way?

Lee provides support and ammunition for the revisionist nationalist in Japan [SLIDE 48] . “Until my early twenties, I thought I was Japanese.” “The KMT felt like an invading force, an alien force”, the KMT are invaders for Lee Deng Hui. “My heartfelt wish is to return to Japan”. “The Senkaku [I added Diaoyutai] Islands are Japanese territory.” I cannot think of more provocative statement. Well, I could not think of a more provocative statement, a more extreme way of creating anger in China than this, until of course he said, “I hope to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pray for my brother.” Lee Teng-hui’s brother Takamori Iwasato was a sailor in the Japanese Navy, killed in 1945 fighting for Japan against the United States. He is enshrined at Yasukuni. Lee Teng-hui wishes to go to Yasukuni to pray for his brother.

All of these comments are from interviews with Japanese correspondents and Lee Teng-hui spent a lot of time with Kobayashi Yoshinori, helping him write his controversial book on Taiwan.

Here are a few examples of pro-Japanese works by Taiwanese nationalists [SLIDE 49] [SLIDE 50] . I will not go into any details. But something you often found is this phrase here, *qingshen* or *seishin*. The idea of Japanese spirit that somehow the Japanese spirit is alive in the Taiwanese.

More controversial works. Another reference to Kobayashi Yoshinori here. Taiwan is often described as being like a peanut because of its shape. This is the Chinese version of Kobayashi's controversial book *'On Taiwan'* 【SLIDE 51】. If you were to cut open the Taiwanese peanut, what do you find inside? The Japanese flag; the Taiwanese people inside are inherently Japanese.

This is the cover of the Japanese version of the book 【SLIDE 52】. And what Kobayashi is doing is not talking to the Taiwanese and he is not talking necessarily to China. He is talking to the Japanese. "Who are the Japanese?" "What is the nation?" "The last page has an important message for Japanese people." And what Kobayashi is saying is we must rediscover our nationalist spirit. We must reinvent ourselves. We must learn from Taiwan because they have kept the true values of Japanese. So Kobayashi is using Taiwan, pro-Japanese feeling on Taiwan, as a way of trying to inspire Japanese nationalism.

I have this slide in Chinese and in Japanese, so I will leave both up 【SLIDE 53】. The man speaking is Shih Wen-long he was a Senior Presidential Advisor to President Chen Shui-bian. . He is addressing the comfort women or sex slave issues and he is saying there was not a sex slave issue. "When I heard about the comfort women I thought it was a lie, so I approached some of them and asked. They said there was no forced conscription. The reality was that, like poor parts of Japan such as Tohoku, poor girls 12-13 years old would be sold. Taiwan was the same. Furthermore, the Japanese military was famous for its protection of human rights. Aware of this being a comfort woman was a promotion, therefore many wanted to do this; there was no forced labour." Look how happy the women are.

Here is the same slide in Japanese 【SLIDE 54】. This view of the past, it is deeply offensive to most observers. But to revisionist nationalists in Japan, it is the evidence they need for their new agenda. It is the key support. For nationalist in China, this is the about as offensive a thing as you could possibly find.

On to my conclusions, we need to re-link politics and economics in Sino-Japanese relations 【SLIDE 55】. Ever since 1949, there has been an assumption in Sino-Japanese relations that politics and economics can be separated. This is the *seikei bunri* argument that somehow these two realms can work differently. Zhou Enlai formulated this principle and it became the rationale for the relationship between 1952 and 1972. It still remains the rationale for the relationship between Japan and Taiwan today.

Sadly, the two are not linked 【SLIDE 56】. The booming economic relationship has not yet led to an improved political relationship. The collapse of Marxism has undermined the 1972 system and reopened the question of Japanese war responsibility. The irrational narrative of nationalism is derailing and undermining the rational narratives of liberalism and realism.

To escape this and the dangers it threatens the Japanese government and the Japanese people need a serious debate about war responsibility 【SLIDE 57】. This is a

debate that has not taken place in Japan since the war. And the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have to accept this will undermine the 1972 consensus. That the consensus reached at the time of normalization is no longer sustainable. And at the same time, China must address its own historical legacies and the way that the war against Japan has been used in China to achieve political ends. The leadership on both side need to exercise statesmanship. They are ugly and vicious elements in Japan. There are ugly and vicious elements in China. If the political leadership in both countries appeal to those, the relationship will only deteriorate. And on that unfortunately, not very cheerful note, I would like to thank you all for listening to me and I welcome any questions or comments that you may have.



●**司会**— フィル・ディーンズさん、どうもありがとうございました。非常に多岐に渡って有益な話でした。それでは、このあと12時半まで質疑応答に入らせていただきたいと思います。発言する方は、所属と名前を言ってから発言をしていただきたいと思います。

それでは発言される方は挙手をお願いいたします。

●**楊棟梁**— 中国南开大学，杨栋梁。听了先生的报告，感到学习很多。我想问一个问题，先生在报告中谈到了中日两国的民族主义问题，我想问的问题是，当代的、现在的两国都存在极端的民族主义，这个没有问题，我想先生能不能谈一谈现在两国民族主义它的不同点主要在哪里。我所注意到的层面是民族主义它的阶层问题，就是说比如青年人、知识分子、政治家，在中国和日本有什么不同，这是里面的一点。还有一点就是，中国的民族主义和日本的这种极端的民族主义它们在国家的这种决定国家政治方向或者决策当中分别所发挥的作用如何？您怎么看？比如说中国的民族主义分子他们在国家中、国家政策中能有多大的发言权，对政府的决策能有多大的作用，那么日本又是怎样的？谢谢。

●**ディーンズ**— Thank you very much. It is a complex question and a complex set of issues. The differences are perhaps not that extreme between Chinese reactionary nationalism and Japanese revisionist nationalism. These are negative sentiments. It is the politics of opposition. It is the politics of criticizing the other, criticizing the outsider. In Japan, a key difference I think, is older generations are much more heavily involved in revisionist nationalism than is the case in China.

In China, reactionary nationalism tends to be predominantly a phenomenon you see amongst younger Chinese, the Chinese that have grown up enjoying the benefits of the reform era. And I think that is a key difference.

In Japan, the revisionists include those who remember the war, participated in the war up to young Japanese in their 20s. And I think that for the demographic is different. The second part of your question asked about influence on policy.

This is relatively easier to answer with regard to Japan. Japan has a democratic system and therefore politicians can appeal to these groups, seek support from these

groups, whether financial or of other kinds, and therefore can try to mobilize this as a way of getting support in electoral politics and in political competition.

Opinion formers can appeal to this as way of selling more newspapers, getting more people to watch TV programs. So in Japan, the relationship between nationalism and policy is much easier to understand.

China, of course, has a much less plural system and therefore the ability for people to directly influence policy is more limited. But we have seen it, for example, the Japanese attempts to win contracts to build high-speed railways in China generate massive popular protest, mainly on the Internet. The architecture I showed you - protests against certain types of design. We can see and identify areas where the Chinese government has had to restrict its policy or its preferred approach to Japan because of concerns that it will lead to protests and complaints at the mass level.

The communist party has considerable autonomy in China because of the nature of the political system but it does not have the autonomy that Mao enjoyed at his height.

He was able to say Mongolia is not part of China and Mongolia was no longer a part of China. He was able to say, we will have relations with Japan, and it happened.

Hu Jintao does not have that power and that authority and I think the changes in China are behind that and that's where nationalism comes in- it doesn't determine or control policy but it does influence it.

●司会— はい、それでは次に質問のある方、どうぞお願いいたします。

●榎根勇— 榎根と申します。私はI C C Sの環境グループの主査をしています。大変鋭いご指摘を、興味深く聴かせていただきました。質問とお願いがあります。

質問は、先ほど加々美さんがおっしゃいましたが、ウォッチャーとしての視点です。やはりフィル・ディーンズさんも鋭いことをおっしゃいますけれども、やはりウォッチャーとして政治の分野あるいは経済の分野からのコメントをなさったと思います。

私は環境を扱っています。環境というものは政治にも経済にも、さらには文化にもかかわっています。質問というのは、ディーンズさんがおっしゃったようなかたちで政治や経済の分野だけから物事を見るだけで日中間の問題が解決できるとお考えなのかどうかということです。

私は、環境の問題を考えるとときには、そこに文化や政治、さらには人間の意識の問題までも入れなければならないという提案を、本日の最後の発表でいたします。質問はそれに関連することですが、ぜひ最後まで残っていただいて、私の話に対するコメントをいただきたいと思います。

●ディーンズ— Thank you very much for the invitation. I'll do my best to attend. The organizers were very generous and gave me two hours. If I was to cover the environment, I would need maybe three or four hours. I don't think people want to sit and listen to me for three days. So, on the environmental question; I agree it's very important and significant. But I think the solutions to the environment, like its causes, lie in politics and they lie in economics.

In one particular area where we can see damage being done is in the reduction of Japanese aid to Japan, a significant portion of which has been dedicated to

environmentally friendly, environment related issues. And this is money that will not otherwise be spent on the environment in China

Japan has become one of the causes of environmental pollution in China because of its investment, because of its desire to move its dirty factories out of Japan, elsewhere. The Chinese and the Japanese leadership, businessmen need to accept their interdependence. The environment is fascinating because it denies the importance of political borders, it makes them irrelevant and meaningless. A dust cloud or pollution doesn't carry a passport. And therefore, I would agree with you, the environment is important. My time is so limited. Thank you.

●司会— それでは、次にご質問のある方、挙手をお願いいたします。

●ドリフター— I am Reinhard Drifte from the LSE. I have two questions; one is about the trade figure between Japan and China for 2004.

If I saw this correctly, then in 2004, the trade with America was still greater than that with China? But as far as I remember, 2004 was a big change. The share of trade with China is now bigger than that with United States, except if you of course only look at exports as a different issue.

The second thing is about tensions. I want to depict a strong and positive economic relationship as a bit more problematic. You see it as hot. But economic relations, of course, have also contributed to deteriorate the relationship, not only because the perception in Japan of China becoming economically bigger and more important, but also there are lot of problems in the economic area with intellectual property rights and so on. There are a lot of complaints on the Chinese side also as well as on the Japanese side. Just what do you think about that? Thank you.

●ディーンズ— First of all, on the trade figures. Trade statistics are collated and collected in so many different ways. I think if we use the Japanese trade figures, you would be correct. I was using American trade figures who count things slightly differently, the Chinese trade figures, rather like the defense spending figures, everybody seems to keep a slightly different set of accounts and they can be used in various ways.

The big shift I think has been the emergence of the EU since its expansion to become China's largest trading partner in terms of official figures. But that in turn doesn't take account of the proportion of Taiwanese and Hong Kong investment, which is really Japanese.

Yes, the economy creates all sorts of problems as well as a positive angle to the relationship – the trade imbalance, fears of piracy, ways of Japanese produces. Last night, I was watching NHK and a very concerned young woman was carrying a very large Daikon (大根) and saying, "It's only ¥100." How on earth can Japanese farmers compete with Chinese agricultural products? And so, those concerns are there in the economic relationship. It's not all good. At the same time, the biggest lobby for improved relations with China is the economic business groups, Keidanren and others who have been furious at Prime Minister Koizumi for the damage he's caused to their business interests in China.

And I'd agree it is a mixed picture. I just wanted to try say something good as I went through my presentation.

●**司会**— はい、次にご質問のある方。

●**李春利**— 愛知大学経済学部の李春利と申します。大変おもしろいプレゼンテーション、ありがとうございます。私は小林よしのりの台湾バージョンを持っています。学生に読んでもらったことがあります。非常におもしろかったですが、ただ大事なところはうまくごまかしてあるなと思いました。

それは別として、コメントが2つあります。この日中関係、とりわけ日本のナショナリズムを語る場合には、日本国内の政治勢力の変化を抜きにして語ることはできません。その部分に言及が少なかった点が気になります。

私の見解では、ベルリンの壁が崩壊したあとに、日本国内の革新勢力の後退という流れがあります。ただマルクス主義、あるいはマルクス経済学の後退だけではありません。いわゆる、比較的左寄りの、あるいは革新勢力と呼ばれた勢力が政治の問題の舞台から大きく後退したことがあります。それに対する考えはどうなのでしょう。

そして、もう一つは日本の選挙制度の変化です。1995年に小選挙区制が導入されました。小選挙区制が導入された場合には、1つの選挙区では一人しか当選できません。以前、中選挙区制では、ナンバー2、場合によってはナンバー3も当選することができました。したがって、政治の表の舞台では、社会の表の舞台では、少数派も発言する機会がありました。今は一人だけです。選挙に出る人もあまり大きな声で発言できませんし、ナンバー2も発言できなくなります。

小選挙区制になってから3回ほど選挙がおこなわれましたが、少数政党の声が小さくなったわけです。それがもう1つの日本国内の政治勢力の変化です。それが先ほど申し上げた革新勢力の後退と一緒に、私の見方では、いわゆる保守的な勢力の声が大きくなったのも事実です。その分だけ革新勢力の声が小さくなったわけです。これは私のコメントですが、フィル・ディーンズさんのお考えはいかがでしょう。

●**ディーンズ**— Thank you. On your first question, I agree. The collapse of the left in Japan in the 1990s is extremely important. Some people have criticized the Japanese Left for being ineffectual, for doing very little. But it played a very important role in that it ensured those who wanted to revise the constitution would never have enough power to do so. The Left in Japan played a very important role in supporting the 1947 Constitution and in ensuring that it remained in place and keeping its symbolic importance very high on the agenda. The collapse of the left in Japan means that they no longer powerful, no longer as able to block constitutional reform issues and that I think is why Prime Minister Abe is now in the position to try and push this agenda forward. So I agree that that issue is important. The changing election system, I agree with you, is a reduced diversity and other issues have contributed to this.

Prime Minister Koizumi has brought a level of discipline to the Liberal Democratic Party that he had never seen before, his assassination of his opponents over post office reform has set a new agenda perhaps that says, you must behave and obey party discipline. This is not uncommon in British or American politics, but it's very new in

Japan, and I think this will create challenges. But that alone, I think, does not explain the strength you see of the revisionists in the LDP today.

If you look at the Koizumi cabinets, after the first cabinet with Tanaka Makiko, they were dominated by pro-Taiwan figures, figures who had served in the pro-Taiwan lobby, the Nikka Kankei Giin kondakai 日華関係議員懇談会 or Nikkakon That phenomenon remains with us and I am not sure what the root causes of that are and I think they are about personal beliefs rather than simple electoral appeal.

●**司会**— はい、それでは次の方、挙手を願います。はい、どうぞ。

●**馮昭奎**— 愛知大学の客員教授の馮昭奎です。ディーンズ先生は中国のナショナリズム、すなわち REACTIONARY NATIONALISM についてお話されましたが、REACTIONARY の意味についてももう少し詳しく教えていただけないでしょうか。那么如果说，中国的是这个 REACTIONARY，那么日本的民族主义 NATIONALISM 就是 ACTIONISM，是不是可以这么说呢？

●**ディーンズ**— The term reactionary, I use it partly because when I studied Marx, reactionary was an insult and so partly I adopted it for rhetorical purposes. But also I believe it is reactionary because this nationalism is predominantly negative. It's about criticism, it's about what's wrong with other people, it's about why the Japanese are bad, why the Americans are bad.

It had a much smaller content of what is positive about China, what is good about China, what can we celebrate to that China. And that I think is why I call it reactionary, it is because it's full of bitterness, anger. It doesn't suggest anything positive, it doesn't look for a way forward beyond criticism and denunciation and that's why I've chose that. It is, in a significant part, a reaction to the growing nationalism in Japan.

We are in a vicious cycle at the moment of provocations between Japanese revisionists and Chinese reactionaries at the popular level. And occasionally, that rises up into higher levels of government. We saw it to an extent with Prime Minister Koizumi and his repeated visits to Yasukuni.

●**張玉林**— 我是中国南京大学的张玉林，我想请教一个问题。日本的大部分政治家，包括普遍的社会舆论和许多学者都认为，中国的对日民族主义，或者所谓的“反日感情”都是由中国共产党的反日宣传所煽动起来的，这种反日宣传的背后是一党专政或者说一党独裁导致的。他们的言外之意就是，如果中国的政治体制改革完成了以后，变成了一个民主的国家，那么这种反日感情可能就会不存在。我个人认为这是日本的对华认识方面一个很大的错误，如果这种观念还一直存在下去的话，可能很危险。我想请教您，不知道您怎么样看这个问题。谢谢！

●**ディーンズ**— Thank you. I think I broadly agree with what you have been saying. The Japanese bookshops are full of books talking about anti-Japanese education in China and media coverage, newspapers like Sankei repeatedly giving this story that the Chinese government is deliberately creating anti-Japanese feeling. To some extent, there is some truth to this. If you look at the patriotic education campaigns of the mid 1990s, and the approach that Jiang Zemin took to sustain the CCP, they did rely increasingly in nationalism. But this has, to an extent, faded. And what the government was doing was recognizing an existing sentiment in China and building upon it, not creating it afresh. I

think perhaps the Chinese government could do more to promote positive views of Japan. And I think that is an area which would help with reconciliation, more recognition of the benefits that Japan has brought since 1972.

On the question of democracy, when countries go through rapid economic and social change, it tends to increase extremism. If you look at the transitions in South Korea and Taiwan, both of these transitions have led to a significant growth in nationalism. If you look at the transformations of Japan, Italy and Germany in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th Century, this also led to a huge surge in nationalist sentiments.

There's a simplistic argument that somehow democracy solves everything, and as a transition will mean all the problems disappear. Unfortunately, rapid transformations often generate uncertainty and discontent.

The rise of new religions, popular cults, and especially the nation, to give people something to believe in, something to support and something to follow is one of the great dangers of modernization and transformation, one from which Europe suffered enormously. Transitions must happen slowly if they are to remain stable.

●ハーウィット— I am Eric Harwit, a Professor at the University of Hawaii. I agree with you that much of the anti-Japanese feeling is genuine for the young people in China. But do you think that some of it is also a reflection of frustration with their own Chinese government and that they are using the opportunity to protest against the Japanese in the streets and on the Internet, mainly because they have no other way to express their dissatisfaction with their own political regime?

●ディーンズ— Yes. I think there is an element within some strands of popular nationalism in China. Nationalism is the key vehicle of politics in China in the 20th Century. It is the main mechanism for expressing opinions. Nationalism is also legitimate in China. Democracy is not a legitimate thing to appeal for or to. But if you couch your protest in terms of nationalism, defending the nation, you are given a certainly leeway and freedom that would not otherwise exist.

The Student Reform Movement of 1989 was very much a nationalist patriotic movement. It was about how political change, reform, democracy, can make China stronger. And I think the two narratives are very much intertwined.

As with the case of course in Europe in the mid-19th Century, liberal nationalism was a vital dynamic in political change. And I think that's one of the positive elements that perhaps we can identify in China is that liberal nationalism may be progressive, may lead to a more progressive China.

The danger is of course nationalism tends to eat itself. It tends to feed upon its worse element and therefore we cannot simply embrace it, we must also watch for its dangers.

●司会— はい、それでは次の方。

●柳欣— 我是中国南开大学的柳欣，我想对您刚才的发言“政冷经热”这么分开来讨论提一点看法。据我所见，中国在70年代和80年代，可以说到96年之前，对日本的技术实际上具有很强

的依赖性，因为 70 年代 80 年代主要的在技术方面的书是从日本过来的。那么到 96 年之后这方面发生了很大的变化，日本在对华对中国的直接投资里面所占的比重和欧美相比一直是在下降的，那么中国的 GDP 的增长率经过这些年的高增长，实际上从 96 年可以作为一个分界点，发生了巨大的变化，到目前为止，无论从经济实力和在政治上国际上的地位，实际上都发生了一个变化，那么我的看法：在 96 年之前中国由于经济上的原因是有赖于日本的，在 96 年之后，中国开始了和日本的一个平等的竞争，那么在未来的比如说 5 年到 8 年之内中国的 GDP 总量可能会和日本相接近或者是超过日本，这个经济背景会不会和政治上的这个关系相联系？这样一个问题。

●**ディーンズ**— Thank you. Yes, 1995, 1996 are really critical years. That is when the key transformation happened. I think that's the point where the 1972 system breaks down. There's a table – European and American assumption that 1989 is the year that matters. The Berlin Wall comes down, the Cold War ends, that's the year of the great transformation. It isn't in East Asia – '95 and '96 are the years of the great transformation in Asian politics.

You've given some excellent examples in the economic area that I wasn't as familiar with in how the relationship changes. But this '95, '96 is also the Taiwan missile crisis, China's nuclear test, a whole series of issues in the political and economic realms which causes both the Japanese and the Chinese to reassess and reconsider their relationship, it is a critical turning point. And I agree that in many ways, China is now less dependent on Japan economically. But perhaps, it is just differently dependent. If you factor in the extent to which Taiwanese, Hong Kong and other investment into China is directly linked to Japanese capital, Japan still has an overwhelmingly strong and dominant position within China, far stronger than I think many people in Japan and many people in China realize. And the cost to both sides of a deterioration will be far, far stronger than even the headline figure suggest.

●**賈保華**— 我是中国对外经贸大学的教师，叫贾保华。刚才听了您的这个演讲，我觉得很受启发。还有前面老师的提问，我也觉得对当前中日关系都是很重要的。我有一种感觉，想听听您的意见，就是我觉得中国的民族主义和日本的民族主义有一点知识背景上的不同。中国的知识分子，就一般而言，好象对世界和日本的消息来源的渠道要更多一些，知道的事情好象比日本要多一些，我以前总觉得日本的大众传媒好象提供的东西很多，但是我后来觉得还是比较有限，比如在日本很难了解到第三世界国家的舆论，主要都是欧洲或者美国的观点。但是在中国有很多的报纸，比如《参考消息》，可以使中国知识分子能够更多地了解整个世界的舆论。所以在这个意义上我觉得如果说中国和日本都有民族主义的话，那么，似乎中国的民族主义的背景、角度要比日本更加广阔一些。所以我觉得这两个还是有所不同的。换句话说中国的对日看法不是单纯对它某一个行动或言论表示的一种反应，而是在全球意识下做出来的一种反应；而日本的民族主义视野似乎比较狭隘和有限。所以我觉得这可能会影响日本对中国的全面的、正确的和客观的理解。因为我不是专门研究中日政治问题的，所以我想听听您的意见。谢谢！

●**ディーンズ**— Thank you for your question. I would agree that media coverage of China in Japan is surprisingly limited, even the Asahi Shimbun, one of the Japan's more progressive newspaper, it seemed to be dazzled by Prime Minister Koizumi, and it seemed to be unable to present a coherent challenge to the policies he was pursuing. And I also

think it is interesting that in some ways, the media in China is more diverse than the media in Japan, given China's authoritarian system, and Japan's relatively plural one.

One of the issues I notice in Japan is that there are only two countries – there is China and there is America. And it is very rare that opinions from outside of those two centers are ever heard or discussed or engaged with – the European experience, the experience of the Middle East, of Africa, rarely enters into Japan's thinking and discussion of the China question. China, I agree, does have somewhat more diversity, albeit limited by a different set of restrictions than the Japanese have to tolerate.

●**田島英一**— 慶應義塾大学の田島と申します。今のお話は日本と中国の関係ということですが、日本と中国以外に、おそらく日中関係に影響を与えるであろうと思われるファクターがいくつかあります。その第一が米国です。おそらく、日中関係を純粋なバイラテラル (bilateral) 関係として考えることは、難しいと思います。米国が与える影響は、相当に大きなものがあるでしょう。

古い話をすれば、今の民族主義の問題にしても、その根底には、やはり戦後処理がしっかりとできていなかったということが禍根としてあります。戦後処理がしっかりとできなかった理由の1つは、米国が冷戦構造のなかで日本を西側陣営のほうへ引っ張り込んだということにあります。この過程で、極東軍事裁判における対中の戦争責任については、ある意味いい加減に済まされてしまった部分があるのだと思います。

つい最近でも、日米同盟の再構築が台湾問題にまで波及しています。周辺事態の解釈と対処をめぐる見解が、中国国内の民族主義に火をつけるわけです。結局、米国は中国をどうしたいのかという問題が、これから先の日中関係にも大きな影響を与えてくるのだらうと思います。

第二点は、オーバースーズ・チャイニーズの増加です。米国でも地方都市では、中国系の方が市長になるというケースがあり、華人社会が量質ともに厚みを増してきています。実は2005年の反日デモの時にも、最初に大きな対日抗議行動が起きたのは海外であって、中国ではありません。中国政府は一貫して、なるべくデモを押さえ込もうとしています。基本路線はやはり日中友好で、事を大きくしたいとは考えていないでしょう。それでも中国の国内に飛び火してしまった背景には、米国、あるいは東南アジアの社会で広がっていた抗議行動にあると思うのです。インターネットなどの影響もあって、それが最終的には、中国に飛び火してしまったわけです。

そうすると、これからの日中関係を考えるうえで、少なくとも米国と海外華人社会の動向には注意が必要だと思います。この2つのファクターについて、先生はどのようにお考えになっていらっしゃるのかというのが、私の質問です。

●**ディーンズ**— Thank you very much. You raised some very important points. I consciously avoided a discussion of the United States in my paper, partly because of reasons of time .

The United States and its Asia Policy is critical to the future of Sino-Japanese relations. America effectively vetoes a change of the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. It provides Taiwan with just enough support to prevent China from taking it over, but not enough support to allow Taiwan to become independent. That's at the heart of Nixon's Policy.

George W. Bush looked like he might be changing that, then he withdrew from it but American policy there is very cynical but very successful, very effective and one of the few areas where I can actually embrace American foreign policy. America is now trying to play a better role at mediating the relationship between China and Japan. A number of initiatives have come out of Washington recently to improve dialogue between the two sides because America realizes how much it will suffer if the relationship between its two most important Asian partners were to become even worse than it is at the moment. So America has a very strong interest in maintaining this relationship and improving it.

With regard to the overseas Chinese, it is a common aspect of Chinese nationalism that it exists overseas and then returns to the Mainland. We see this with Sun Yat-sen, we see this with Chinese nationalism in the early 20th Century.

We see this more recently with the Bao Diao – The Protect Diaoyutai Islands Movements in the 1970s. They became a key source of overseas Chinese nationalist activity, and we see this again up to the present day, very strong nationalist actions amongst overseas Chinese on that particular issue.

Exile nationalism has always been very strong. When you are separated from your mother country, you fantasize about what is good and what is bad about it. And therefore, you tend to become more extreme, more exaggerated in your opinions. More specifically for Japan and the role of the United States, the terrible dilemma of Taiwan's future is the thing that keeps policy makers awake. Should Taiwan push closer to independence? Where does Japan turn? Does it reject China? Does it say “no” to a nuclear armed hostile power on its border over the Taiwan question or does it say “no” to the United States and reject its strongest and most important post-war ally? It is a terrible dilemma for the Japanese government and that's why it's so important to prevent the Taiwan issue reaching that stage.

●鄒驥— 谢谢！我叫邹骥，是来自中国人民大学环境学院的。感谢您的演讲，本来我也要提关于美国影响的问题，前面这个同志提了，我就想提一个进一步的相关的问题，可能和分析中日关系的方法论有关。因为我们是做经济学，有时候习惯用博弈论（就是 Game Theory）来看待一些问题，我想在分析中日关系的时候可能这也是存在一个博弈的框架，这里面有很多博弈的当局者（player），这里面包括政治家，包括产业界的公司，也包括公众，包括媒体，有很多的当局者（player）。我的问题就是现在您谈的这个民族主义的极端民族主义的问题，我更觉得它象是一种现象，那么在这个后面，不同的当局者，或者叫不同的 player，他们都在发挥着不同的作用。我的问题就是产业界，无论是日本方面的还是中国方面的，他们对这样的民族主义的现象，或者说对两国的政治家们的影响，您是怎么评价的？谢谢！

●ディーンズ— I think – I used Game theory occasionally in my research. I recognize what a powerful and useful tool it can be for analyzing certain situations. I find that when I am confronted with these nationalist agendas, that irrationality can undermine some of the philosophical assumptions that operate within Game theory. But I agree when we look at industry and business concerns, we can see that they have tended to act very rationally with regard to the relationship. We can see the way that business groups

attempted to pressurize the Liberal Democratic Party, to pressurize Prime Minister Koizumi to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. But Koizumi's constant visits to Yasukuni demonstrate just how important emotion and personality are in the relationship. There was no obvious political gain for Koizumi to visit Yasukuni. It wasn't especially popular in public opinion, it clearly damaged Japan's diplomacy, it was opposed by most business groups, many newspapers, but still he visited. Why? On one level, he was fulfilling a promise he made, but politicians don't always keep their promises. But he was being stubborn. He was going because someone has said "No." And he was a very proud man who didn't care what the damage was because he didn't want anyone to tell him what to do.

It's very hard to model that kind of personal behavior because what were the benefits to anybody from Koizumi's visit to Japan? There was no electoral support, no economic support, no social support for that. He did it because he could and because he wanted to. That's why I find politics so fascinating and so unpredictable.

●司会— それでは時間の制約もありますので、これで最後の質問とさせていただきます。

●服部健治— 愛知大学の服部と申します。先生のお話を聴いて思うことは、日本のナショナリズムと中国のナショナリズムとも基本的には同根と言いますか、同じところから派生しているように感じます。ナショナリズムと言っても、ウルトラ・ナショナリズムです。日本の場合、今のウルトラ・ナショナリズムのひとつの特色は、過去の日本の強い時代、それを憧憬していくところに根源があります。そのひとつに台湾の植民地支配があり、台湾がそれを褒めるとうれしくなるのです。逆に中国は、過去に侵略され、非常に弱かった、あるいは屈辱を受けたと、これを晴らしたいというところに根源があります。それが近年の経済勃興のなかで晴らしていけるという感情を刺激していると思います。結局、日本も中国もともに過去のところから出発しているように思います。

今後、それを解消していくためには、未来に向かってどうするかだと思います。その場合に、昨今討議されています東アジア共同体などの話し合いのなかで日中双方のウルトラ・ナショナリズムを解消していく方策があるのかどうか、また、そのような未来志向のなかで互いのウルトラ・ナショナリズムが解消できるのかどうか、先生のお考えをお願いしたいと思います。

●ディーンズ— I often look at extreme nationalism and it almost appears to me to be like a form of mental illness, a refusal to accept one's own responsibility, a refusal to address issue in one's past, blaming somebody else, transferring all your problems, projecting all your problems – I am married a psychoanalyst so maybe this is why I take this view.

The relationship needs therapy. It needs to talk openly and honestly about its past. Both sides need to admit where they have been wrong, both sides need to accept that there is some validity in the position of the other side. Only when these steps were taken in Europe were the Europeans able to begin to move on and start to have a dialogue about the present and about the future. And I don't want to be an Orientalist and impose a European solution on Asia – it would not work. Asians must devise their own ways of talking and having a dialogue. But only by both sides approaching the past honestly, accepting shared responsibility, shared mistakes, and a common future can any progress be made.

●**司会**— 時間の制約がありますので、これで基調講演を終わらせていただきたいと思います。
非常に有益な講演と活発な質疑応答へのご参加どうもありがとうございました。