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Professor Kagami's paper offers an extraordinarily thoughtful critique of contemporary China area studies, particularly as practiced in Japan and the United States, and it presents us with an inspiring vision of how Area studies might be reformed and renewed in the 21st century. The paper is especially timely. Because of the rise of Chinese wealth and power, the structure of Asian economic and political relationships is being reconfigured. At the same time, both the hard power (effective military power and economic power) and soft power (global moral authority) of the United States has deteriorated, particularly because of the Iraq war. And all of this takes place in a context of intensifying globalization. To help find the way toward mutually beneficial and peaceful global interdependency, we will need new intellectual disciplines. Professor Kagami points us toward a new type of area studies.

There are two parts of his paper. The first, and by far the longest, is a critical account of the history of the development of Chinese Area Studies in Japan and the United States. The second is a vision of new way for doing China studies. This vision is derived from the implications of the historical critique, in light of a philosophy of intersubjectivity. I will briefly discuss these in turn.

I learned a great deal from Professor Kagami's account of the development of China studies in Japan, a subject about which I knew very little. I will limit my remarks here to a subject with which I am more familiar -- the development of China studies in the United States. As Prof. Kagami says, China studies in the USA was a product of the cold war. The programs, and eventually research centers, for China studies established at Harvard, Columbia, and the University of Washington in the late 1940s (eventually joined by other important centers at the University of Michigan, the University of California, etc.) were oriented to "state policy research," in the sense that their leaders wanted to help the US government construct more effective policies toward China. But, because they were located in universities, these centers had only an indirect and sometimes tension filled relationship with the government. Their initial funding came, not from the government, but from private foundations, such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. (The Ford foundation was particularly important in the development of China area studies.) The people who worked in these centers had to at least partially meet the standards of the university as a whole, which stressed basic research over applied research and nurtured an ideology of autonomy from political pressure (even as universities were becoming increasingly dependent on government funding). These tensions with the government reached a critical mass during the McCarthy era, when China scholars like John Fairbank came under attack for allegedly being pro-Communist.

I would slightly disagree with Prof. Kagami's characterization of Fairbank having "pro-Communist sympathies." Fairbank was one of my own teachers at Harvard, and as far as I could tell, he had no sympathies with Marxism-Leninism, dialectical materialism, or any part of Communist ideology. (Owen Lattimore was a different matter – but I believe that he was an exception among China scholars at that time.) Fairbank saw the Chinese

revolution as a part of Chinese nationalism. He thought that the Chinese communists had prevailed in the civil war because, at the time, they were better organized and in closer touch with the grassroots than an incompetent and corrupt KMT. The implications of this were, first, that the United States should not see Chinese communism as a part of a global Communist conspiracy and, second, that it should not rely on the KMT to "roll back" the Chinese communist regime. Such views did not support the more expansive notions of a global crusade against Communism that some proponents of the cold war wanted to wage. Joseph McCarthy and his followers wanted to destroy the influence of intellectuals who stood in the way of this expansive notion of the cold war and they slandered Fairbank and other such intellectuals. In the name of protecting academic freedom, Harvard helped defend senior faculty like Fairbank (but to their shame they did not come to the defense of junior faculty like Robert Bellah).

Thus, university-based research centers stood at least partially in opposition to state policies and they tried to provide an understanding of China that would be policy-relevant but objective. Research on China was carried on outside of university-based research centers of course, in institutions like the CIA and State Department, institutions oriented directly toward policy formation. During the McCarthy era, however, many of the China experts were purged from these institutions, leaving US policy toward Asia vulnerable to being driven more purely by ideological considerations. This contributed at least partially to the disastrous slide into the Vietnam war.

During the late 1960s, university China research centers became the sites of strong opposition to the Vietnam and strong opposition to US policy toward China. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars was founded by young Asia scholars at the convention of the Association for Asian Studies in 1968. Many of these young scholars were indeed "Communist sympathizers" who supported Mao Zedong's cultural revolution. (They engaged in strong debates with more senior scholars like John Fairbank over this issue.) Unfortunately, many of these self-proclaimed Maoist scholars actually knew little about China or Mao Zedong and some of them quickly became disillusioned and even swung to the right wing when they gained more knowledge. Other scholars of that generation, who were better grounded in their knowledge of the real world, strove to develop new, self-critical approaches to studying Asia. Paul Cohen, whom Prof. Kagami cites as an important critic of "orientalism" in China studies, was a good example of such a scholar. But he was by no means an outsider to China area studies. The support for his research came from the Harvard Fairbank Center for East Asian Reseach.

This account of the development of China area studies in the United States differs slightly from Prof. Kagami because it suggests that 1) university based area studies was not in a simple, direct way oriented to state policy research and 2) that it facilitated critiques of orientalism as well as support for orientalism.

What are the implications of this for Prof. Kagami's inspiring vision of a new paradigm of "co-behaviorism" in China studies? I agree with him that "orientalism" persists in the area studies that is based in China research centers at American universities. (I will not

talk here about the situation in Japan.) I would, however, have more confidence that critiques of such orientalism could arise from within such research centers. In the United States, at least, the strongest base of "orientalism" is not within area studies centers, but within the mainstream, specialized social science disciplines: economic, political science, sociology. Very often, these disciplines seek to develop universal theories that are in fact based particularisticly in American conditions. Area studies centers tend to support more interdisciplinary approaches with more of an orientation toward the languages and cultures of China. They also encourage forms of research based more on "practical reason" than "theoretical reason." This is more likely to foster genuine intersubjective encounters with China than research in mainstream social science. One sign that area studies centers could possibly harbor threats to the hegemonic ethnocentrism (orientalism) in American social science is that under present circumstances universities and funding agencies are no longer so willing to support such centers. Pushed out of the mainstream, they are a good place to begin swimming against the tide.